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Introduction
In spite of the proÜferation of quantitative methods within history since the
1950s, the first two-day program on quantification at the International Congress
of Historical Sciences only took place during the August 1985 meeting in
Stuttgart. Promisine beginnings fifteen years earlier at the Moscow Congress
languished until a Commission for the Application of Quantitative Methods
in History (INTERQUANT) was founded during the 1980 Conference in Bucha-
rest. Pulling together several initiatives of East European Historians (V. Liveanu),
the German QUANTUM group, and the quantitative methods committee of
the American Historical Association, this commission set out to initiate a multi¬
lateral international dialogue on quantitative methods. In subsequent Con¬
ferences at Washington (USA) in 1982 and at Bellagio (Italy) in 1984 a number
of leading quantifiers from Europe, the United States and the Third World
met in order to discuss common problems as well as to share Solutions 1).
This cross-national dialogue culminated in four sessions at the Stuttgart Con¬
gress, devoted to the impact of quantitative methods upon historical research,
social inequality in comparative perspective, the transition from agrarian to
industrial society and the implications of the microcomputer revolution.
Since the high quality of the presentations generated considerable interest,
the commission decided to make some of the best contributions available in
print. While some topical oral discussions were too informal to be reproduced
(the session on micros, organized by M. Thaller with papers by Robert McCaa
and Don K. Rowney) and one provocative piece was already committed else-
where 2), the papers coUected in this volume offer a broad cross-section of the
kind of work done by quantitative historians world-wide. Certainly accidents
of travel funds, visa permissions or personal health play a role in selecting who
actually participates in a scholarly meeting. But an International Congress of
Historical Sciences is sufficiently prestigious (taking place only every fifth
year) to attract some of the leading historians. Hence the following essays
represent selections from the first three sessions, ranging from Poland through
Scandinavia and Germany to France or the United States all the way to |apan.
The topical coverage includes Latin America as well. Without pretense to com-
pleteness, this anthology therefore offers glimpses of advanced quantitative
work in social as well as economic and political history. The contributions em-
1) Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., "Quantitative History in International Perspective,"
special issue of Social Science History 8 (1984): 123 ff. and the same with W. H. Schro-
eder, eds., 'The Transformation of European Society," special issues of Historical Social
Research, Nos. 33 and 34 (1985).
2) J. Morgan Kousser'sreconceptualizationof American political history in light of ratio¬
nal decision theory has been submitted to the American Historical Review.
ploy a variety of approaches and techniques which intentionally reflects the
diversity and vigor of quantitative work in different national settings 3).
Recent attacks on quantitative methods by partisans of anthropological
methods, by Western Marxists or proponents of Alltagsgeschichte render it
imperative to start with the current debate on quantification. Drawing on the ex¬
perience of a half-decade of international discourse, Konrad Jarausch tries to
distinguish national styles of quantification, thereby offering a brief Synopsis
of quantitative work world-wide 4). Instead of once again refuting groundless
charges, Charles Tilly takes a more profitable approach of reflecting on the
relationship between quantitative methods and the central questions of the
respective historical discipline. The following cluster of papers on social inequali¬
ty probes one central question of social history in comparative perspective in order
to exemplify both the essential necessity of quantitative analysis as well as its
hmitations if taken alone. Hartmut Kaelble provides a historiographical and
conceptual framework which is then applied in a variety of spatial (Sweden, Po-
land and the U.S.) as well as temporal (18th to 20th centuries) settings. The
final half of the volume centers more loosely on social, economic and politi¬
cal transitions to "modernity", if one is allowed to use that ambiguous term. It
is less homogeneous, since its purpose is to inciude the best current work sug-
gested by scholars themselves, thereby providing open access to the Congress.
Nonetheless, the session was quite successful since some of the papers are techni-
cally sophisticated (Schroeder/Best, Yamaguchi), while others address fresh
topics (Tulchin, Komlos) and others yet suggest a research agenda for quanti¬
fiers in countries where there has been Httle work so far (Dopico). Patrice
Bourdelais manages to draw them all together, somehow.
The preceding dialogue within the Comission (INTERQUANT) and the Stuttgart
discussions underline the importance and profitabihty of international Coopera¬
tion among quantifiers. Since national academic cultures differ considerably,
quantitative historians can take heart from the successes of their colleagues
eisewhere, if they are under fire at home. Moreover, on concrete questions of
methods, an exchange of ideas across frontiers sometimes yields surprising
new Solutions, since an obstacle which seems insurmountable in one context
may long have been scaled in another. While working conditions may differ and
cultural frames of reference may be distinct, innovative historians everywhere
are confronting similar challenges during the late 1980s: First, there is the
microcomputer revolution, which makes available not only word-processing
which is far superior to the typewriter, but also data-basing (outdating the
trusty card-file) and powerful Statistical tools (downsized mainframe packa-
3) For a complete listing of the Stuttgart program cf. Historical Social Research 33
(Spring 1985) ,pp. 120-141.
4) This piece originally appearedin Historical Methods 18 (1985): 13 -19.
ges such as SPSS, and now also SAS) 5). Second, there is the increasing ava-
lanche of mass data, be it still in word-form or in Statistical guise. Governments,
businesses and private institutions are producing more and more records such
as personnel files, budget figures and so on which are no longer amenable to
philological investigation, but cry out for formalized analysis 6), And finally
there are the core questions of the historical discipline, which have been ans-
wered many times and are yet provins somehow elusive. While many topics
(such as the causes of World War One) may well be beyond quantitative investi¬
gation, increasing numbers of other issues (involving the daily lives and
deaths of millions) definitely are amenable to formalized analysis ?). Quanti¬
tative history will retain its vigor and once again move forward, if it can meet
these challenges creatively. To facilitate such a relance quantitative, quantifiers
ought to intensify their Cooperation across frontiers.
Konrad H. Jarausch and Wilhelm H. Schroeder
5) This was the consensus of the microcomputer session at Stuttgart.
6) Konrad H. Jarausch, "Historische Auswertung von Massendaten," paper deli-
vered at the East German Academy of Sciences on February 5, 1986. Cf. also the same
with M. T h a 1 1 e r and G. A r m i n g e r, Quantitative Methoden in der Geschichts¬
wissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Forschung, Datenverarbeitung und Statistik (Darm¬
stadt, 1985).
7) See the special issues of the Journal of Interdiseiplinary History, edited by T. Rabb
and I. Rotberg on the "New Histories" (1981) and of Historical Methods, edited by P.
Smith on "History and Epistemology" (1984/5).

I.THE STATE OF THE DEBATE
(Inter)national Styles of Quantitative History
Konrad H. Jarausch *)
Quantitative historians are gradually becoming aware of the "international
dimension" of their enterprise. Much of the pioneering work in the apphcation
of quantitative methods was done in the United States and by American histo¬
rians, as A. Bogue recentiy recalled 1). But a series of bilateral Conferences bet¬
ween U. S. and Soviet historians or West German scholars 2), the translation
project of the Annales, as well as some multilateral meetings among leading
quantitative historians 3) indicate a slow rise in the awareness of and interest in
quantitative work in other countries. Some of this new concern is a matter of
tracing American influences beyond U. S. frontiers, especially among those for¬
eign colleagues who at one time or other participated in the North American
debate (through visiting lectures, guest professorships, and the like). But looking
at quantitative history beyond the American sphere reveals a double paradox:
while much of the hardware (IBM) and Software (SPSS, SAS) tends to be identi-
cal, their applications elsewhere differ considerably from U. S. patterns. More¬
over, related historical questions can and do lead to distinctive scholarly appro¬
aches and answers in other countries. Divergent historiographical traditions,
contrasting modes of disciplinary institutionalization, and separate cultural,
ideological, and political agendas can influence the content and apphcation of
a common historical method. Instead of one homogeneous, U. S. - inspired quan¬
titative history, there seem to be emerging a number of competing national
styles.
*) This paper is a revised version of an essay that first appeared in the special issues on
quantitative history and theory, edited by P. S m i t h, in: Historical Methods 18 (Winter
1985): 13-19.
1) A. G. Bogue, Clio and the Bitch Goddess: Quantification in American Political
History (Beverly Hills, 1983), 17ff, 51 ff, 137ff, and 203ff.
2)1. D. Kovalchenko and V. A. T i s h k o v, Quantitative Methods in Soviet
and American Historiography (Moscow, 1983) published in Russian;andJ. Clubb and
E, K. Scheuch (eds.), Historical Social Research: The Use of Historical and Process-
Produced Data (Stuttgart, 1980).
3) Konrad H. Jarausch (ed.), Quantitative History in International Perspective,
special issue of Social Science History 8 (1984): 123ff; together with W. H. Schroeder
(eds.), The Transformation of European Society, special issues of Historical Social Research,
Nos. 33 and 34 (1985).
In some ways the differences between national variants of quantification are
predictable. After all, the source materials available in diverse countries are quite
distinctive. Despite some high-level jet-setting, the structures and rewards of
national scholarly communities are still fairly separate. Moreover, intellectual
priorities among countries differ considerably even within the same language
area 4). In other ways the distinctions are somewhat surprising. Are not quanti¬
tative historians everywhere struggling with similar problems, such as funding
and recognition? Are they not divided within countries according to ideology
or methodology (degree of theory orientation)? Do they not face the same
technological challenges (microcomputers) regardless of their national locat¬
ion 5)? Certainly there are substantial commonalities in method and current
concerns. But the responses of quantitative historians also differ according to
nationality, thereby adding another layer of diversity to their temperamental,
methodological, or practical differences. Moreover, these nascent national
styles also complicate the international dialogue among quantifiers. While there
is much exchange on specific questions, it appears to be more difficult to har-
monize broader research designs across frontiers. Lifting discrete findings with
scant attention to their argumentative context can be intellectually hazardous.
The differences in national styles, therefore, have interpretive as well as practi¬
cal implications.
The oldest and most influential form of quantification outside the« United
States is the French Annales school. Founded by M. Bloch and L. Febvre in
1929 in a new Journal of that name, it attempted to break the dominance of
event-oriented pohtical history through concentration on "economic and social
history." This shift in subject matter and methodology was carried further by
F. Braudel and E. Labrousse in the revised Journal {Annales: Economies, socie-
teSy civilisations, 1946 ff) and continued by E. Le Roy Ladurie, F. Füret, and
others as nouvelle histoire during the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast to the
quickly turning political carousel of the Third and Fourth Republics, the An-
nalists were preoccupied with "structure and ... the long term. The very logic
of such an undertaking inevitably meant working with figures and statistics."
Nevertheless, J. Marczewski's attempt to promote economic modeling through
national income accounts as histoire quantitative lost out to a more broadly
based and less rigorous histoire serielle. Through a layering of multiple time
4) Val L o r w i n and J, M. P r i c e, The Dimensions of the Past: Materials,
Problems and Opportunities for Quantitative Work in History (New Haven, 1972) concen-
trates on different national materials rather than on distinctive national styles.
5) The last general surveys from an Anglo-American point of view are T. K. R a b b,
"The Development of Quantification in Historical Research," Journal of Interdiseiplinary
History 13 (1983): 591 - 601; and J. M. Kousser, "The Revivalism of Narrative: A
Response to Recent Criticisms of Quantitative History,'* Social Science History 8 (1984)
133ff,
series this statistically simple but documentarily complex serial history aimed at
recreating the total history of a Community. In countless theses French histo¬
rians explored the economic (price) and demographic (family reconstitution)
structure or conjoncture of a locality (town,departement), moving eventually
to society, material culture, and mentality {troisieme niveau)™).
In the 1960s, quantitative methods became the core of the Annales approach.
One of the leading protagonists, Le Roy Ladurie, could suggest with typical
hyperbole: "History that is not quantifiable cannot claim to be scientific."
Despite their objectivist air, the Annalists also shared an ideological outlook,
focused on "economism and the history of the masses." This progressive temper
could be described as a generalized, but nonorthodox Marxist influence, recogni-
zing "no enemies on the Left." Brilliant external (towards the social sciences)
and internal (towards traditional historians) strategies enabled the Annales
group to conquer the famous 6th section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etu-
des (now reconstituted as the Centre de Recherches Historiques in the EHESS),
and thereby to achieve a hegemonic position in French intellectual life. On the
50th anniversary of the journal's founding, Ladurie proclaimed that this domi-
nance "is also gaining in the international historical Community, whether in the
English language ... the Latin countries or Poland and Hungary 7)."
Though internal and external acclaim seems to have elevated the Annalists
above criticism, their hegemony is being challenged in the 1980s. As a perusal
of any French university bookstore reveals, much political, biographical, mili¬
tary, and intellectual history is still being written (and read) outside of the
paradigm of the Annales. Spectacular sales figures of La Mediterranee or Mont-
aillou notwithstanding, the very exclusion by the Annales of populär subjects
has guaranteed the survival of a vigorous traditional historiography (often un-
derestimated by foreigners). Moreover, there is with maturity a growing criti¬
cism from within the Annales camp. The fourth generation of scholars finds
fault with simplistic Statistical procedures and a lack of theory. The effort to
compile multiple series has often exhausted the energy of the researcher before
the more complex processes of hypothesis formation and testing begin. Some of
the former leaders themselves have grown tired of a surfeit of numbers and, like
Ladurie, have embraced anthropological, qualitative research strategies to ex¬
plore mentalities. The revival of the narrative, increasing skepticism of structu-
6) For an English language history of the Annales cf. G. G. I g g e r s, New Directions
in European Historiography, 2nd ed. (Middletown, Ct., 1983). Cf. also J. Marczewski
"Quantitative History," Journal of Contemporary History 3 (1968): 179 - 191; versus
F. Füret, "Quantitative History," Daedalus 100 (1971): 151 - 167.
7) E. L e Roy Ladurie, "Motionless History," Social Science History 1 (1977):
115 - 136; The Territory of the Historian (Chicago, 1979); and "Les mousquetaires de la
nouvelle histoire," Le Nouvel Observateur (1979): 58. Cf. also H. Coutau-Begarie,
Le Phenomene "Nouvelle Histoire": Strategie et Ideologie des nouveaux historiens (Paris
1983) for a French critique.
ral determinism, and impatience with the immobilism of long-range series among
more recent historians are beginning to undermine the intellectual hold of the
Annales group over the Controlling heights of French historical scholarship.
Raised on a generation of handbooks füll of demographic and economic tables,
history students are also rediscovering other, emphatic interests in the past.
These rumbhngs within and without do not presage the immediate collapse of
the Annales, but rather indicate that triumph engenders its own difficulties. For¬
eign quantitative historians should therefore look less enviously towards la douce
France, since the slowness of change in its peasant/smalltown/clerical structures
can rarely be duplicated outside. The Annales paradigm is, on balance, a highly
successful national style of quantitative history - but not its sole, unproblematic
incarnation 8).
In German-speaking countries, quantitative methods developed later and have
yet to reach the same level of public acceptance. Statistical work began in the
eighteenth Century, and the publication of govemment series as well as the
emergence of a school of historical economists made German scholars leaders
in this field at the turn of this Century. This tradition was cut off by the world
wars and the Third Reich. The hesitant restoration of descriptive industrial and
agrarian historical statistics in the 1950s needed powerful impulses from outside
in the 1960s in order to develop into full-blown quantitave history in the 1970s.
The change of general interest from diplomatic to social concerns (the develop¬
ment of a Gesellschaftsgeschichte) required new methods. The rehabilitation
of the neighboring social sciences with their empirical and behaviorist orien¬
tation contributed to the adoption of some of their working tools. The influ¬
ence of the French was less powerful in confronting their German colleagues
with the possibilities of this kind of research than were the American pioneers
of quantitative methods. Finally the availability of the technical resources in a
comparatively wealthy country facilitated access to Computing machinery. In
the mid-1970s a group of young historians and sociologists at the University
of Cologne founded in quick succession an Organization (QUANTUM), a Jour¬
nal (Historical Social Research), and a publication series (Historisch-Sozialwis-
senschaftliche Forschungen), which helped organize independent efforts into a
respectable and dynamic enterprise. After fairly rapid initial gains, this deve¬
lopment has recentiy slowed, since the overcrowding of the historical profession
has prevented the establishment of most quantifiers in chairs and frozen them on
lower levels of the hierarchy (as project assistants). At the same time the limi-
8) Coutau-Begarie, Le Phenomene "Nouvelle Histoire," pp. 317 - 320; and
P. Bourdelais, "French Quantitatitve History: Problems and Promises," Social Science
History 8 (1984): 179 - 192. For a shrewd appraisal of the Annales contribution cf. also
J. H e x t e r, "Fernand Braudel and the monde braudellien,
"
Journal of Modern History,
43(1972):483ff.
tation of overall funding has made support for innovative projects more dif¬
ficult 9).
Although it reaches only a minority of professional scholars, a peculiarly
German Version of quantitative history is also beginning to emerge. Due to the
separate institutionalization of chairs or institutes for economic and social his¬
tory, quantitative methods have spread most in these sectors. While there are
relatively few demographic projects, it appears that social history with a quanti¬
tative bent is further developed than in France. On the whole German quanti¬
fiers also have considerably more interest in political developments: given the
turbulent territorial and constitutional history of Central Europe since the Mid¬
dle Ages, it is harder to shut out the political dimension completely 10). German
quantitative history also tends to be more theoretically oriented, since the We-
berian influence still makes itself feit. Moreover the German notion of Histo¬
rische Sozialwissenschaft is less behaviorist than American historical social
science because the concept Wissenschaft means "systematic scholarship" rather
than hard "science". Quantitative methods are generally used within the con¬
text of Gesellschaftsgeschichte, sl broad conception of social history, which may
not dominate the methodological arena to the same degree as the Annahsts, but
which is institutionalized with the most interesting historical Journal of the
Federal Republic 11). Due to their late start, German quantifiers are often tech-
nically more sophisticated and open to international scholarly dialogue than
their French counterparts. One interesting contribution is the "databank-
oriented programming-system for historians, calied "CLIO", which has been de¬
veloped by Manfred Thaller 12). Despite their smaller institutional success (due
to the decentralization of academic structure), quantitative methods are pro¬
ducing innovative works in Germany. One indication of this vitality is the
opening ofa new Zentrum für historische Sozialforschung in Cologne in 1987.
9) K. H. Jarausch, "Promises and Problems of Quantitative Research in Central
European History," Central European History 11 (1978): 279 - 291; and H. Best,
"Quantifizierende Historische Sozialforschung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Ge¬
schichte in Köln 9 (1981): 121 - 157.
10) Exemplary surveys of the State of research are the annual volumes on Quantitative
historische Forschung 1977. Eine Dokumentation der QUANTUM-Erhebung (Stuttgart,
1977ff), Cf. also W. B i c k, P. Müller and H. R e i n k e, "Quantitative History
in Transition," Social Science Information 16 (1977): 694-714.
11) J. K o c k a, "Theories and Quantification in History," Social Science History 8
(1984): I69ff. Cf. also the essays by H. U. Wehler on Historische Sozialwissenschaft
und Geschichtsschreibung (Göttingen, 1980); and the Journal Geschichte und Gesellschaft
(1975ff).
12) M. T h a 1 1 e r, "Automation on Parnassus. CLIO - - A Databank Oriented System
for Historians", Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 15 (1980): 40 - 65;
and his historical Software column in the Journal Historical Social Research.
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In the Soviet Union and to some degree in other Eastern European countries,
a Marxist-Leninist approach to quantitative history has developed as well. Build¬
ing on a long Russian tradition of Statistical compilation in the cause of social
reform, Soviet historians in the early 1960s became interested in applying
mathematical and Statistical methods to historical research. Western scholars
were surprised to encounter sophisticated presentations by I. Kovalchenko and
J. Kahk at the 1970 International Congress of Historical Sciences (Moscow) and
at subsequent international meetings. Efforts at the Soviet Academy of Sciences,
Moscow State University, the Estonian Academy of Sciences, etc., are being
coordinated by a special committee within the Soviet National Committee of
Historians. Because the overwhelming majority of Russians lived in the country-
side and worked in agriculture until relatively recent times, the leading economic
history topic is agrarian development. Less econometric than in the U. S., Soviet
agricultural history tends to analyze the structure of the agricultural labor force,
the introduction of capitalism into the countryside, and so on. A second large
area of quantitative research in the Soviet Union deals with social history, such
as the structure of the Proletariat and its organizations or the composition of the
Tsarist bureaucracy. While the Statistical techniques are generally similar to Wes¬
tern procedures, they tend not to be documented as extensively, and modeling
is directed more towards synthesis than towards hypothesis testing. Close col-
laboration with mathematicians has produced high Standards in some areas (pat¬
tern recognition), although on the whole the thrust of quantification appears to
be more descriptive than analytical. Given the basic Marxist assumptions of
Soviet historiography, the ultimate aim cannot be to develop a general historical
theory of human behavior, but to fill in details within the existing ideological
canvas and to refine explanations of particular changes. A similar Marxist Version
of quantification is also emerging in East Germany, Poland, Romania and
other Eastern European countries 13).
Because of the interpenetration of the Anglo-American academic commu¬
nities, it is difficult to discern a separate British national style of quantitative
history. While there is much exchange across the Atlantic, a common language
of publication, etc., institutional career sequences are more distinctive than
commonly realized, and Journals as well as scholarly presses have different
centers of gravity. Perhaps one should, therefore, think of British quantitative
history as a variant of the Anglo-American pattern. Interest in quantitative
methods began in the 1950s and reached considerable levels of sophistication by
the 1970s, as the leading English-language text by R. Floud indicates. But the
13) D. K. R o w n e y (ed.), Soviet Quantitative History (Beverly Hills, 1984), especially
the introduction by the editor; J. Kahk, "Quantitative Historical Research in Estonia:
A Case Study in Soviet Historiography", Social Science History 8 (1984): 193 - 200;
Kovalchenko and T i s h k o v, Quantitative Methods, 5 - 22; and T. Kuczynski,
Wirtschaftsgeschichte und Mathematik (Berlin, 1985).
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distribution of subject matter differs between the U. S. and England. With the
Cambridge Group for Population Research, the British historians around E. A.
Wrigley, P. Schofield, or P. Laslett became internationally famous pioneers of
demographic history. Also in the independent chairs or departments of eco¬
nomic history, quantitative methods have spread quickly, even though a consi¬
derable segment of traditional work survived as well. But the leading quanti¬
tative efforts in political history were undertaken by American scholars (W. Ay¬
delotte), and the "new social historians" (especially of radical persuasion like
E. J. Hobsbawn or E. P. Thompson) remain skeptical of quantitative methods.
Hence in Britain, quantifiers appear to be a respected group in some fields, but
a distinctive minority in the profession. In the spring of 1986 Deian Hopkm
and Peter Dently held a successful Conference at the University of London which
resulted in the Organization of an "International Association for History and
Computing". Prospects look therefore promising that this new impetus will
become a focal point of quantitative efforts in the English speaking countries
of Europe 1^).
In the smaller Western European countries the Situation is similar, since their
academic communities are not large enough to produce an independent national
style. Oriented largely towards Anglo-American debates, some creative scholars
have been employing quantitative methods for two decades. The especially rieh
records of Scandinavia have allowed the creation of a massive social data base
for the last two centuries, which encourages advanced work on social mobihty,
literaey, and family reconstitution. Technical Standards are often quite high,
and there is much interest in scholarly Cooperation among economic and demo¬
graphic historians.
In the Third World the position of quantitative history is more precanous.
Precious Computer time is rarely available to historians, the audience for quanti¬
tative work is limited, cultural bias militates against it, and documentary as well
as sometimes political obstacles abound. Nonetheless;in Latin America an ac-
complished body of quantitative historical scholarship has crystallized in the last
decade. Methods as well as methodologies are imported as technological trans¬
fers either from the Annales school in France or the econometricians in the U. S.
Latin American historians have made impressive gains in the collection of his¬
torical statistics, as John Coatsworth shows in his paper, "Cliometrics and Mexi-
can History," and they are beginning to make distinctive interpretive contribu¬
tions as well. But in other Third World countries (and in some ways even in
Japan), quantitative historians still seem to be struggling as individuals or isolat-
14) R F 1 o u d, An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Historians (London,
1973, 2nd ed., 1979). I have found no separate treatment of quantitative history in Britain
For the general context cf. the essay by K. B a k e r in Iggers, New Directions, and E J
Hobsbawm, "From Social History to the History of Society," Daedalus 100 (1971)
20 - 45. See also the "History and Computing" programm, March 21 - 23, 1986.
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ed groups. The gap between enormous opportunities and limited accomplish-
ments remains substantial 15).
About half a dozen styles of quantitative history (including American QUASSH
-quantitative social science history) are producing divergent reactions to the
common problems facing quantitative scholarship. The current mood of self-
questioning among quantifiers, aware that the bloom is off and the first enthu-
siasm has cooled, takes on distinctive shapes in varying national contexts. A
recent examination of the Annales school by Coutau-Begarie lists a number of
criticisms such as "a reaction," "the illusion of scientificity," "the risk of im-
mobilism contained in the longue duree," and "frequent anachronisms." But the
author supports "a prudent and measured utilization," indicating that in France
quantitative methods are so firmly entrenched that the debate revolves more
around their intelligent application than around their elimination. In Germany
the Situation is more problematic. Lukewarm acceptance by leading social his¬
torians like J. Kocka, coupled with a paucity of convinced quantifiers in major
positions, makes quantification vulnerable, even if it has become an integral
part of many Grossprojekte. In Russia, D. Rowney sees quantitative methods
as "confident, not tentative, scholarship." Verbal acceptance of quantification
is high, even if one may question whether practicing quantitative historians
constitute more than a tiny minority of the large Soviet historical profession.
In Britain and in smaller Western European nations where more scholars actually
use quantitative methods, there is greater ambivalence. On one hand, quantifi¬
cation seems so essential in some specialties that it goes without saying. But in
the overall historical enterprise it appears to be somewhat in retreat, since skep-
tics, never quite convinced of its Utility, are now happy to fall back on narra-
tive modes with Lawrence Stone's trend-setting blessing. In the Third World,
quantification still seems to be in its heroic age—confronting larger-than-life
ob Stades and promising superhuman intellectual rewards, since the basic nu-
merical outlines of development still have to be sketched in 1^). This rapid
survey of non-American styles of quantitative history reveals neither an irresis-
tible tide of progress nor a universal ebb. The present Situation seems rather em-
battled, somewhat on the defensive, but still in command of enough scholarly
territory to launch a counterattack.
15) H. Perez-Brignoli and E. A. R u i z, "History and Quantification in Latin
America: An Assessment of Theories and Methods," Social Science History 8 (1984): 201ff;
and John H. Coatsworth, "Cliometrics and Mexican History," Historical Methods
18 (1985): 31-37.
16) Coutau-Begarie, Le Phenomene "Nouvelle Histoire/'114 - 121; J. Ko¬
cka, "Quantifizierung in der Geschichtswissenschaft," in H. Best and R. Mann
(eds.), Quantitative Methoden in der historisch-sozial wissenschaftlichen Forschung (Stutt¬
gart, 1977); Rowney, Soviet Quantitative History, 25; L. S t o n e, "The Revival
of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History," Past and Present 85 (1979): 3 - 24.
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A second area in which national styles lead to different responses is the ideolo-
gical affinity of quantitative history. Is quantification, as is often claimed, a
neutral method, or does its apparent empiricism rest on crypto-capitalist foun-
dations, as is sometimes charged? In France the Annalists, whether Marxists
or not, seem to employ quantitative methods without ideological qualms. Per-
haps the socialist stance of the founder generation and even more strongly
the "omnipresence" of Marxist currents in the postwar generation kept quanti¬
fication from being associated with one camp. Interestingly enough,there seems
to be "a relative decline of Marxist influences since the beginning of the 1960s"
so that the leaders of the present cohort of Annahsts are clearly non-if not anti¬
Marxist (Chaunu and Besancon). In Germany the radical proponents of Alltags¬
geschichte, the everyday history of the little people, tend to reject quantitative
methods as dehumanizing, as incapable of grasping the social Situation or cons¬
ciousness of an individual worker, a housewife, etc. Ironically, the preceding
cohort of socio-pohtical historians criticizes this "pronounced tendency to nos-
talgic idyllification of preindustrial conditions; their antiquantitative, even anti¬
social science bias; their disregard for theoretical efforts; their imprecise con¬
cepts, especially their notion of class I7)."
In contrast, Soviet historians depart self-consciously from Leninism and can¬
not understand the Opposition between radicals and quantifiers: "Thus the Marx¬
ist theory of social development and scientific Cognition serves as the general
methodological basis of Soviet historical science." But in Britain there is tension
between the anti-quantitative bias of History Workshop, a group of Marxist
"people's historians," and the practitioners of quantitative history. The objec-
tions centering on the class bias in Statistical data, the irnpersonalism of quan¬
tification, the capitalist association of econometric history, and the difficulty
of learning quantitative techniques have been refuted convincingly. But the odd
fact of the hostility remains. In Latin America one can observe a similar associ¬
ation between quantification and capitalism, which encourages the Annales
paradigm over QUASSH. Clearly, as the French and Soviet reactions demonstra-
te, there is no necessary connection between quantitative methods and reac-
tionary politics. But it will take much convincing to merge the complementary
approaches of People's History and social science history elsewhere 18).
17) Coutau-Begarie, Le Phenomene "Nouvelle Histoire," 225 - 243; R. Ber-
dahl, A. Ludtke, H. M e d i c k, et al, (eds.), Klassen und Kultur. Sozialanthro¬
pologische Perspektiven in der Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt, 1982) versus J. K o c k a
"Klassen oder Kultur? Durchbrüche und Sackgassen in der Arbeitergeschichte", Merkur
36 (1982): 955-965.
18) J. Kahk, "Quantitative Historical Research in Estonia," 193ff; R. F l o u d,
"Quantitative History and People's History: Two Methods in Conflict," Social Science
History 8 (1984): 151ff; L. T i 1 1 y, "People's History and Social Science History,"
Social Science History 7 (1983): 457 - 474; and the papers by N, Fitch as well as J. D.
Willigan versus K. A. Lynch in the Fall 1984 issue of Historical Methods.
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A third major issue, which is hotly debated among (and less so within) national
variants of quantitative history, is the role of theory and the relationship be¬
tween history and the social sciences. In France the nouvelle histoire has gained
a paramount position among the social sciences, due to its enlargement of scope
(totale), its dynamic perspective (longue duree), and its quantitative rigor.
Surprisingly, Annales explanations tend, however, to be largely atheoretical,
layering time series and analyzing their interactions rather than testing explicit
theories. In the German-speaking countries, there is more explicit theorizing,
reflecting the strong philosophical tradition and the Theoriediskussion of the
1970s. The hermeneutical heritage Stresses qualitative generalization so that one
can argue that "there is theory-oriented history ofa non-quantitative character,
and legitimately so." Hence only a small minority (such as the leaders of QUAN¬
TUM) subscribe to the more rigorous Standards of a Statistical Historische So¬
zialwissenschaft. In Eastern European countries, Marxism as theory (not just
ideology), defines the essential contextual parameters: "It is precisely the Marx¬
ist theory and methodology of historical knowledge with its characteristic
principles of logical historical method which guarantee that modelbuilding in
historical research is apphed effectively." Modeling (largely on the reflective-
measuring level) plays a limited but important role in middle-level empirical
generalization, especially in areas where there are no direct Statements by
Marxist-Leninist classics I9).
In Britain and in the smaller European countries, divisions on the theory
question seem to run somewhat along American lines. A vigorous and sophis¬
ticated' minority of quantifiers appears to aspire to the stringent Standards
of "scientific history" (R. Fogel) or quantitative social science history (M.
Kousser), involving analytical use of statistics as well as explicit modeling. A
larger but less vocal group of practicing quantifiers is content with medium-
level generalizations, while an indeterminate number simply apphes methods
without much theoretical concern. Some scholars support the fusion into a
historical social science; others are more comfortable in the middle ground
between the social sciences and the humanities (occasionally borrowing for
specific purposes), while still others are clinging to the fundamentally humanis-
tic character of historical scholarship, even if they admit the Utility of quanti¬
tative methods for particular questions. In the theory debate there are signifi¬
cant differences among the national viewpoints, but equally fundamental distinc¬
tions exist within many of the countries concemed 20).
19) B o u r d e 1 a i s, "French Quantitative History," 179ff; J. K o c k a, 'Theorie¬
orientierung und Theorieskepsis in der Geschichtswissenschaft. Alte und Neue Argumente,"
Historical Social Research 23 (1983): 4 - 19; versus Best, "Quantifizierende Historische
Sozialforschung," 121ff; I. Kovalchenko, "Model-Building for Historical Pheno-
mena and Processes", Soviet Quantitative History: 29 - 45.
20) R. Fogel," 'Scientific History' and Traditional History," in L. J. Cohen (ed.),
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The technological workmg conditions of quantitative scholars in different
countries are a final area of difference between national styles of quantitative
history. While much of the Computer machinery is transnational (or American in
design), national academic cultures and forms of Organization determine the condi¬
tions of its use. Moreover govemment support ofindigenous Computing technolo¬
gy (France, West Germany, and Russia) creates substantial time lags in the avai¬
lability of Software, such as SPSS, which first needs to be transposed mto an¬
other machine language (not to mention the translation of the manual, etc.)
In some of the wealthier Western European countnes Computer use is relatively
open, though the working conditions are more regimented and the turn-around
time tends to be longer (jobs often cannot be run by the user directly, but have
to be done by other personnel). In Eastern Europe access is quite difficult and
m many Third World countries virtually nonexistent. Ironically, the rapid
spread of the microcomputer is likely to increase these differences. While France
has launched a pubhcity campaign in its favor, there seem to be few micros
in actual working use by historians. In West Germany researchers expect them
to be provided by the university or research team, which is a slow and labonous
process. In Commumst countnes and the developing world, funds are hardly
available for such extravagance. Especially the soaring yen is keeping Japanese
machinery expensive abroad and there are also fewer discounts. Only in Britain
and in Scandinavia do microcomputers seem to be spreading rapidly on the level
of the individual working scholar. On the continent the dominant organizational
style of GrossWissenschaft (large institutionally sponsored team research)
appears to be inhibiting the microcomputer revolution because of its main-
frame orientation In contrast, in the Anglo-American sphere, microcomputers,
especially for word processing, are transforming quantitative history into a
cottage industry in the individual department or scholarly study, even if useful
data-base and Statistical Software is only beginning to emerge 21). Hence practi¬
cal working conditions of quantitative historians may well diverge further
in the near future.
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam, 1982), vol 6 15 61 and M
J Kousser, "Quantitative Social Scientific History," in M Kämmen (ed ),
The Past Before Us (Ithaca, 1980), 437 456 as well as "The Agenda for 'Social Science
History,'
"
Social Science History 1 (1977) 383 391, versus D H e r 1 i h y, "Numencal
and Formal Analysis in European History," Journal of Interdiseiplinary History 12 (1981)
115 136, or B Bailyn, "The Challenge of Modern Historiography," Amencan Histo
neal Review 87 (1982) 1 24
21) There is nothing comparable to the hvely discussion about microcomputers outside
the U S See D K Rowney, "The Histonan and the Microcomputer," Byte 7 (1982)
168ff, the threepart articie series on microcomputers byMM Finefrock in AHA
Perspectives 21 (1983), nos 8 and 9, 22 (1984), nol,R Jensen "The Microcomputer
Revolution for Historians," Journal of Interdiseiplinary History 14 (1983) 91 111, and
KH Jarausch, "SPSS/PC A Quantitative Histonan's Dream or Nightmare?" AHA
Perspectives 23 (1985) 25 26
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These somewhat impressionistic reflections on quantitative history outside
of the United States reveal the emergence of a number of distinctive
national
styles. Given an expectation of uniformity, the differences between national
variants are surprisingly extensive. One might even talk of competition between
the American (historical social science), French (Annales)> and Russian (Marxist
quantification) paradigms especially in the developing countries, which are
importing not only machines but also methodology. While the German quanti¬
tative style is still defining itself, a British version is in danger of being swamped
by influences from the United States. Although not internally uniform, these
prevailing national patterns also lead to divergent responses to the challenge of
the revival of narrative, the role of ideology in quantification, the issue of
theory, and finally, the practical working conditions of quantitative scholars.
No wonder that this diversity complicates the intellectual dialogue across fron¬
tiers. The considerable differences in the use of quantitative methods between
Ladurie's serial approach to the peasants of the Languedoc, J. Kocka's soft
statistics on German white collar employees, J. Kahk's compilations of Esto-
nian agricultural figures, and Wrigley/Schofield's sophisticated British demo¬
graphic computations are not just due to the peculiarities of individual authors;
they also reflect the respective quantitative style of each scholarly Communi¬
ty 22). Instead of assuming the universality of the American model (which
one?), historians would be better advised to take these national styles into ac¬
count as conditioning factors of academic production, which have not only
organizational implications but, more significantly, intellectual consequences.
Against these centrifugal tendencies, it is important to stress that quantita¬
tive historians also have much in common across national frontiers. Beset by
methodological and ideological criticisms, they can take heart from the in¬
ternationality of their enterprise, not just in the Western countries but also
in the Eastern bloc and the Third World. Except in France and Russia, much of
the basic Computing technology tends to be American, which makes for a cer¬
tain uniformity. Since the lingua franca of quantifiers is English, Software and
Statistical methods often spread from the Anglo-American center outwards,
even if they are applied differently in other contexts and some feedback (from
West Germany for instance) is beginning. There is a considerable resemblance
among such historical problems as population growth, price fluctuation, elec-
22) Since it is impossible to distill the breadth of quantitative scholarship in various coun¬
tries into a single work, these four titles are intended only as illustrations of the kinds of
divergences among national styles. E. L e Roy Ladurie, Les paysans de Langu¬
edoc (Paris, 1966); J. K o c k a, Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Bei¬
spiel Siemens 1847 bis 1914 (Stuttgart, 1969); J. Kahk, Peasant and Lord in the Process
of Transition from Feudalism to Capitalisrn in the Baltics (Tallinn, 1982); and E. A.
Wrigley and R. Schofield, The Population History of England, 1511 - 1871
(Cambridge, 1981).
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tion results, or social mobihty in spite of somewhat different approaches to
them. Some areas of inquiry, like historical demography and economic history,
have well developed international subject networks and organizations. There
are also a few bilateral ties (American-Soviet, French-Latin American) that
have a centripetal effect. A number of quantitative historians work and pubhsh
in two languages and cultural contexts, facilitating transfer of methods and
results. Finally, there have also been a few transnational cooperative research
projects such as the Tillys' effort to study the bases of populär revolt in Western
Europe 2^).
The emergence of national styles of quantitative history is, therefore, both a
threat and an opportunity. On the one hand it raises the danger of further
fragmenting the Community of quantitative historians already divided over such
questions as ideology or theory. On the other hand the different variants of
quantification also present the challenge of a dialogue that can enrich the
participants. With the translation of the major works of the Annales, this debate
is well on its way between some Anglo-American and French historians. One
could only wish that it would reach broader circles of the profession and display
more awareness of the impact of academic structures on formal intellectual
exposition. Lack of contextual understanding of the other position reduces
some of the discussion to shadow-boxing. However, other varieties of quanti¬
tative history are largely ignored by the Anglo-American profession. Occasion-
ally individual scholars from abroad are co-opted for a while, but only specia¬
lists in Russian history (and among them only a small minority) are aware of
the existence of Soviet quantitative work. To overcome this lack of communi¬
cation, some quantitative historians (representing the AHA quantitative methods
committee, its Soviet counterpart, QUANTUM, and individuals from England,
France, etc.) have founded an International Commission for the Application of
Quantitative Methods in History. Attached to the International Congress of
Historical Sciences, this Organization has sponsored Conferences in Washington
(1982) and Bellagio (1984) 24). During the 1985 meeting of the International
Congress of Historical Sciences in Stuttgart (West Germany) INTERQUANT
has sponsored a two-day programm with sessions on the impact of quantitative
methods on the writing of history, the problem of social inequality, the use of
microcomputers, and the transition from agrarian to industrial society 25).
23) Charles T i 1 1 y and Louise T i 11 y, The Rebellious Century (Cambridge, 1975).
The great opportunities for comparative/international quantitative history have not yet
been explored to the degree they should. Cf. Jarausch, "The International Dimension
of Quantitative History," Social Science History 8 (1984): 128.
24) "Quantitative History Conference Report," AHA Newsletter 20 (1982): 8; and the
special issues of Historical Social Research, published in early 1985.
25) For the best papers from these sessions, see the other essays in this volume.
18
But organizational efforts to overcome quantitative parochialism can play only
an auxiliary role. To derive greater benefits from the national varieties of quanti¬
tative history, individual scholars must become more willing to run the risks of
international dialogue. Impressive beginnings have been made. We only have
to go on.
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Formalization and Quantification in Historical Analysis *)
Charles Tilly
A Wave or Formalization
In historical analysis, the first great wave of formalization started in the
1950s and began to lose its force in the 1970s. Now it has spent itself. When and
how will the second wave arrive, if it ever does? Let us address the question in
characteristic historical fashion: by examining the first wave carefully, to see if
it displays regularities that help specify the conditions under which something
similar might occur again.
Formalization? I mean a variety of procedures that match descriptions of e-
vents, structures, and process with exphcit modeis ofthose events, structures, and
processes. Formal methods do not necessarily involve quantification or Compu¬
ting; analyses of linguistic, spatial, or temporal structure, for example, often pro-
ceed quite formally without Computers and without any direct Intervention of
mathematics. In history, however, the formalization that concemed history's
technical Innovators in the 1960s and 1970s typically included quantification
and/or Computing.
Among historians as a group formalization gained a number of energetic
advocates during the 1960s. To some, the increasing availability of formal
procedures for the investigation of large numbers of cases opened the way to
science and certainty. A kind of populism attracted others; they saw the possi-
bility of letting inarticulate people speak for themselves through the real beha¬
vior reflected in parish registers, arrest lists, and similar sources. In either case,
the path toward formalization typically led through collective biography: the
assembly of standardized descriptions of individual units-persons, households,
firms, places, events, points in time, or something else-into portraits of the
entire sets, and into means for studying Variation among the individual units.
Full-fledged formalization in history involves four activities: conceptualiza-
tion, measurement, modeling, and estimation. Conceptualization concerns
the Statement of an historical question as a problem susceptible of formal treat-
ment--for example, conceiving of a plantation as a kind of firm (and thus sui¬
table for analysis in terms of the economics of the firm) or of a Community
as a closed population (and thus available to the demographic analysis of ferti¬
lity change in closed populations). Measurement refers to organizing the evi¬
dence in Standard, comparable form, for example by assembling similar records
*) This paper is a substantially revised version of "Neat Analyses of Untidy Processes."
Working Paper No. 5, Center for Studies of Social Changes, New School for Social Research,
which appeared in International Labor and Working Class History 27 (1985): 4 - 34. The
earher version has a larger bibliography and a more extended discussion of labor history,
but says less about other historical fields.
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of income and expenditure for all households in a village. Modeling involves
the formal Statement of an argument conceming the expected pattern ofa phe¬
nomenon, for example the exphcit retrodiction that in a given German town
more of the Mittelstand than of other classes will turn out to have supported
Hitler. Estimation, finally, means matching model to evidence in order to see
how well the model fits, for example by means of a Statistical procedure, the
correlation coefficient, that determines how close to linear is the relationship
between wage levels and class voting.
All formalization requires some version of conceptualization, measurement,
modeling, and estimation, but analysts do not necessarily give them equal at¬
tention. Formalizing historians have, in fact, devoted little of their ingenuity
to conceptualization, modeling, and estimation. Often they have unwittingly
accepted the concepts, modeis, and estimation procedures that are implicit
in a particular quantitative routine, for example by running a straightforward
ordinary least Squares multiple regression of electoral results on social charac¬
teristics of the populations of electoral districts-an act assuming implicitly that
the electoral districts are coherent, independent units, that the social charac¬
teristics of those units somehow cause the votes of their electorates, that strong
causality would show up as a linear increase or decrease of one sort of vote as
a function of increase or decrease of a particular social characteristic, and so on.
Often historians have truncated their formalizations: taken considerable care
with measurement, only to interpret the measurements informally, for instance
by constructing a time series of strike activity and then inserting it into a non¬
quantitative discussion of rising or falling class consciousness. Historians have,
on the other hand, made great contributions to measurement; they have, for
example, devised ways of reworking religious records into solid indicators of
fertihty, mortality, and nuptiality; research done on the resulting historical
evidence has altered our ideas of the conditions for large-scale population
change.
Formalization had important successes in historical research. Without formal
analysis based on collective biography, we would lack almost all of historical
demography, most city-by-city studies of social mobility, major treatments of
political activism, and much more. Demographic, social, urban, and economic
history all underwent significant renewals through the introduction of formal
analysis and collective biography. That many wheels spun idly and that the
ratio of results achieved to effort expended was often painfully low goes almost
without saying; such things usually happen when unprepared people start ex-
perimenting with complex new techniques and equipment. On balance, never-
theless, the introduction of formal procedures enriched the possibilities of his¬
torical analysis.
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Despite indignant complaints about the irruption of positivism into history,
many historians then feit that formalization and quantification were the wave of
the future. Jacob Price and Val Lorwin-no wild-eyed enthusiasts-introduced
their volume on quantitative history with the declaration that:
From France to Scandinavia to Japan, quantitative ways of thinking, quanti¬
tative approaches, and quantitative methods have entered the mainstream
of historical investigation. In all areas, major quantitative work is now being
done, and even more is Hkely to be done in the immediate future. The neglect
of the possibilities of quantitative research by so many American historians
working on topics outside of United States history leds to an unnecessary
restriction of their analytical techniques and an unfortunate enfeeblement
of their results. Not all problems are equally suitable for quantification; nor
will quantification ever become the exclusive or even preponderant form or
mood of historical investigation. Yet if historians in the United States and
other English-speaking lands working on the history of other countries wish
to move to exciting frontiers of research endeavor in their respective areas
of interest, a greater proportion of them than at present will have to think
and work in part quantitatively 1).
Lorwin and Price's Statement, although restrained and sensible in its context,
rings quaintly today. "Existing frontier of research endeavor" ? In economic,
demographic, and electoral history, quantification has ceased being an adventure
in itself; historians in those specialties quantify as a matter of course. Almost
everywhere eise, however, quantitative analysis has lost much of its following.
It is now fashionable to decry formal methods as sterile and reductionist, to in-
sist on the centrality of consciousness, mentalities, and culture in historical
experience, and therefore to regard textual explication, retrospective ethnogra-
phy, and the construction of intelligible narratives conceming daily experience
as history's true frontier. As Erik Monkkonen, an experienced quantifier, re¬
ports:
From scholarly Journals to the New York Times, historians have been
castigating themselves for excessive narrowness and a decline in the public
voice of their profession. This critique has been articulated through a call
for a return to "the narrative", which seems to mean well told, dramatic
stories of the past, which attract large readerships, public attention, and
respect. Indirectly, quantitative history has born the brunt of this critique,
though it includes many non-quantitative forms of history as well 2).
The new critique has an ironic side. It arrives more or less in step with the
long-awaited appearance of major works of quantitative social history such as
1) Val R. Lorwin and Jacob M. Price, eds,, The Dimensions of the Past: Mate¬
rials, Problems, Opportunities for Quantitative Work in History (New Haven, 1972) 10,
2) Eric Monkkonen, "The Challenge of Quantitative History," Historical Methods
17 (1984): 86-94.
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Wrigley and Schofield's Population History ofEngland and the Stones' An Open
Elite? 3). But since Lawrence Stone himself has lent an influential voice to the
critique, it represents more than a discordant noise in the profession, at least in
the Anglo-Saxon world 4). In contrast, Continental Europe looks different.
There, formal analysis are still proliferating: studies of Nazi membership, enume-
rations of Swiss Aktivierungsereignisse, content analyses of Medieval texts, and
much more. There, furthermore, even studies concentrating on qualitative
variations and states of mind commonly turn to some sort of formalization
as an auxiliary to their analyses. Daniel Roche's treatment of eighteenth-century
provincial academies, for instance, deals mainly with the Organization and cultu¬
re of those quintessential Enlightenment institutions,\yet Roche does not hesi-
tate to map, graph, or quantify the provincial savants' activity: not only such
obvious features as social origin and age at death, but also more esoteric matters
such as themes of pöetry read and contents of appointment letters 5). Conti¬
nental institutional, cultural, and intellectual historians often turn to formal
methods of analysis.
To some extent, the difference between Anglo-Saxon and Continental Euro¬
pean reliance on quantification reflects differences in the questions being asked.
Generally speaking, quantification provides Httle help in attempts to account
for single instances of anything, especially if the explanations being considered
rest on general traits of the individual, group, or place in question. Quantifica¬
tion becomes more useful as a function of a) the compexity of the explanatory
model, b) the intrinsic quantifiability of the phenomenon to be explained, c)
the importance of Variation to the argument, and d) the number of units obser¬
ved. Any form of "exceptionalism" tends to make quantification uninteresting,
even distasteful. Thus the greater readiness of continental scholars to place
their subjects in a comparative frame, and yet to employ complex arguments,
inclines them toward quantification.
Clearly, the post-1950 wave of formalization did not strike all parts of the
historical shore with equal force. At one extreme, such specialties as economic
and demographic history made formal methods their Standard procedures. At
the other, fields such as intellectual history, diplomatic history, and the history
of science remained almost untouched by formalization. In between, political
history, urban history, social history, labor history, and related subdisciplines
3) E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, The Population History of England,
1541 - 1871: A Reconstruction (London, 1981); Lawrence Stone and Jeanne Fawtier
Stone, An open Elite? England 1540 - 1800 (Oxford, 1984).
4) Lawrence Stone, "The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,"
Past and Present 85 (1979): 3-24.
5) Daniel Roche, Le siede des Lumidres en province: Academies et acadfe'miciens
provinciaux, 1680 - 1789 (Paris, 1978), 2 vols.
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divided by specific subject; the study of social mobility, industrial conflict,
urban segregation patterns, elections, and household structure became quite
formal, for instance, while students of power structure, war, revolution, gen¬
der, urban planning, and social movements rarely ventured into formal analy¬
sis of their evidence. Within these intermediate fields, methodological struggles,
line-drawing, mutual suspicion, and name-calling multiplied.
Disciplinary Agendas
Although these struggles entailed plenty of misunderstanding, they did not
result from simple ignorance. Disciplinary agendas were at stake. In any disci-
pline, members organize themselves in two fundamental ways: a) by creating a
bounded interpersonal network, often one that is formalized via organizations,
meetings, Journals, and similar devices; b) by establishing a shared agenda which
includes pressing questions, certified means of answering those questions, and a
recognized body of relevant evidence.
Let us concentrate on the pressing questions. All historical fields having any
practical coherence organize around a very limited number of "payoff questi-
ons"--questions which define the field, whose pursuit requires little or no justi-
fication among practitioners, with respect to which specialists are instantly
alert to new answers, confirmations of disputed answers, or challenges towide-
ly accepted answers. At any given moment, only a limited number of alternati¬
ve answers to the big questions are typically in play; otherwise, members of the
craft worry about its disarray.
Labor history provides a case in point. Labor history is a bipolar field. It ac¬
tually organizes around two partly independent sets of questions. One set sums
up to the very broad query: What relationships exist among the Organization of
production, the formation of social classes, and workers' collective action?
Under that broad rubric fall narrower and somewhat more manageable questions
such as "Which kinds of workers, in what circumstances, most regularly engage
in class-conscious militancy, and why?" That and perhaps a dozen other ques¬
tions inform the bulk of research and writing in labor history.
The other cluster of questions cumulates to this one: What historical circum¬
stances determine the rise and fall of militant and/or effective national labor
movements? This question, unanswerable as stated, breaks into a small series
of less general inquiries. Within labor-history-defined-as-national-movements, one
of the few venerable payoff questions is "Why so much more socialism in some
countries and periods than others?" Broadly speaking, the main alternative ans¬
wers to that old query now under serious consideration are variants of the fol¬
lowing:
1. The Organization of capitalist production varies significantly over time and
Space, and only some (few) versions of it promote sharp confrontations of labor
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and capital; those confrontations produce support for socialist programs.
2. The pohtical strategies of states and national elites—for example, cooptation
and corporatism-strongly affect the availability and viability of a socialist reply
to capitalist power.
3. Other features of social life, such as the presence of ethnic divisions, the dif-
fusion of bourgeois styles of life, or the structure of workers' residential commu¬
nities, govern the extent of working-class consciousness, and therefore the sup¬
port for socialism.
4. Specific historical experiences and leaders, such as responses to the Depres¬
sion of the 1930s, shape the political choices and possibilities available within
any particular State.
Put so generally, to be sure, these answers could all be correct simultaneously.
Only when a historian specifies one of the Statements further (for example, by
claiming that American geographic and class mobility diminished working-class
consciousness) or assigns preeminence to one of them (for example, by insisting
that working-class socialism appears only in early phases of rapid industrializa-
tion) do sharp contradictions arise. But historians, including labor historians,
proceed by alternation between the deliberate sharpening of such contradictions
and the judicious synthesis of competing arguments. The choices, and the balan-
ce among the choices, remain fundamental to their work. At a given point in
time, only a handful of such questions define the overall agenda of the entire
field,
Labor history has an indefinite boundary, a chaotic periphery, and a relati¬
vely well-defined core. Labor historians regard historical research and writing
as important to the extent that it a) renews understanding of the conditions
underlying national fluctuations in the militancy and/or effectiveness of worker
action, b) helps connect the Organization of production, the formation of social
classes, and worker collective action, or c) both. By and large, the successes
of formal analysis have occurred in labor history's periphery. They inciude:
a) time-series; analyses of the determinants of fluctuations in national levels
of strike activity,
b) treatments of the organizational bases of workers' collective action,
c) studies of the demographic correlates of different sorts of industrial Organi¬
zation
d) reconstructions of labor migration and its consequences,
e) quantitative portrayals of occupational mobility and of social ties among
different occupations, and
f) research on the urban geography of migration, work, and workers.
These sorts of studies have great merits. (At least I hope so, since my own
efforts in labor history lie almost entirely in these areas). But they do not address
the organizing questions of labor history directly.
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The organizing questions, on the other hand, resist formalization. Remember
the ideal conditions for useful quantification: 1) an explicit, complex model of
the process or structure under analysis, 2) intrinsic quantifiability of the pheno-
men to be explained, 3) importance of Variation to the central arguments, 4)
large number of units. Although the major modeis of labor history are often
complex, they are rarely explicit. Many of the major phenomena figuring in
those modeis, such as class consciousness and revolutionary will, are not ob¬
viously quantifiable. Variation is a sometime visitor to the central arguments
of labor history; although the differences between two countries are often at
issue, even that minimum comparison serves mainly to identify the unique
properties of each individual country. And the central arguments of labor histo¬
ry rarely deal explicitly with large numbers of units, except in the sense that
they sum up the experience of all workers, all labor unions, and so on.
Where Formalization Works
Many other historical fields resemble labor history in these regards. Intellec¬
tual history, the history of science, diplomatic history, political history, the his¬
tory of warfare, and most synthetic national histories (e. g. the histories of India
or China) rarely employ explicit modeis, deal with intrinsically quantifiable
phenomena, analyze Variation systematically, or treat large numbers of units-
at least not all at the same time. And these characteristics stem directly from a
concentration on payoff questions that resist formalization.
Within labor history, consider the problem of national labor movements. For¬
mal analyses of strike activity and quantitative treatments of the organizational
bases of workers' collective action begin to address that issue. Yet labor histori¬
ans tend to question their validity and relevance on the grounds that the formal
analyses in question consider too narrow a ränge of action, fail to provide con-
vincing evidence on the orientations of the workers involved, and ignore the poh¬
tical context.
When push comes to shove, labor historians who are concemed with national
labor movements seem to want one or both of two things: a) persuasive recon-
stitutions of the shared states of mind of the principal actors at different points
in time, b) tactical replays of the interactions among various groups of workers,
labor leaders, capitalists, political powerholders, State officials, and other signi¬
ficant actors in the national arena. Formal studies of strike activity and of the
organizational bases of worker collective action set some limits on the possible
reconstitutions of shared states of mind, but provide no effective means for
getting at them directly. Dealing with strikes in nineteenth-century Massachu¬
setts, for instance, Carol Conell is able to build mathematical modeis whose
empirical application strongly suggests an important conclusion: skilled workers
timed and located both their Organization and their strike activity to maxi-
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mize the impact of withholding their labor, and the advantage of Organization
and timing to them was significantly greater than it was for less skilled workers.
But Conell's results cannot teil us whether skilled workers made self-conscious
calculations to that effect 6).
On the side of strategy and tactics, in principle, it is possible to capture tacti-
cal interplay in formal modeis; in practice, the difficulties of measurement and
modeling entailed by the analysis of fluctuations in the national politics of labor
will exceed anyone's technical capacity for some time to come. Instead, labor
historians are likely to continue with analytically-informed narratives and broad,
complex comparisons of a few national experiences at a time. Neither of these
enterprises will yield readily to formalization.
Or take the other core problem: the connections among the Organization of
production, class formation, and worker collective action. Several of the formali¬
zed analyses in my earlier list obviously touch on the problem: studies of organi¬
zational bases of worker collective action, labor migration, and social mobility.
Yet labor historians tend to insist on the consciousness and experience contai-
ned in class formation, and the political interaction affecting worker collective
action. They also tend to broaden "class formation" and "worker collective
action" to embrace a wide ränge of behavior. In those circumstances, the exis¬
ting formalizations become peripheral to the real enterprise, and the formaliza-
tions that are possible in principle become enormously demanding.
Common understandings of labor history's core focus on matters that yield
only with great difficulty to formal analysis. Class consciousness is the obvious,
and no doubt the most important, example. But recentiy different varieties of
culture have preempted the territory previously occupied by class consciousness.
If the current drift toward retrospective ethnography, individual experience, and
discourse continues, formalization will spread slowly, remain at its present low
level, or even decline in significance.
Nevertheless, the periphery constrains the core. Collective biography, as the
central evidence-producing procedure of formal analysis, necessarily sets limits
on a wide variety of arguments in labor history. Findings of studies dealing with
labor migration, industrial conflict, daily life and other "peripheral" subjects
set limits on plausible reconstructions of the connections among production,
class formation, and collective action, or on explanations of fluctuations in
national labor militancy and effectiveness. Studies by Victoria Bonneil, Diane
Koenker, William Rosenberg, and others conceming the Organization and action
of workers in Moscow and Petrograd, for example, now make it virtually impos¬
sible to portray working-class involvement in twentieth-century Russian move¬
ments as a consequence of the thrusting of uprooted peasants into big-city indus¬
trial life7).
6) Carol C o n e 1 1, 'The Impact of Union Sponsorship on Strikes in Nineteenth Cen¬
tury Massachusetts," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1980.
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Again, research on the dynamics of rural industry by Franklin Mendels, David
Levine, Yves Lequin, and others has established the wide extent of rural prole-
tarianization-and therefore of a kind of class formation-in Europe before the
period of capital-concentrated industrialization, the complex interdependence
between proletarianization and population growth, and the importance of re¬
gional Systems linking the labor and capital of city and country. These findings
limit our possible accounts of the qualitative experience of industrialization.
They thereby make more dubious the oncepopular explanations of working-class
action that stressed the shock of abrupt-exposure to industrial conditions 8).
Over the last two decades, important findings on such matters have emerged
firom formal analysis, and would have been less likely to appear without formal
analysis.
Conditions for Change
Formalization, then, does have a bearing on the core questions of labor histo¬
ry. Under what circumstances might we expect formal analyses to become every¬
day activities of labor historians, as they have for economic, demographic, and
urban historians? Three possibilities come to mind: 1) that some group of scho¬
lars who are directly addressing labor history's core questions will develop a
kind of formalization that will transform the field: 2) that the core will shift to
questions that now remain in the periphery, and for which effective formal
procedures exist; 3) that an intellectual revolution will establish a new core that
lends itself directly to formal analyses. None of the three is likely.
It is possible, but improbable, that some great success will establish formal ana¬
lysis at the core of labor history. American urban history once concentrated on
urban biographies and general portrayals of urbanization, It shifted rapidly
toward some kinds of quantitative work when Stephan Thernstrom and a few
other pioneers demonstrated that through a variety of collective biography ur¬
ban history could produce results bearing on one of American history's grandest
questions: to what extent is the United States a land of opportunity, and how
much has that opportunity changed over time 9)? In retrospect, one can see
7) Victoria B o n n e 1 1, Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organization in St.
Petersburg and Moscow, 1900 - 1914 (Berkeley, 1983); Diane K o e n k e r, Moscow
Workers and the 1917 Revolution (Princeton, 1981); and William G. Rosenberg,
"Workers and Workers' Control in the Russian Revolution", History Workshop Journal,
5 (1978): 89-97.
8) Franklin Mendels, "Seasons and Regions in Agriculture and Industry during
the Process of Industrialization," in: Sidney P o 1 1 a r d, ed., Region und Industrialisie¬
rung: Studien zur Rolle der Region in der Wirtschaftsgeschichte der letzten zwei Jahr¬
hunderte (Göttingen, 1980); David Levine, ed., Proletarization and Family Life
(Orlando, Fl, 1984); and Yves Lequin, Les ouvriers de la region lyonnaise, 1848
-
1914 (Lyon, 1977), 2 vols.
9) Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth
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readily that the question has a quantitative, structural component that lends
itself to formal treatment. In prospect,however, it is not so easy to see that ei¬
ther of the dominant agendas of labor history-the one linking production, class
formation, and working-class action or the one dealing with national labor move-
ments-wül yield to formal treatments that most labor historians will recognize
as contributions to their field.
It is possible, but even less probable, that the periphery will transform the
core-that because of the transformation of our understanding of labor history
through work on such matters as labor migration, gender, or industrial conflict
the Standard questions conceming national labor movements or the established
triad of production, consciousness, and collective action will come to seem less
central to the entire enterprise. To some extent, such shifts have occurred in
economic and social history; peripheral questions (such as how, if at all, indus¬
trialization transformed social relations within families) became core questions.
The creation of an entirely new core is unlikely and unpredictable. If it occurs
at all, changes in the political environments of scholars concemed with labor-
the success of a certain kind of revolution, the failure of another, a fundamental
shift in the positions of workers and organized labor-will surely play a part in
the redefinition of labor history's subject matter. In that unpredictable event,
the discipline's organizing questions could move toward problems that lend
themselves to formal analysis. They could also, however, emphasize problems
that are even less amenable to formalization. This possibility therefore leads to
no forecast at all.
Let me add a disclaimer. I do not claim that a shift to formalization, or to the
sorts of peripheral questions that lend themselves to formalization, would "im¬
prove" or even "clarify" labor history. I do claim that in the present Organiza¬
tion of the field a great expansion of formal analysis at its core is very, very un¬
likely. Not unless the organizing questions of labor history change significantly
will Computing, quantification, and other formalizations become central to the
discipline. To the extent that members of the discipline move toward questions
involving explicit modeis, systematic Variation, comparison of many cases, and
intrinsically quantitative phenomena, conversely, they will become receptive to
formalization.
The same reasoning applies, I believe, to the rest of history. In pohtical histo¬
ry, diplomatic history, intellectual history, and a number of other fields, no
large expansion of formalization will occur unless the dominant questions chan¬
ge. In any of the fields someone could devise a formal method that would recast
a major question, currently peripheral questions that lend themselves to forma¬
lization could become more pressing, or an intellectual revolution that replaced
Century City (Cambridge, 1964); and "The New Urban History," in: Charles F. D e 1 z e 1
ed., The Future as History (Nashville, 1977).
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the core questions could occur. As the use of Computers for such routine tasks
as the preparation and storage of texts increases, historians might find themsel¬
ves drifting into the pursuit of questions that only Computers make practicable.
As the findings ofthose fields that have invested heavily in formalization, such
as economic history, impinge on the questions people are asking in other fields
(for example, by stretching out the ''industrial revolution" over such a long peri¬
od that it stops being a plausible explanation of abrupt changes in populär
politics), historians in unformalized fields may find themselves compelled to for-
malize, if only to drive away the formalizers.
No doubt we can invent other scenarios that would produce a rapid, large in¬
crease in historical formalization. Nevertheless, the main points remain: in to-
day's practice of history, with few exceptions, the dominant questions around
which practitioners organize resist formal analysis; those questions guide a great
deal of research and change rather slowly. Without a substantial alteration of
those questions we have no reason to expect a rapid expansion of formalization.
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Quantitative Historical Social Research:
The German Experience *)
Heinrich Best and Wilhelm Heinz Schröder
Quantitative Methods in History:
Between Methodological Rigorism and Pragmatism
At the German Historians' Congress in Mannheim in 1976, Jürgen Kocka
warned: "In this country .. we tend to criticize a thing before it really ex-
ists1)." This Statement anticipated the controversy,the spread of quantification
was expected to raise in the Federal Republic of Germany. Two issues were at
stake: what is history, and what criteria are there for truth in history? Jürgen
Kocka's prognosis, shared by many, seemed to be well-founded. In the United
States ten years earlier, quantification had arisen in explicit and definite Oppo¬
sition to "traditional" historiography and its proponents had claimed that
history could only be considered scientific when based on numerical evidence
and formalized methods. At about the same time, Arthur Schlesinger, the most
prominent representative of the "traditionalists" formulated his famous verdict
on quantification: All significant questions were significant precisely because
they defied quantitative answers2). When quantitative methods became an issue
in the Federal Republic of Germany, the debate in the United States had already
become heated 3). It only seemed natural that the controversy on quantification
would be imported into the Federal Republic along with the method itself.
The spread of quantitative methods was nevertheless inconspicuous and uncon-
troversial. The reasons for this "German Sonderweg to quantification" can
only briefly outlined in this essay. It was specially important that just at this
time the sociological debate on methodology which had examined the concept
of experience maintained by the social sciences had died down.
Since this discussion also dealt with the value of analytical and hermeneutic
methods for epistemology, the American quantification controversy seemed
to offer nothing new to a German public concemed with methodological pro-
*) Translated by Ray Rosdale (Berlin).
1) Jürgen Kocka, "Quantifizierung in der Geschichtswissenschaft," in: Heinrich
Best and Reinhard Mann, eds., Quantitative Methoden in der historisch-sozialwis¬
senschaftlichen Forschung (Stuttgart, 1977), p. 4.
2) A good survey of the American debate is Allan G. Bogue, Clio and the Bitch
Goddess. Quantification in American Political History (Beverly Hills et al 1983); cf. also
Robert W. Fogel,
"
Scientific and Traditional History" in: L. J. Cohen et al.,
eds., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam, 1982);J. Morgan
K o u s s e r, "Quantitative Social Scientific History," in: H. Kämmen, ed., The Past
Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca, 1980), pp. 433 -
456. Arthur Schlesingers Statement is quoted in C. V. W o o d w a r d, "History and the
Third Culture," in: Journal of Contemporary History 3 (1968), p. 29.
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blems, except possibly for a blatant scientism seldom seen here.
Another explanation for this Sonderweg is that the discussion in German his¬
toriography in the 1960s and early 1970s showed little interest in the methodo¬
logical foundations of history, but rather centered onthe selection and Interpre¬
tation of concrete historical topics. An example of this orientation is the contro¬
versy on the German power-elite's responsibility for the outbreak of World
War I. When set against this passionate debate on the reinterpretation of German
history, quantification seemed an esoteric methodological innovation that could
not readily be associated with any particular political camp or historiographical
school. Quantification was put to very disparate use: as a means to help perfect
positivist fact-collecting and fact-processing4); as a method of letting the "silent
masses" speak 5); or even as part of the methodological canon of Marxist histo¬
riography 6). Out of fear that they might be banished into the esoteric realm
of "pure" specialization, the early protagonists of quantification consciously
avoided methodological rigorism. The composition of the membership of the
advisory Council for the "Association for Quantification and Methods in Histo¬
rical and Social Research" (QUANTUM), founded in 1975, demonstrates that
a pluralism in political and scientific orientation stood at the cradle of German
quantitative historical research ?)•
This pluralism did not mean there were no differences of opinion or program-
matical controversies. But the use of quantitative methods must really be seen
in the context of a more general historiographical development: The field of
research which viewed itself as a "history of society" (in the broadest sense
of term) was morning towards the research logic and methodological Standards
of the systematic social sciences 8), The keyterms structuring the different stages
of this development are -in order of their introduction- social history, structural
history, historical social science, and historical social research. In this context,
historical social research represents a methodological paradigm, meaning more
than quantification in the sense of an auxiliary science.
3) Some of the most important contributions are to be found in an anthology, published
repeatedly since the middle of the 1960's Ernst T o p 1 t s c h, ed , Logik der Sozial
Wissenschaften (Konigstein/Ts., 1984)
4) Cf for instance, Carl August Luckerath, "Prolegomena zur elektronischen
Datenverarbeitung im Bereich der Geschichtswissenschaft," in Historische Zeitschrift
207 (1968), pp. 265-296.
5) Cf. Richard T l 1 1 y, "Sozialer Protest als Gegenstand historischer Forschung," in
H R. Tilly, Kapital, Staat und Protest in der deutschen Industnallsierung (Gottingen, 1980),
p. 175.
6) For a comprehensive treatment see Don Karl Rowney, ed., Soviet Quantitative
History (Beverly Hills, 1984).
7) Cf. Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 17 (1981), p. 96 f.
8) Cf. Heinrich Best, "Histoire sociale et mSthodes quantitatives en Allemagne FeMe*
rale," in: Histoire moderne et contemporaine mformatique 7 (1985) > pp. 3 - 28.
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At the beginning of this development, stood social history defined by Werner
Conze as "history of society, more explicitly, of social structures, sequences of
events, movements 9)." However, this global definition does not make clear the
distinction between social history and the other approaches which we will be
discussing. One distinguishing feature of social history is the subject tackled:
traditionally, the field of social history is society without politics or, as George
M. Trevelyan put it, "the history of a people with the politics left outlO)."The
second differentiating feature lies in the method and the criteria of truth app¬
hed. Near the end of the 1960's Werner Conze could still claim: "The methods
of social history are characterized by the methods-generally valid in history-
of historicalsource criticism and that of 'understanding' history 11)." But in fact,
both aspects were at this time in the process of further development. This made
itself most strongly feit in the broadening of the topics deemed valid for social
history. Werner Conze emphasized that social history was as much "political
history" as the history of events and decisions12). With reference to Otto Brun¬
ner, Hans Mommsen similarly characterized social history as a "general view"
intent on the "inner construction, the structure of human organizations 13)."
"Structure" became the key term in the next discussion. The concept of
"histoire des structures" (i. e. history of structure, structuralist history) propo¬
sed by Fernand Braudel and elaborated in many articles published by the French
Journal, Annales, was an attempt to reconstruct the historical "relationships"
and "conditions" of supra-individual developments and processes without ex¬
plicitly concentrating on certain areas of historical reality. Nonetheless, the
political system was generally excluded de facto 14). Often associated with this
approach, was the demand for an understanding of the total historical process
in its synchronic and diachronic context. But in the attempts at a "histoire
totale,f, a comprehensive history of economics, society, politics and culture
(large-scale in Space and time), the specific weaknesses of "structuralist history"
became apparent. Upholding a "sharp demarcation between structures and non-
structures (events, decisions and actions) in history is theoretically and practi-
9) Werner Conze, "Sozialgeschichte," in: Hans-Ulrich W e h 1 e r, ed., Moderne
deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 3rd ed. (Köln/Berlin, 1979), p. 19.
10) George M. Trevelyan, Illustrated English Social History (New York, 1962)
(first publ. 1944), p. XI.
11) Conze, Sozialgeschichte, p. 25.
12) Ibid., p. 24.
13) Hans Mommsen, "Sozialgeschichte," in: Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte,
p. 34.
14) Jürgen Kocka, Sozialgeschichte. Begriff-Entwicklung-Probleme (Göttingen,
1977), p. 70 f.; Michael Erbe, Zur neueren französischen Sozialgeschichtsforschung.
Die Gruppe um die "Annales" (Darmstadt, 1979). For the German reception see especially
the introduction, p. 27 ff.
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cally very difficult and problematical I5)." Another weakness of the struc¬
turalist approach was the arbitrary way the facts were "assembled" into inte¬
gral large-scale histories. Indeed, structural history had no substantial theory
that would facilitate the selection of relevant facts, no hypotheses at its dis-
posal on the interdependence between economics, politics and other areas of
reality, nor was it able to formulate provable hypotheses that would identify
the causal and functional relationships between the individual aspects of the
historical reality studied and the important factors of changes 16). Polemical
criticisms sometimes termed this approach, the "sandwhich-method" or "desk-
drawer history." Brilliant descriptions of great literary quality were occasio-
nallythe result, but consistent and far-reaching explanations remained rare.
In this point the programm of historical social science went further than struc¬
turalist history: "The growing insight into the often cited 'theoretical poverty'
of history played a major role in the development of historical social scien¬
ce 17)." Referring almost exclusively to the theoretical advances of the syste¬
matic social sciences, this claim usually means that sociological terms, categories
and modeis are fitted into historical argumentation. But less stringent demands
are placed on the scope and explanatory force of theoretical Statements: histo¬
rical social science is concemed with "changes in a historical period under the
specific conditions of that period *8)" and not with supra-historical theoretical
laws. The theoretical Statements of historical social science are primarily "ad-hoc
theories", i. e. "hypotheses, used exclusively to transform present (restricted)
regularities into a complex of theoretical Statements neither integrated into a
broader context, nor apphed in their valid ränge to other areas or periodsl9)."
Though some representatives of historical social science claim to formulate
"mid-range theories", this practice actually violates the given ränge of such
propositional Systems. "In order to broaden an ad-hoc theory into a mid-range
theory, the series of invariables and regularities covered must be confronted
with similar invariables differing in Space and time. This will either lead to a
unified mid-range theory or to a typological differentiation..., in which case
the development of a theory on a higher level of abstraction will become neces¬
sary to cover and explam the different types equally well 20)." The proponents
15) Kocka, Sozialgeschichte, p. 73.
16) Ibid., p. 79.
17) Reinhard R ü r u p, "Zur Einführung," in: Rürup, ed. , Historische Sozialwis¬
senschaft (Göttingen, 1977), p. 8.
18) Ibid.; cf. also Winfried Schulze, Soziologie und Geschichtswissenschaft. Ein¬
führung in die Probleme der Kooperation beider Wissenschaften (München, 1974), p. 188.
19) Rene König, "Grundlagenprobleme der modernen soziologischen Forschungs¬
methoden (Modelle, Theorien, Kategorien)," in: SozialWissenschaft und Gesellschaftsge¬
staltung-Festschrift für Gerhard Weisser (Berlin, 1963), p. 26.
20) Ibid., p. 30.
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of historical social science, however, would reject this procedure as "unhistori-
cal." Even though it would be desirable for historical social science to define
its demands on theory more clearly, the use of ad-hoc theories is legitimate and
fruitful. Empirical social research also makes use of such propositions whose
ränge is limited to the particular problem discussed. A more problematic aspect
of historical social science research is the use of individual sociological terms
and categories out of their theoretical context; another difficulty is the use of
theory in which "explanations" are later "transposed" onto the evidence. This
inductive procedure leads to arbitrariness. The "results" observed can be "ex¬
plained" by a theoretically infinite number of "causes". It is impossible to form
alogical chain firom Observation to theoretical propositions 2*).
The methodological practice of historical social science is subject to severe
criticism too. Though the representatives of historical social science demand
a fusion of "historical -hermeneutic" and "analytical-social scientific" methods,
historical social science, in practice, rarely goes beyond hermeneutics, rarely
resorting to quantitative methods even for illustrative purposes. However, des¬
criptive casuistry does not suffice for testing theories, since it leads to discrepan-
cies between the proposed ränge and empirical proof of theoretical propositions
on past society.
In this regard historical social research is a further development of historical
social science. Generally speaking, historical social research can be defined as
"theoretically motivated research into societies, past and present, with valid
methods-valid, in the sense that the scope of the research Operations fit the
scope of the theoretical propositions 22)." In our case, it may be defined as
"empirical, especially quantitative, research on social structure and processes
in history, considered theoretically and methodically 23)." This approach
is neither "neo-positivist", since it is theoretically based, nor can it be simply
viewed as a historical application of empirical social research, since the parti-
culars of historical data and the demands placed on theories able to deal with
historical facts differ in many respects from a contemporary sociology. The re¬
lationship between empirical and historical social research may be characterized
by saying that the methodological Standards of empirical social research (though
not necessarily the methods themselves) have gained acceptance in historical
social research. Since historical social research deals with collective phenomena,
the acceptance of these Standards implies the use of quantitative methods. In
21) Heine von Alemann, Der Forschungsprozeß. Eine Einfuhrung in die Praxis
der empirischen Sozialforschung (Stuttgart, 1977), p. 25.
22) Heinrich Best, "Quantifizierende Historische Sozialforschung in der Bundes¬
republik Deutschland. Ein Überblick," in: Geschichte in Köln 9 (1981), p. 147.
23) Wilhelm H. Schröder, "Kollektive Biographien in der historischen Sozial¬
forschung," in: Schröder, ed., Lebenslaufund Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, 1985), p. 8.
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contrast to the traditional use of statistics in social history, historical social
research transforms qualitative information into numerical data which is then
turned over ,to mathematical calculation, quantitative evidence is not used just
as an illustrative, but to test hypotheses.
Theory - - Research Tool and Epistemological Goal
in Quantitative Historical Social Research
The theoretical component in the definition of historical social research is
based on two presuppositions that need further clarification. Historical social
research is guided by a research strategy led by theoretical suppositions and aims
at confirmation of the most general hypotheses possible. A brief look at the
practice of quantitative historical research demonstrates that the first presup-
position mentioned above is in no way self-evident. Quantification is not ne-
cessarily associated with conceptualization and theoretical orientation. Many
users see quantification and data-processing as further developments of the fun¬
damental procedures used in traditional historical research, with the old histo¬
riographical aim of putting all available sources and interpretative methods to
use in order to win the most detailed, complete and objective knowledge of the
past possible. In this respect, the Computer is a tool for reconstructing past
reality "like it really was". Behind this view, there is a methodological suppo-
sition rarely made exphcit: historical events, processes, and persons may best be
understood by considering all the sources deemed relevant. A characteristic
expression of this view can be found in the early discussion on data-processing
in German publications. Data-processing was viewed as an auxiliary tool neces¬
sary only for expanding history's capacity for mass sources 24).
It soon became apparent, however, that the great capacities and flexibility
of electronic data-processing were changing the direction of research in a way
many neither desired nor expected: the choice of a data base with adequate
indicator qualities, the necessity of sometimes rigid Classification of material
before data-processing, and, finally, the selection of appropriate methods of
Statistical analysis made it necessary to begin research with an adequate con¬
ceptualization of the historical processes and phenomena observed. Relinquis-
hing theory would immediately reduce the quality of the research undertaken:
the facts collected cannot-in and of themselves-reveal the criteria that would
make possible the appropriate selection, Classification and combination ofthose
same facts. The postulate of a theory-free fact base contradicts important
pre-suppositions of quantification; or put in other terms, "there can be no mea¬
surement without theory" 25)m
24) cf. et al. Rolf G u n d 1 a c h and Carl August Lückerat h, Historische
Wissenschaften und elektronische Datenverarbeitung (Frankfurt on the Main, 1976); cf.
also Lückerath, Prolegomena.
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Quantitative research therefore must begin with theoretical reflection. Not
only does this requirement apply to the high-level testing of hypotheses, but
also to the "simple" descriptive presentation of empirical data. Since no des-
cription is able to reflect reality in all its complexity, it must confine itself
to a particular segment. The decision as to which part of reality should be exa¬
mined or which characteristics are relevant for analysis and should therefore
be surveyed, can only be made on the basis of theoretical criteria; which only
then dictate further .Steps, such as the type and manner of source selection,
collection of data, etc. This fundamental and logical priority of explicit theore¬
tical consideration does not mean, as far as everyday research work is concemed,
that the researcher - completely independent of the concrete context of his
research - is chiefly concemed with some "pure" development of theory; but,
rather, that he will naturally consider the conditions for research (availability
of primary and secondary sources, methods, techniques, etc.) in the process
of developing theory, in order to guarantee the success of his research.
In this respect, the traditional process of historical research is reversed. Instead
of being the hesitantly pursued and rarely attained culmination of positivist
fact-gathering, theory becomes the starting point for the epistemological process.
Instead of making hypotheses and normative propositions on the basis of Ob¬
servation, theoretical propositions are confronted with reality. Put in ideal-typi-
cal terms, the meta-theoretical model of induction is replaced by a deductive
one-an unexpected dynamic of a technology often indiscriminately applied.
This has put some users in the thankless position of the "sorcerer's appren-
tice", unable to contain the magical forces he had brought to life.
Another underlying meta-theoretical presupposition is a consequence of the
maxim that the goal of the epistemological process in historical social research
is to formulate the most general theoretical propositions possible. But even this
assumption is neither obvious nor undisputed. Many historians still uphold
the view that it is not possible to speak of laws in the same sense that one can
in the natural sciences. This stance is based on the proposition that human acti¬
vity and, in this sense, all historical phenomena, are symbolic in character and
are the result of human intention 26).
At the beginning of the 19th Century, the German philosopher Windelband
distinguished between the two opposing metatheoretical positions considered
here. His definition of nomothetic and ideographic scientific thinking is still
25) Michael Drake and Peter Hammerton, Exercises in Historical Sociology
(Walton Hall, 1974), p. 12.
26) Peter Christian L u d z and Hans-Dieter R ö n s c h, "Theoretische Probleme
empirischer Geschichtsforschung," in: Theodor Schieder and Kurt G r ä üb i g,
ed., Theorieprobleme der Geschichtswissenschaft (Darmstadt, 1977), p. 63; exemplary for
the State of the general discussion on theory in German historiography are the earlier four
volumes in the series, Theorie der Geschichte.
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significant for the contemporary discussion on the philosophy of science 27). Win¬
delband saw the natural sciences as being characterized by nomotheticism and
the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften)—or more generally, "human scien-
ces"-by ideographism; but the social sciences were increasingly guided by na¬
tural science's concept of experience. Today, laws of the type represented by
"Newton's Law" are the epistemological goal of a portion of sociology. This
development was the maxim of the "unity of the empirical sciences", most
prominently represented by Hempel and Popper. If science aims at the truth,
and truth is undivided, then there must be a unified approach capable of per-
ceiving this truth. The goal of the epistemological process cannot, therefore,
be reduced to the development and apphcation of theoretical concepts and
structure types (to which many traditional historians would consent); the
epistemological process must aim at the formulation and investigation of cove-
ring laws, understood here as "strictly universal, physically necessary (i. e. no-
mological) assertion on stable relationships of at least two classes of events 28)."
Does that historical research which claims to be non-theoretical, actually lack
theory? The argument is certainly justified that even a narrative and associative
history is implicitly or latently theoretical. This is true in, at least, two respects:
1) It is assumed that the facts considered are relevant (principle of relevancy);
2) upon closer inspectation the narrative itself reveals itself to be a chain of
assumed causalities, a web of relationships. This fact is occasionally characteri¬
zed in the discussion as the "paradigm of historical sequence." Theoretical
assumptions, in the broadest sense, lay the foundations for this paradigm.
In the most general sense, these may be on the categorial level: e. g. "determi-
nism", "causality", "accident", and "freedom"; they may involve descriptions
of the motor force attributed to particular agents and agencies in history, e.g.
ideas, great men, divine guidance, moral forces, climate, geography, social and
economic conditions; and theoretical assumptions may also be seen in the
categories dealing with the course of historical processes: e. g., "irreversibility
of development", "repetition", "progress", and those inherent in historical
stages theories. Usually, these paradigms are not made exphcit in the formu¬
lation of historical relationships; nonetheless, they are present and play a struc¬
turing role in the historian's portrayal of events and his presentation of the
evidence for relationships 29), The distinction between theoretically oriented
historical research and narrative historiography lies, therefore, in the different
degree of explicitness of the hypotheses and normative propositions utilized. If
27) W. Windelband, Präludien, Aufsätze und Reden zur Einführung in die Philo¬
sophie, 4th rev., vol. 2 (Tübingen, 1911), p, 145.
28) Bernhard Giesen and Michael Schmid, "Erklärungsprobleme in den Sozial¬
wissenschaften," in: Giesen/Schmid, ed., Theorie, Handeln und Geschichte (Hamburg,
1975), p. 14.
29) Ibid., p. 11.
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we assume (as most do) that every type of research should attempt to recon-
struct the epistemological process as far as possible and, thus, be open for criti¬
cism (intersubjectivity), then explicitly theoretical historical research must
be preferred.
Further criticism of the theoretization of historical research is based on a
different view of the epistemological goal of history. It is argued that the his-
torian's task is to understand historical facts, but not to give causal explanations.
The hermeneutic modus of experience is made obligatory for history 30). His¬
tory should, therefore, describe various aspects of culture, but not formulate
covering laws. Though seen from a different angle this view returns to the
contrast between ideographic and nomological method as defined by Windel¬
band. One might object that this distinction was not, as many philosophers of
science seemed to suppose, that important for theoretically oriented social rese¬
arch. One example is Max Weber's classical definition of sociology as a science
"which understands and interprets social action, and in so doing attempts to
explain its course and effects 31)," Even in a sociology which views itself as a
rule-bound science, the researcher is only capable of comprehending the infor¬
mation inherent in his material when he knows the system of linguistic signs,
the symbolic language in which his material has been written. "It, therefore,
plays no great role-as far as epistemological theory is concerned-whether this
information is directly perceived through immediate social contact (as in inter-
views), or indirectly, through historical documents 32)t» ^he fact that both
sociology and history are tied to the hermeneutic modus of experience must
not necessarily contradict their theoretical orientation. To put it differently:
the question, "what happened in the past?" is intrinsincally bound to the ques¬
tion, "why did it happen?."
Theoretically oriented quantitative history is often also criticised because of
the defects and difficulties in the transmission of historical data. Historical
data are "inadvertent" data, i. e. they are usually neither gathered nor transmit¬
ted under scholarly auspices, and even if scientists were involved in the produc¬
tion of contemporary data, they were interested in particular aspects not neces¬
sarily of interest to future researchers. Historical data are, in this sense, the
by-products of economic, social and cultural processes. Neither their production
nor their transmission are usually scientifically controlled. At best, retrospective
Interviews are an exception to this, although they do suffer from other flaws.
30) Peter Christian Ludz, "Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte: Aspekte und Probleme,"
in: Ludz, ed. "Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte," in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und
Sozialpsychologie, special issue 16 (Opladen, 1972), p. 16.
31) Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (Studienausgabe) (Tübingen, 1972),
p. 1.
32) P. Ch. Ludz, "Aspekte", p. 16.
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Seen in this light, some observers have asked whether historical social research
could ever be anything more than a "tincture of empirical evidence combined
with bits of useful theory and mixed with large elements of impression, surmise
and empathetic understanding33)." One may object to this verdict, however,
on the grounds that contemporary sociology is making increasing use of data,
whose production is hardly seientifically controlled either. An example of this
are the so calied process-produced data, i. e. the internal records of public and
private organzations not gathered for scientific use 34). The same is true of
documents and texts that are the database for computer-supported content
analysis 35). For this material, empirical social research developed and is still
developing systematic theories of biased recording which allow for a better
evaluation of the data's reliability, validity, and ränge. One can expect that this
knowledge may compensate for insufficient research control over the process
of data-collecting and transmittance. On the other hand, empirical social rese¬
arch regards its own data, especially when attained through questionnaires, with
growing scepticism. As a result, contemporary empirical social research is relying
increasingly on "unobtrusive measure" without, however, surrendering its theo¬
retical orientation. Many of today's social scientists are becoming more aware
that their data on society can only approximate social reahty. In this sense,
sociology has, at best, a quantitative, but not a qualitative advantage over
history, which has always viewed its sources as incomplete and faulty. One may
go further: even in the natural sciences it is well known that measurement pro¬
cedures may affect the phenomena under investigation. This "uncertainty
principle" resembles the concept of "validity" in the social sciences.
The Research Process in Quantitative Historical Social Research
It should not be surprising that the course of quantitative historical social
research generally parallels empirical social research 36). Differences may be
33) Jerome M C 1 u b b, "The 'New* Quantitative History Social Science or Old Wine
in New Bottles?" in. C 1 u b b / Erwin K Scheuch, eds., Historical Social Research.
The Use of Historical and Process-Produced Data (Stuttgart, 1980), p. 370 f
34) Wolfgang Bick/ Paul J M u 11 e r, "The Nature of Process-Produced Data To
wards a Social Scientific Source Criticism," in: Clubb / Scheuch, op cit., p 370 ff.; for a
comprehensive treatment: Wolfgang B l c k et al., ed., Sozialforschung und Verwaltungs
daten (Stuttgart, 1984).
35) Heinrich Best, "Analysis of Content and Context of Historical Documents--The
Case of Petitions to the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49," in Clubb/Scheuch, op.
cit., p. 244.
36) In the meantime, an imposing number of such introductions has been published
which, depending on their different intentions, give special emphasis to the areas of theory,
general methodology, specific research methods and application practice in research and
education, cf. et al. * Jürgen Friedrichs, Methoden empinscher Sozialforschung,
12th ed. (Stuttgart, 1984); Peter A t t e s 1 a n d e r, Methoden der empirischen Sozialfor-
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observed, however, due to the special nature of the historical social researcher's
primary-source material, and his relationship to the period on which he is
working. For historians, inquiry into the significance and condition of the
source material is of greater importance than for empirical social researchers
who have standardized-though imperfect™ fact-coflecting instrumenta at their
disposal. Whereas the latter draws on his personal experience for inspiration in
the development of theories and criteria for the evaluation of evidence, the
former must first attain comprehensive knowledge of previous societies through
intense effort. Technology is no Substitute for this work - even our electronic
age has not yet developed a machine capable of generating theory or inter-
pretations.
The main steps in a research strategy resulting from a deductive research
logic that are briefly outlined below should be seen as a model descriprion of
the procedure predominant in quantitative research 37). Inductive "feed-back"
is common and can be combined with hermeneutic methods.
The aim of formulating an "empirical theory" is the starting point of the
historical social research strategy. This simply means that the research er collects
his hypotheses (questions) and assembles them in the most systematic, logical
and uncontradictory manner possible. Theories/hypotheses must refer to reality,
so that they may be proved faulty when confronted with empirical Observation.
It is necessary to form theories/hypotheses at the beginning of research, since
only then can decisions be made pertaining to the methods and instruments
of research needed.
In a second step, important prerequisites for the intersubjective examination
and control of Statements on reality (i. e. on the area to be studied) must be
developed by formulating precise terms, and operationalizating them appropria-
tely. The terms used in theoretical Statements must be clearly defined before
beginning the empirical investigation. Each term is accorded a series of charac¬
teristics with the help of semantic rules; characteristics are, in this sense, obser-
vable events and/or words, whose meaning is known. In order to define a term
it is often necessary to analyse its meaning systematically or empirically. In
empirical research, nominal definitions are usually preferred as they are «specially
schung, 5th ed. (BerHn, 1985); Rolf Prim /Heribert T il m a n n, Grundlagen einer
kritisch-rationalen Sozialwissenschaft, 5th ed. (Stuttgart/Heidelberg, 1983); Erwin Roth,
ed., Sozialwissenschaftliche Methoden (Munich, 1984); Franz K r o m p k a, Sozial¬
wissenschaftliche Methodologie (Paderborn, 1984); Horst Kern, Empirische Sozial¬
forschung (Opladen, 1980), Insofar as Statements referring to the methods of empirical
social research are made below, see the sources already mentioned above.
37) The elements mentioned in our survey are in general accordance with the study
units of our basic curriculum: Heinrich Best/ Wilhelm H. Schröder, "Basis-
curriculum für eine quantitative historische Sozialforschung," in: Historical Social Research/
Historische Sozialforschung 17 (1981), pp. 3 - 50.
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suited for subject-structuring; in nominal definitions a term already known
(definiens) is substituted for the term to be defined (definiendum).
Operationalization is the most important step in historical social research
when the theoretical and empirical level are brought together. The vahdity and
reliability of operationalization are decisive for the quality of scientific argumen-
tation. Operationalization aims at linking previously defined terms needed for
empirical investigation of quantifiable data. Operational definitions determine
the research Operations which enable the researcher to decide whether or not the
case investigated corresponds to the term defined. The concrete procedure
is dependent on the relation between the empirical sphere and the term to be
operationalized. In a direct relation, the Situation described by the term can be
directly observed or perceived. In this case, the Operations of research can
be immediately undertaken (information on what, where, when, and how the
counting should be done). For terms with an indirect empirical relation, indi¬
cators must first be developed. Indicators, aided by the empirically observable,
should allow those phenomena to be inferred which are not directly observable
but are, nonetheless, described by the term. These indicators are then also
operationalized through information on the research Operations necessary. The
validity of indicator development is highly dependent on the precision with
which those phenomena made observable by the indicator, reflect the Situation
described by the term. Indicator development must, therefore, be substantiated
by careful indicator analysis.
In a third step the selection procedures and techniques for historical data must
be determined. At this stage of research, genuinely historical methods (especially
source criticism), as well as those of empirical social research (sampling proce¬
dures) may be put to work with complementary benefit 3^). The historian's
usual procedure may be so summarized: he determines the historical problem
area to be examined, decides on the appropriate source material, considers the
availability of sources and then works through all the sources available (i. e. in an
ideal case) while applying the method of historical source criticism. The assump¬
tion usually implicit in this procedure is well known: "somehow" the sources and
historical reality will correspond; the problem of representativeness and selec-
tivity of sources is usually only superficially handled and then in a casuistic-
descriptive and not in a Statistical manner. But even brilliant source criticism
may lead to an insufficient treatment of sources in historical social research,
characterized by a double problem: On the one hand, historical sources are
38) Cf. Harald R o h 1 i n g e r, "Quellen als Auswahl-Auswahl aus Quellen," in:
Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 24 (1982), pp. 34 - 62; Paul J.
Müller, "Improving Source Criticism to Cope with New Types of Sources and Old
Ones Better," in: ibid.,pp. 25 - 33; for practical application see Erdmann Weyrauch,
"Datenverarbeitung als Quellenkritik?" in: Paul J. Müller, ed., Die Analyse prozeß-
produzierter Daten (Stuttgart, 1977), pp. 141 - 198.
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often incomplete, i. e. only a segment is available; on the other hand, the his¬
torical social researcher might take a technically poor sample from those sources
that are available.
When historical sources pertaining to the question studied are incomplete or
only a sample is available, the validity of further research depends on the resear-
cher's capacity to determine what type of "selection", in relation to the "com¬
plete" body of non-accessible sources, the available sources represent. The ques¬
tion may also be put this way: which subset of objects from what total popula¬
tion do the sources constitute? Since there is often no adequate and certainly
no quantifiable information on the population, the historian must ascertain,
how representative the sub-set of historical sources at his disposal actually is
by considering the data available on the total population and by using the cri¬
teria of empirical theory already formulated. The further systematization
and increasing precision (also Statistical) of such decisions still remains a major
methodological concern of historical social research. In the application of samp¬
ling procedures to historical sources one can again draw upon the methods of
empirical social research (although not to the historical social researcher's com¬
plete satisfaction) 39). Sampling is appropriate and, in the case of an abundance
of sources, usually necessary when the total population may be precisely asses¬
sed. The degree of selection in the treatment of sources depends primarily on
the necessity of economizing labor and resources, or on the subject studied. Des¬
pite some historians hankering for totality, it is often unnecessary and some¬
times even damaging for the validity of empirical research to work through all
accessible sources.
In the next stept, the characteristics of the object to be investigated (units of
analysis) are transformed into measurable variables. The construction of variables
is a result of the operationalization of the terms already precisely defined. In this
context, "variables" are terminologically defined characteristics of objects
having several levels. Measurement is understood as the assignment of a set of
numbers or symbols to the levels of a variable. This assignment must be syste¬
matic, i. e. all objects must be treated the same way and in accordance with the
rules of assignment. This procedure is ordered according to the criteria of uni-
queness (it is termed unique when every object can be ascribed to one level),
39) Cf. et al., Ferdinand B ö 1 t k e n, Auswahlverfahren (Stuttgart, 1976); Gabriele
K a p 1 i t z a, "Die Stichprobe," in: Kurt Holm, ed., Die Befragung, Vol. 1 (Munich,
1975), pp. 136 - 186; Erwin K. Scheuch, "Auswahlverfahren in der Sozialforschung,"
in: Rene* Könij, ed., Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung, vol. 3a (Stuttgart,
1974), pp. 1 - 96; Manfred Sturm/ Th. Vanja, "Planung und Durchführung von Zu¬
fallstichproben," in: Jan van Koolwijk/ Maria Wieken-Mayser, eds., Techni¬
ken der empirischen Sozialtorschung, Vol. 6£Munich, 1974), pp. 40 - 80; Jan van Kool¬
wijk, "Das Quotenverfahren: Paradigma sozialwissenschaftlicher Auswahlpraxis," in:
ibid., pp. 81 - 99; Roger S. Schofield, "Sampling in Historical Research," in: E. A.
Wrigley, ed., Nineteenth-Century Society (Cambridge, 1972).
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exclusiveness (it is exclusive when only one and not more than one level of a
characteristic is appropriate) and completeness (it is complete when both criteria
listed above are fulfilled for all objects). When these requirements are completely
met, one speaks of a "Classification." When these requirements are incompletely
fulfilled, one speaks of a "typology." In this sense, a variable may also be
defined as a set of values (levels) forming a Classification (or typology).
In historical social research, measurement is often done according to nominal
scale characteristics, i. e. the levels of a given variable have no substantially inter-
pretable order or other metric properties. For a long time, this meant that the
Statistical processing of such data was restricted to simple descriptive procedures
such as marginal distribution and cross-tabulation. The last few years, however,
have seen the development of more sophisticated Statistical procedures for the
analysis of nominally scaled variables which-going beyond the analysis of two-
dimensional relations through measures of association-are capable of analyzing
multivariate relations (e. g. on the basis of loglinear modeis) 40), In connection
with nominal variables, also termed qualitative variables, a misleading differen¬
tiation between "qualitative" and "quantitative" methods has arisen in historical
discussion. Often, quantification is considered only in the narrow sense of the
term, as the application of quantitative methods to metric variables. This narrow
view corresponds to the typical use of quantification in German economic and
social history, where source material already in quantitative form is examined
and evaluated. In contrast quantification in historical social research is appro¬
priate not only for metric variables but for non-metric variables as well. The
criterion for differentiating between qualitative and quantitative methods is,
therefore, not the measurement level of the variables under scrutiny, but rather
the level of theoretical orientation and formalization in the research Operations
used.
Mathematical procedures are only meaningful when an elementary and funda¬
mental requirement of research strategy is satisfied: The relations between the
objects must be reflected by the relations between the numerical values. This
precept on the validity of quantification has such prerequisites as the validity
of term development (the precise assignment of designates), indicator develop¬
ment (representative description of the cases characterized by a term) and of
variable development (systematic assignment rules). Another important precept
concerns the reliability of quantification which depends on three requirements
that must be satisfied: intertemporal stability (repeated measurement of the
same phenomena bring the same results), intersubjective stability (different
researchers using the same measuring devices on the same phenomena attain
40) For an introduction see Gerhard Arminger's chapter on "Zusammenhange
zwischen nichtmetrischen Variablen," in: Konrad H. Jarausch et, al., Quantitative
Methoden in der Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Forschung, Datenverar¬
beitung und Statistik (Darmstadt/1985), pp. 162 - 181 (with more far-reaching literature).
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the same results) and inter-instrumental stability (the use of differing measuring
devices on the same phenomena lead to the same results).
The fifth step in a general research strategy consists of the analysis of the data.
Statistics provide the methods for the aggregation, processing, and Interpretation
of numerical evidence, Statistics are an aid in consolidating, structuring, or grou-
ping numerical data, and may also be put to illustrative purposes. Further,
statistics put procedures at the researcher
'
s disposal which enable him
to prove and evaluate hypotheses. In contrast to the field of qualitative proce¬
dures where the explanatory capacity of hypotheses remains vague, the appli¬
cation of Statistical analysis delivers criteria which make it possible to prove
the correctness and the ränge of the explanations proposed. In statistics, one
may differentiate between causal analysis (e. g. path-analysis) and those methods
which reduce the existant complexity of information to a few dimensions, as in
the case ofmultidimensional scaling or factor analysis 41). The application of Statis¬
tical modeis also invalues the precept of validity; criteria for the adequacy of
a Statistical model for the question to be examined may not be drawn from
statistics alone, but must be developed through the Constitution of hypotheses
and through operationalization. The choice of a particular Statistical model is
always made under the assumption that its conditions completely reproduce
those of reality or-in the case of incomplete representation-that observable
deviations from reality may still be tolerated without endangering the validity
of the application.
Quantification is not data-processing. One should not confuse a general metho¬
dology with an important research tool. The difference between "traditional"
and more advanced applications of statistics is undoubtedly the latter's routine
use of electronic data-processing for the examination and analysis ofdata- a use
which has greatly broadened the scope and the epistemological potential of
quantification 42)
The five stages of a general research strategy outlined here must be transfor-
med into directly applicable methods of investigation suited to the specific
case under study. Inspite of the fact that empirical social research has already
developed an arsenal of adequate and tested methods and has systematized them
for use in research and education, no text book, on Methods of Historical Social
41) For practica! applications, see Hans H. Blotevogel, "Faktorenanalytische Un¬
tersuchungen der deutschen Großstädte nach der Berufszählung 1907,", in: Wilhelm H.
Schröder, ed., Moderne Stadtgeschichte (Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 74 - 111; Heinrich J.
Schwippe, "Faktorenanalyse und Clusteranalyse. Möglichkeiten des Einsatzes multi-
variater Verfahren in der Analyse des Verhältnisses von Stadt und Land im östlichen Mün¬
sterland im frühen 19. Jahrhundert," in: ibid., pp. 112 - 144.
42) For data-processing see especially, Manfred T h a 1 1 e r, "Numerische Datenverar¬
beitung für Historiker," (Wien, 1982); Konrad H. Jarausch et al., Quantitative Me¬
thoden, pp. 58 - 73 (Author: Manfred Thaller); see also Manfred Thaller's column, "Histo¬
rical Software Section," in: Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung,
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as such has yet been written ^3). Although the development of genu-
inely valid methods or systematic procedures for historical social research has
begun in many areas, only the first Steps have been taken. When historical social
research's attempts at methodological development could adapt methods already
existent in neighboring disciplines, progress has been relatively rapid. Such a
methodological development within historical social research may be observed,
e. g. in certain topics (stratification and mobility research, historical demogra¬
phy...) for specific historical source groups (files, texts, parish registers, census
manuscripts...), for particular types of data collecting (content analysis, retro¬
spective interviews...) and for special analysis procedures (time series analysis,
analysis of aggregated data, application of loglinear modeis...) 44)#
Perspectives in historical social research in the Federal Republic of Germany
When asking how successful historical social research has been in its attempt
to broaden the scope of historical studies and to introduce a methodologically
stricter concept of experience, it must not be forgotten that historical social
research has been in existence in the Federal Republic of Germany for only
about ten years as an approach encompassing a large number of researchers
and the usual ränge of dissemination media 45). This is a short time when set
against the general time-span of large projects and the sluggish spread of scienti¬
fic results. Nonetheless, the standardized examination of historical mass sources
and the utilization of Computers has become routine and has lost the exotic
flavor it may oncel have had. Especially historical demography, history of the
family, collective biography, and the history of voting behavior have reached a
high Standard and have made significant contributions to contemporary discus-
43) In the meantime, German textbooks on quantitative history have also been published;
see Konrad H. Jarausch et al., Quantitative Methoden; Dieter R u 1 o f f, Historische
Sozialforschung. Einfuhrung und Überblick (Stuttgart, 1985); Roderick F 1 o u d, Einfuh¬
rung in quantitative Methoden für Historiker (Stuttgart, 1980), a sometimes inadequate
translation of the 2nd ed. of An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Historians
(London, 1979); Norbert O h 1 e r, Quantitative Methoden für Historiker. Eine Einfuhrung
(Munich, 1980).
44) A good survey of research in this area can be found in the periodical documentary
volumes in the series, Historisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, each of which con-
tains extensive reports on research projects in the field of historical social research; cf.
also R u 1 o f f, Historische Sozialforschung, pp. 70 - 194.
45) This beginning can be almost exactly dated to the year 1975 when the association,
QUANTUM, was founded. QUANTUM launched the Journal, Historical Social Research/
Historische Sozialforschung (initially as a newsletter with the title, QUANTUM-Informa-
tion), as well as the publication series, Historisch-Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen.
At the same time it created an academic audience for quantitative historical social research
in the Federal Republic through a series of Conferences and working Conventions.
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sions in sociology and history 46), German quantitative history today cannot
be labelled, "backward", anymore.
Still, many contemporary observers show a scepticism and reservation regar¬
ding the gains of historical social research that cannot simply be explained by
insinuating that an exotic novelty naturally loses its fascination 47), On the
contrary, many have only now come to realize that the use of quantification
implies specific limitations. At first sight, the need for methodological self-dis-
cipline and asceticism in the face of speculative temptation might seem to be
the greatest restriction. Even more conflicting, however, is the fact that micro-
analyses in which people are the study units are almost exclusively limited to
research on institutionally defined roles and formal structures. Quantifiable mass
sources are typically the products of public book-keeping which in its function
and fact-gathering method is incapable of covering the informal world. Not only
official secrets and matters left to personal discretion are badly recorded, but
also, more generally speaking, the intent and motivation of human activity are
left out. With the help of quantitative methods, we are quite capable of recon-
structing the formal "structure of opportunity 48)" of past societies, as well as
the way people behaved within this framework. But only rarely can a quanti¬
tative answer be given to the question of how people viewed the conditions
under which they acted. One might expect that the use of systematic content
analysis (a method too often neglected) might shed some light onto this dark-
ness, but success remains limited: It cannot be forgotten that until the late 19th
Century the great mass of society was illiterate; the scope of the evidence for
systematic content analysis, however, is limited to the literate elites.
Comparative restrictions must also be accepted in research on a higher level
of aggregation, i. e. when regional units or organisations are the units of Obser¬
vation. Typical data sources here are administrative statistics. But the goals
of administrative data-collecting do not necessarily coincide with the interests
of present researchers. It seems obvious that the study of questions not covered
by immediate Statistical evidence must be given up, but it is also understandable
that the claim is very reluctantly waived. One way out of this dilemma is to
choose methods of indirect measurement and highly complex analysis proce¬
dures that attempt to examine the "unmeasured" through the use of mathe¬
matical Operations on manifestly empirical evidence. The apphcation ofsuch pro¬
cedures is dependent on long chains of inference needing many pre-requisites.
Here historical social researchers have sometimes skated on thin ice. The use of
46) This is also documented by the (meanwhile) 21 volumes of Historisch-Sozialwissen¬
schaftlichen Forschungen.
47) Cf. et al. the section, "Qualitative Kritik", in: Konrad H. Jarausch et al., op.
cit., p. 195 ff.
48) Cf. Talcott Parsons/ Edward A. S h i 1 s, ed., Towards a General Theory of
Action (New York), p. 225 f.
47
the "cattle-quota" as an indicator for the secondarization of national economies
in the late 19th Century 49), 0r population growth as a Substitute for missing
data on the gross national product 50) are examples of this tendency. The
question is whether or not historical social research can meet its own demand of
utilizing more valid evidence than "traditional" history while skirting the border-
line of the measurable. At this point a descriptive casuistry would be more
appropriate. This raises a more fundamental consideration: historical social
research should complement philological historiography, but it is no Substitute
for it. If we allow the world beyond the data to turn into forbidden ground, our
view of history will degenerate into a collection of disparate phenomena and
events. However, this is not a carte blanche - quantitative methods do have
greater evidential power than the hermeneutic circle. The maxim that, ceteris
paribus, those procedures should be used that offer the most reliable results,
makes quantification with a good data base preferable.
As far as the future potential of quantitative historical research is concemed,
one may voice the optimistic prognosis that the scope of historical social rese¬
arch will be broadened in the next few years. Historical social research is profi-
ting from technical innovations, e. g. the microcomputer which allows on the
spot data-collecting in archives, and the development of more efficient word
processing which greatly reduces the time and financial costs of transforming
texts into machine-readable form. Efficient data-bank Systems decrease the loss
of information occuring through transformation of sources into data ^1)# There¬
fore, the demand for theory-guided research is rapidly loosing its technological
foundation. New techniques of random sampling for complexly structured and/
or damaged populations can now often reduce the survey effort without loss of
information. Today historical source materials can be used which previously
would have been considered too extensive, too complex in their content, or too
oblique in their structure 52), progress and new possibilities may also be seen
in the area of analysis procedures, For example, the methodological repertoire
of network analysis can be successfully applied to the profusely documented
49) Cf. et al. Richard H, T i 11 y, Sozialer Protest, p. 185.
50) Paul B. H u b e r, "Regionale Expansion und Entleerung im Deutschland des 19.
Jahrhunderts: Eine Folge der Eisenbahnentwicklung?" in: Rainer F r e m d 1 i n g/Richard
H. T i 1 1 y, ed., Industrialisierung und Raum. Studien zur regionalen Differenzierung im
Deutschland des 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1979), p. 37 ff.
51) Cf. Manfred T h a 1 1 e r 's column, "Historical Software-Section" (see ft. 42) in
the Journal, Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung and also, M. T h a 11 e r,
"Automation on Parnassus. CLIO-A Databank oriented System for Historians," in: Histo¬
rical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 15 (1980), pp. 40 - 65.
52) Cf. et- al. Harald Rohlinger, "Quellen als Auswähl--Auswähl aus Quellen,"
in: Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 24 (1982), pp. 34 - 62.
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historical data on interlocking positions and kinship patterns 53). New proce¬
dures in the multivariate analysis of event data represent efficient Statistical
instruments, especially suited to a science like history which considers events
and development over long periods of time 54),
Problems in the adaption and transfer of the methods and research instruments
do lead to bottlenecks. The most important future task of interdiseiplinary his¬
torical social research is, however, precisely the Solution of these problems.
53) Cf. et al. The KZfSS.s special issue (1984) on the analysis of social networks.
54) Cf. et al, Hans-Jürgen Andreß, Multivariate Analysen von Verlaufsdaten.
Statistische Grundlagen und Anwendungsbeispiele für die dynamische Analyse nichtmetri¬
scher Merkmale (Mannheim, 1985); for an example of practical application: Heinrich
Best, "Reconstructing Political Biographies of the Past: Configurations, Sequences,
Timing, and the Impact of Historical Change," in: Helene M i 1 1 e t et. al., ed., Proso-
pographie et Informatique (Paris, 1985).
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II. SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Social Inequality in the 19th and 20th Centimes:
Some Introductory Remarks
Hartmut Kaelble
Why should social inequality be the topic of a session of a history congress
rather than of a meeting of sociologists and, hence, a section of this book by
historians rather than by sociologists? Why should one raise the issue of social
inequality in a period of deep worldwide economic crisis in which the general
public is interested in other themes and in which social inequality is often
considered as a preoccupation of the past economic boom ? Why should social
inequality be treated in a series of papers on quantitative history after having
become so much a preoccupation of intellectual history and of ideological
debates? I shall briefly answer these important and unavoidable questions, then
cover the definition as well as some ideas on the long-term change of social
inequality and finally say something about the three cases which are dealt with
in the following papers, i. e. Sweden, Poland, and the U.S.
There is a widespread misunderstanding among historians about who should
properly do research on the history of social inequality. Most historians do
think that this is the task of sociologists and that they had better read sociologi¬
cal studies for information on this field. This attitude is reinforced by the im¬
pression that social historians have rarely published on this topic in a general
way. If one looks for books and articles on "social inequality", one ends up, in
fact, with the work of philosophers, sociologists or economists such as Stanislaw
Ossowski, W. G. Runciman, Pierre Bourdieu, Gerhard Lenski, Ralf Dahrendorf,
Simon Kuznets or Jan Tinbergen 1).
1) S. Ossowski, Class Structure and the Social Consciousness (New York, 1963);
W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (London, 1966); P. Bour¬
dieu,' La distinction (Paris, 1979); G. Lenski, Power and Privüege. A Theory of
Social Stratification (New York, 1966); R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict
in Industrial Society (Stanford, 1959); S. Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the
Economic Growth of Nations: VIII: Distribution of Income by Size," in: Economic Deve¬
lopment and Cultural Change 11 (1963); J. Tinbergen, Income Distribution (Amster¬
dam, 1975).
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For various reasons, however, this is a mistaken view of the task of historians
as well as of their actual contribution to this field. The history of social inequali¬
ty cannot be written without the contribution of historians (or, alternatively
without exceptionally intensive studies of the past by sociologists and by econo¬
mists). Who eise but historians know about the exact strengths and shortcomings
of the sources for the history of social inequality, such as tax registers, censuses,
rules of etiquette, dictionaries, diaries or letters of travellers etc.? Who eise but
a historian understands the complex historical meaning of indicators of social
inequality, e. g. the factual role of monetary income for the social differences
in the Standard of living in the past or the meaning of education in the past so
different from current educational institutions and so important for the ine¬
quality of life chances. Who eise but a historian could place the findings on so¬
cial inequality in the wider perspective of past societies and economies? There
is a peculiar role for historians and a particular need for their research in the
field of social inequality. Historians cannot be replaced by sociologists and
economists in the study of long term change of social inequality unless the latter
become in fact historians.
Morever, the history of social inequality has not been neglected by social
historians. A substantial amount of research was done by historians especially
in the last fifteen years or so. This research Covers many aspects of social ine¬
quality, uses many methods, deals with many types of communities and coun¬
tries. It is rieh in many respects. But it is extremely difficult to find, since
historians have not yet found a common term, not yet started a debate, not
yet established a scientific network in this field of research. Tracing the work
on social inequality by historians means investing much time and energy in
reading and skimming through large numbers of books. It is like the work of
the gold-digger who has to sift lots of sand and flint to find small nuggets 2).
So it comes as no surprise that the work by historians has been rarely used in
sociological or economic research. To draw the attention of historians to this
problem and to present their research in a more accessible way to other disci¬
plines is one purpose of this section.
Do we raise the topic of social inequality at the wrong time? Should the his¬
torian living in a long economic depression better treat other topics of greater
actual interest? No doubt, historical research often has peculiar cycles of debates
and new topics. It is often difficult to say whether historians are late or early,
since the best time to raise a new topic might be when it is totally out of fas¬
hion. In addition, social inequality in long economic depressions is a compelling
theme as historians know from former depressions. Anyway, there is substan¬
tial, perhaps even increasing interest among historians in the history of social
2) As a report of the studies by historians see H. K a e 1 b 1 e, Industrialization and So¬
cial Inequality in 19th-century Europe (Leamington Spa^,1986).
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inequality. It is telling that in the last two years (1984 and 1985) more general
books on social inequality have been published than in many years before 3).
Hence, this section of the book is not an isolated attempt to promote a neglec-
ted topic but just one publication among several others.
Is a book in quantitative history the right place to present studies of the his¬
tory of social inequality? There is no doubt that a large amount of the research
by historians on social inequality in the 19th and 20th centuries is in fact
quantitative. To be sure, advanced quantitative techniques are rarely used; many
studies of social inequality base their conclusions on counting and on numbers.
Since differences in social inequality over time and across societies often are
a matter of minor shades rather than of strong contrasts, quantification is im¬
perative. Because social inequality often does become clear only if many indi¬
vidual lives are looked at, quantification is also necessary. It is interesting that
one of the most known promoters of the "new" non-quantitative narrative
history, Lawrence Stone, recentiy published a highly quantitative book in the
field of social inequality. This does not only show the common sense of this
author. It also demonstrates that quantification is very useful or even unavoi-
dable in the history of social inequality.
On the other hand, quantification is not the only way of treating the history
of social inequality. What definition of social inequality we use, what research
approach we choose, how social inequality was seen in historical times, what
demarcation lines and social distinctions were drawn by whom and with what
instruments, how the politics of social inequality happened, are all questions
which are not answered by quantitative studies. Since the topic of social inequa¬
lity does lead to non-quantitative methods, we inciude in this section one articie
out of three which is less quantitative than the others. For the history of social
inequality as for other fields of history, the debate on quantitative versus narra¬
tive methods is ill-defined, unrealistic and futile. Quantitative and non-quantita¬
tive methods can be and often must be used alongside each other depending on
the topic, the sources, sometimes even the training of the audience. The future
of quantification in history, after being firmly established, lies in the sensitive
and reasonable combination with other, non-quantitative methods. Historical
research on social inequality is a good example for this.
3) I would consider three recent books as important new interpretations in the history
of social inequality: J. G. Williamson, Did British Capitalism Breed Inequality
(Boston, 1985); L. Stone and J.C Fawtier Stone, An Open Elite? England 1540 -
1840 (Oxford, 1984); and J. M o o s e r, Arbeiterleben in Deutschland 1900 - 1970
(Francfort, 1985) (Working-Class in Germany, 1900 - 1970). A sociological research survey
with a certain historical perspective is R. Girod, Les ine*galites sociales (Paris, 1984);
and a sociological congress on social inequality with an interest in the past is G. Stras¬
ser and R. W. H o d g e, eds., Status Inconsistencies in Modern Societies (Duisburg, 1986).
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The history of social inequality is not an established field of historical research
with a wide consensus about its basic terms. Hence it is necessary to cover
briefly the definition of social inequality. Three approaches are used in historical
research, For lack of Space I shall simply review them rather than discussing
their strengths and weaknesses:
Firstly and usually, historians see social inequality as differences in the Stan¬
dard of living in the broad sense, i. e. not only in the real income, but also in
the quality of working conditions, housing, family life and neighbourhood, educ¬
ation, level of health and life expectancy, or of security against crime and op-
pression. In trying to cover as many of these aspects as the sources allow, his¬
torians usually pursue social inequality between social classes and occupational
groups or, less often, between men and women, between minorities and majori¬
ties, between urban and rural people, and between generations. Sometimes, his¬
torians are interested in social inequality only at one point in time and in one
place; sometimes, however, they deal primarily with the long-term change of
social inequality and its demographic, economic, social, cultural and political
reasons. The following articles by Johan Söderberg and by Janusz Zarnowski
are good examples of this approach.
Secondly, historians see (sometimes in combination with the first approach)
the development of social inequality as the history of social differences in
attitudes, life styles and mentalities, or as the history of purposeful social dis¬
tinctions and social demarcation lines. Once again, the differences are investi¬
gated mostly between social classes and occupational groups, but sometimes
also for minorities, between generations, between women and men, or between
rural and urban people. This approach is generally used for the study of one indi¬
vidual social class, one occupational group, or one minority, rather than for the
study of entire societies. Some historians use this definition together with the
first one, since they intend to write a histoire totale, or since they consider both
aspects of social inequality as closely interwined in historical reality and find it
difficult to say whether certain differences of the quality of housing, of levels
of education or of health are a matter of cultural choice or a result of Standards
of living. The following articie by Olivier Zunz is a good example of starting
from this second definition of social inequality.
Finally, historians sometimes look at social inequalities as social contrasts
between two basic social classes, i. e. the employers and the wage earners. All
other social classes and social differences are considered or supposed to be
secondary. This approach is not only used by Marxists, but also by non-Marxists
open toward the falsification of the approach. Two things are perhaps surpri¬
sing in the actual use of this approach in the research of social inequality in the
past:
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First, an extremely small number of studies in fact investigates the social
differentials of the Standard of living even between the two social classes which
are considered the two most important ones. Generally, the rise or decline of the
Standard of living of a single class is treated rather than its differentials. Second,
such investigations are not simply a Variation of the study of the Standard of
living. There is an important European school, inspired especially by E. P.
Thompson, which looks at social actions, social conflicts, and social attitudes
rather than at the mere material Situation. One might even say that this is in
fact the strength of the best of the small number of studies on social inequality
using this approach.
Historical research can contribute most to an analysis of the long-term change
of social inequality, i. e. to the question of the rise or decline of social inequa¬
lity in the long run. Especially the following papers on Sweden and Poland
follow this perspective. It would be highly interesting to describe the main
trends of the discussion on the long-term changes in social inequality. For lack
of space, I want only to point to three major debates which have dominated
research on the change of social inequality.
One major discussion Covers the rise or decline of social inequality during
the industrial revolution. Historians have, on the one hand, argued that the in¬
dustrial revolution in Europe led to a mitigation of social inequality compared
to the sharp social differences in feudal agrarian society. Lawrence Stone has
described early modern European society as a huge hill with a high and extreme¬
ly thin tower on it, with the bulky hill consisting of the mass of poor peasants,
artisans, and labourers, and the thin tower consisting of the courts, the large
landed aristocrats, and the rieh merchants. During the industrial revolution
the middle class became much more numerous. The tower on top became more
solid and the contrast to the large hill of poverty below less striking. On the
other hand, historians with such different basic points of view as Jeffrey Wil¬
liamson and Eric Hobsbawm have argued that social inequality during the
industrial revolution increased distinctly, especially between the rising middle
class and the working class. From this point of view, the industrial revolution
is seen as the period of most distinct social contrasts 4). The following papers
one Poland and Sweden join this controversy.
4) L. Stone, "Social Mobility in England 1500 - 1700," in: Past and Present 33
(1966); E. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, An Economic History of Britain since
1750 (London, 1968); Williamson, Inequality; cf. as other recent interpretations
in this debate: P. K. O'Brien/S. L. Engerman, "Changes in Income and its
Distribution During the Industrial Revolution,'* in: R. Floud/D.N. McCIoskey,
eds., The Economic History of Britain since 1700, vol. 1 (London, 1981); R. Q. Gray,
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A second debate among historians Covers the change of social inequality during
the subsequent period of second industrialization. To simplify once again a
complicated discussion, two basic positions can be found. On the one hand,
historians have seen the second industrialization as a period of less sharp social
inequalities due to various reasons such as the rise of the labour movement,
the early beginnings of social policies, the decline of the artisan elite in the wor¬
king class, the rise of routine white collar workers. Standards of living between
various social classes became somewhat less distinct in the period of the rise of
large entreprises and the beginnings of State Intervention. On the other hand,
historians have pointed to rising social inequalities between the concentrated
economic and political power of emerging big business and the mass of wage
earners, small farmers, artisans and shop-keepers. Once again, the following
papers participate in this debate among historians 5).
The Aristocracy of Labour in 19th-Century Britain, 1850 - 1914 (London, 1981); G.
C r o s s i c k, An Artisan Elite in Victoria Society, Kentish London 1840 -1880, (London
1978); J. M. M. de Meere, Long-Term Trends in Income and Wealth Inequality in
the Netherlands 1908 - 1940," in: Historical Social Research 27 (July 1983); A. Dau¬
mard, "Wealth and Aflluence in France since the Beginning of the 19th Century,"
in: W. D. R u b i n s t e i n, ed., Wealth and the Wealth in the Modern World (London,
1980); R. H. H u b s c h e r, L'agriculture et la societl rurale dans le Pas-de-Calais du
milieu du XIXe siecle a 1914, 2 vol. (Arras, 1979); F. Marquardt, "A Working Class in
Berlin in the 1840's" in: H. - TJ. W e h 1 e r, ed., Sozialgeschichte Heute (Göttingen,
1974); D. S a a 1 f e 1 d, "Lebensverhältnisse der Unterschichten Deutschlands im 19.
Jahrhundert," in: International Review of Social History 24 (1984); J. Kocka, Lohn¬
arbeit und Klassenbildung. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland 1800 - 1875
(Hannover, 1983); H. Rosenbaum, Formen der Familie (Francfort, 1982); L. S o 1-
t o w, Toward Income Quality in Norway (Madison,1965); V. Z a m a g n i, "The Rieh
in a Late Industrializer: The Case of Italy, 1800 -1945," in: W. D. R u b i n s t e i n, ed.
Wealth and the Wealthy in the Modern World (London, 1980); A. Imhof, Die Gewon¬
nenen Jahre (Munich, 1984), pp. 107 ff.; H. Kubier, Besoldung und Lebenshaltung
der unmittelbaren preußischen Staatsbeamten im 19. Jahrhundert; Y. S. B r e n n e r, H.
K a e 1 b 1 e and M. Thomas, eds., Income Distribution in Historical Perspective (forth-
coming).
5) Recent interpretations in this debate are H. U. W e h 1 e r, ed., Klassen in der euro¬
päischen Geschichte (Göttingen, 1979) (especially the articles by Hans-Ulrich Wehler,
Heinz-Gerhard Haupt on France, Sidney Pollard on Britain, Jürgen Kocka on Germany,
Hans Jürgen Puhle on the United States); F. Kraus, The Historical Development of
the Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick,1981); H. K a e 1 b 1 e, "Ar¬
beiter und soziale Ungleichheit in Europa, 1950 - 1930," in: K. T e n f e 1 d e, ed., Die
internationale Forschung zur Geschichte der Arbeiterschaft (Munich,1985); W. Fischer,
Armut in der Geschichte (Göttingen, 1982); Brenner, Kaelble and Thomas,
Income Distribution; Williamson, Inequality; S. Pollard, The Development
of the British Economy, 1914 -1980 (3rd ed., London, 1983); d e M e e r e, Inequality;
D a u m a r d, Wealth; H. Kaelble/H. Volkmann, "Streik und Einkommensver¬
teilung im Kaiserreich", in: J. B e r g m a n n et al., Arbeit, Mobilität, Partizipation, Pro¬
test (Opladen, 1985); V. H e n t s c h e 1, Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik im Wilhelmi-
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A third discussion Covers the period since 1945. It is a discussion more general
among social scientists than just among historians . Once again, we find the view
that the social differentials in the Standards of living became less distinct especi¬
ally as a consequence of the- final establishment of the welfare State, the unpre-
cedented power of trade unions, the rapid expansion of higher education and of
a highly educated labour force, the unique economic prosperity, or as a conse¬
quence of political factors such as the wars or basic changes in economic Sys¬
tems. On the other hand, we find the view that social inequalities since 1945
became more distinct between generjations, between native and foreign workers,
between the average wage earners and the new poor, but also between the new
professionals and the traditional industrial workers. The paper on Poland joins
that debate6).
4
Why should we take Sweden, Poland, and the United States as examples of
the history of social inequality in 19th and 20th Europe and America? It is
certainly not easy to find historians who are ready to give good papers with
new findings or new perspectives on this topic. We tried to find a paper on one
of the early industrialized countries of Western Europe and a paper on a Medi-
terranean European country. This failed. The three papers which follow are,
however, not accidental. They represent three different situations.
The Swedish paper by Johan Soderberg covers a country with one of the
most rapid industrializations in Europe. Between 1880 and 1913 the Swedish
rate of industrial growth was 2,9 % annually compared to only 2,1 % in Europe
nischen Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1978), pp. 67 ff.; Imhof, Gewonnene Jahre, pp. 107 ff.;
R. Spree, Soziale Ungleichheit vor Krankheit und Tod. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Ge¬
sundheitsrechts im Kaiserreich (Göttingen, 1981); J. Kocka, Die Angestellten in der
deutschen Geschichte 1850 - 1980 (Göttingen, 1981); K. D i t t, Industrialisierung, Ar¬
beiterschaft und Arbeiterbewegung in Bielefeld, 1850 - 1914 (Dortmund, 1982); H. J.
R u p i e p e r, Arbeiter und Angestellte im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung. Eine sozial¬
geschichtliche Studie am Beispiel der Maschinenfabrik Augsburg und Nürnberg (M.A.N.)
1837 - 1914 (Francfort, 1982); H. Pohl, ed., Sozialgeschichtliche Probleme in der Zeit
der Hochindustrialisierung (1870 - 1914) (Paderborn, 1979); M. K ö n i g /H. S i e g r i s t/
R. Vetterli, Warten und Aufrücken. Die Angestellten in der Schweiz 1870 - 1950
(Zürich, 1985).
6) Typical examples of work on the postwar trends are Tinbergen, Income Dis¬
tribution; Kraus, Income Inequality; T. Stark, The Distribution of Income in
Eight Countries (London, 1977); P. T o w s e n d, Poverty in the United Kingdom (Har-
mondsworth, 1979); A. B. Atkinson/A. J. Harriso n, Distribution of Personal
Wealth in Britain (Cambridge, 1978); A .H. H a 1 s e y, Change in British Society (Oxford,
1978), ch. 2; A. E. Atkinson, ed., Wealth, Income and Inequality, 2nd ed., (Oxford,
1980); H. van der W e e, Der gebremste Wohlstand (Munich, 1984), pp. 287 ff.;
D a u m a r d, Wealth; H. Suppanz/M. Wagner, eds., Einkommensverteilung in
Österreich (Munich, 1981).
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in general. The share of the industrial work force grew with a unique rate of
2,1 % annually from 1880 until 1910 compared to only 0,6 % in Western Europe
in general. The share of urban population increased by 2,2 % annually between
1890 and 1910, once again one of the highest rates in Europe 7). Sweden in fact
jumped into industrial society. In contrast to other rapid European industriali-
zers, however, the political history of Sweden is characterised by an exceptional
steadiness, by soft transitions and by the rareness of major upheavals. Not only
did the European wars of the twentieth Century afflict Sweden least; the tran¬
sition to parliamentary democracy was also unspectacular and unrevolutionary
in Sweden. Moreover, Sweden had a long, strong tradition of State intervention
and, hence, was not characterised by a dramatic and unprecedented rise of
govemment interventions as in other European countries or as in the U. S. In
sum, an unusually dramatic industrialization and a political steadiness make
Sweden an interesting case for the history of social inequality.
Poland, which is covered in the paper by Janusz Zarnowsky, is an important
case for opposite reasons. Predominately agricultural until the 1950's with
few, though sometimes early industrial regions, Poland on the whole is one of
the late industrializers among the large European countries. Perhaps due to
this backwardness (compared at least to Western Europe), Poland's economic
development since her independence was rapid. In spite of relatively modest
growth rates of industrial production, the share of the industrial labour force
increased rapidly. Since the first reliable occupational census in 1921, it grew
from 9 % to 35 % in 1970. Even compared to Sweden, the 20th Century Polish
labour force changed rapidly '. What makes Poland, however, a peculiar case
for the history of social inequality, is an exceptional series of political upheavals
in the 20th Century. When Poland became independent in 1919 from Russian,
Prussian, and Austrian rule, a certain foreign part of the upper class and the
Upper middle class emigrated and might have left behind a different structure
of social inequality. Only twenty years later, Poland was occupied by the Nazi
forces and suffered from one of the most brutal Nazi policies in occupied Euro¬
pean territories. A substantial part of the Polish middle class and lower middle
class was exterminated in the Holocaust,, again with strong and lasting effects
on class structure and social inequality. Finally, when Poland became a com-
7) Calculated from: P. Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels from 1750
to 1980," in: Journal of European Economic History 11 (1982), p. 294 (rates of industrial
growth per capital); H. Kaelble, "Was Prometheus most unbound in Europe? Labour
force in Europe during the late 19th and 20th centuries,'* in: Journal of European Econo¬
mic History 16 (1986) appendix; P. Flora, Quantitative Historical Sociology (The
Hague, 1977), pp. 46 f. (cf. also id., State, Economy and Society in Western Europe 1800 -
1975, vol. 2, Francfort, 1984 - 86).
8) Calculated from: B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750 - 1970
(London, 1978), p. 58; for economic growth cf. B a i r o c h, Industrialization Levels,
p. 331.
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munist country another ten years later, a further upheaval of class structure
and change of social inequality in Polish society occured. In sum, Poland is
a case in which social inequality was not only affected by a dramatic economic
development but also by dramatic political events.
The United States, which is discussed by Olivier Zunz, is important for our
theme since it was for some Europeans the most attractive or for others the
most repellent, egalitarian model. A "charm of American Life" wrote the
British ambassador to the United States, James Bryce, in 1888 was the attenu-
ated form of social inequality. "People meet on a simple and natural footing,
with more frankness and ease than is possible in countries where every one is
either looking up or looking down. There is no servility on the part of the
humbler... . There is no condescension on the part of the more highly placed9)."
Many Europeans before and after saw the United States in this egalitarian way
and their own Europe in an unegalitarian way. James Bryce makes clear that he
speaks of a specific sort of social inequality. He does not want to say that the
social differentials of the Standard of living were less distinct in the U. S. than in
Europe. He does not deal with this understanding of social inequality which can
be often found - as we saw - among social historians. He only says that social
distinctions were less clearly drawn than in Europe and that the different worlds
of social classes were less separated in the United States. It is this meaning of
social inequality which matters in historical comparisons between Europe and
America. In fact, it is this meaning which Stands behind the following articie
by Olivier Zunz on the American white collar employees of the period in which
James Bryce saw America.
For all these reasons I think the following papers are important and stimula-
ting. I hope they are also the beginning of more intensive and more comparative
research on the long-term historical change of social inequality in modern so¬
cieties.
9) J. Bryce, The American Commonwealth (New York, 1888), citation from: H. S.
Commager, ed., America in Perspective. The United States through Foreign Eyes
(New York , 1947), pp. 233 f.
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Trends in Inequality in Sweden, 1700 -1914 *)
Johan Söderberg
Introduction
This articie discusses the secular development of social inequality in Sweden
from ca. 1680 to 1914. The following questions are asked: What were the main
trends, and what subperiods can be discerned? How do urban patterns (Stock¬
holm) compare to rural ones? What were the driving forces? What is the relevan¬
ce of the Kuznets curve as a description of historical patterns?
In contrast to Williamson's recent Standard work on Britain this research em-
phasizes wealth rather than income inequality mainly because of its longer time
perspective. The more we focus on pre-industrial and agrarian conditions, the
less relevant will an income approach be. While information on various aspects
of wealth is fairly rieh, direct measurement of even late 19th Century farm in-
comes is seldom feasible because of the scarcity of data. Though there seems to
be widespread agreement that income and wealth inequality are closely related
in historical series, I am also less convinced than Wilhamson that "wealth and its
distribution is the tail wagged by the current income dog *)."
Studies of historical inequality have a place in several research agenda. One of
them, the macroeconomic analysis of capitalist development, deals with ine¬
quality as part ofa general equilibrium process. Within a growth and distribution
model, inequality may be treated as a set of price signals flashing factor scar-
cities and triggering supply responses. Eventually, such a model may explain the
Joint behaviour of factor rewards, output, and inequality. The work of William¬
son along these lines resembles but also attempts to augment the modeling of the
classical economists from Ricardo to Marx, predicting the long-term behaviour
of wages, rents, and profits2).
*) This articie was written as part of the research project "Stagnating Metropolis: Growth
Problems and Social Inequality in Stockholm, 1760 - 1850*', for which financial assistance
was provided by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences,
I wish to thank Professors Rolf Adamson, Konrad H. Jarausch, and Hartmut Kaelble for
their comments on an earlier version.
1) J. G. Williamson, Did British Capitalism Breed Inequality? (Boston, 1985),
p. 78. Investigations into long-term patterns of interoccupational pay ratios and intra-
occupational wage or earnings inequality is certainly a promising line for Swedish research,
but a focus on urban data will be unavoidable.
2) Williamson, op. cit., thinks that independently changing wealth distributions
(due to emancipation, land reform, or revolution rather than to income changes) are
historically rather rare. Such "independence-" would however be more frequent in the pre-
industrial era, say prior to 1815, particularly with reference to the effects of war, demo¬
graphic crises, and political instability. It is interesting to note that Eli F. Heckscher faced
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Plausible macroeconomic modeling is however dependent upon the availabi¬
lity of fundamental data on inequality, factor markets, and output. More has
been done on the British and American economies than on others. For Sweden
and many other countries we need a much more systematic empirical basis 3),
This paper reviews some basic evidence on Swedish inequality. Only regarding
Stockholm have I been able to conduct a few selective investigations into pri¬
mary materials and a the real property tax registers of 1715, 1799, and 1845.
My focus is on economic aspects of inequality; patterns of social mobility will
only be treated briefly.
Important aspects of the distribution of resources in pre-industrial society may
be traced in Swedish materials since the 16th Century. No doubt this should
also be possible regarding other European countries or regions. This opens up
intriguing questions conceming the very long-term evolution in inequality which
are just beginning to be explored. The well-known Kuznets curve of course only
intended to describe the period of modern economic growth from the 19th Cen¬
tury. As yet few corresponding hypotheses exist for the pre-industrial era.
Since little empirical research has been carried out in Sweden, only some ten-
tative hypotheses suggesting various long-term shapes of the inequality curve
in pre-industrial agrarian society are discussed.
Inequality is measured solely by conventional indicators such as the Gini in¬
dex. In quantitative history there has sometimes been an overstress on the unu-
sual or fanciful at the expense of standardization and comparability. The com¬
parative dimension will be extremely important in future historical inequality
research. Such work will be aided by the use of Standard methods and measures
as far as possible 4).
As readers cannot generally be expected to know Swedish economic history
well, it may be worthwhile briefly to present some basic features. Pre-industrial
agrarian society was dominated by relatively independent peasants in large
the problem squarely in his discussion of the distribution of wealth in 17th Century Sweden.
Noting that "one of the great controversies in pohtical economy concerns the question
whether wealth mcreases are rooted in especially valuable economic contributions - accord
mg to market valuation
- or depend on the distribution of power in society, two viewpoints
which, to be sure, do not altogether exclude each other", he reached the conclusion on
historical evidence that "the great fortunes were created primarily by the pohtical condi¬
tions; contributions to ordinary economic activity in 17th Century Sweden were not the
main factors in the formation of large fortunes, although business transactions played their
substantial part". Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia fran Gustav Vasa, I 2
(Stockholm, 1936), p. 318. Compare also the discussion of the reduktion below.
3) Important work on national product series for the whole of the 19th Century is current¬
ly carried out by Olle Krantz and Lennart Schön at the Department of Economic History,
University of Lund.
4) Much of the French inequality research is less useful for comparative purpose than it
might have been due to a reliance on home-spun rather than Standard methods. See, e. g.,
A. Daumard et al. Les fortunes frangaises au XDCe siecle (Paris, 1973).
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parts of the country. Most researchers maintain that Sweden was never feuda-
lized 5). Large estates were mainly found in the plainlands of the lake Mälaren
region in eastern Sweden and in the south. The Strategie industrial activity in
the pre-industrial era was iron production. A strong, centralized bureaucraey
emerged during the 17th Century.
Agrarian economic growth in the period 1750 - 1850 is now generally regarded
as an important prerequisite to later industrialization. The expansion of the
peasant economy was a major force in the transformation of agriculture and
the beginning of modern economic growth 6). Large-scale farming did not pos-
sess any obvious produetivity advantages over peasant farming based on family
labour7).
The country was overwhelmingly agrarian well into the second half of the
19th Century. As late as 1850 not more than one tenth of the population lived
in towns. Industrialization was late but rapid; during the last decades of the 19th
Century exports of wood produets and iron ore grew dramatically. The indus¬
trialization process was extremely successful in terms of economic growth and
rising Standards of living. From about the turn of the Century the domestic mar¬
ket increased in importance and industrial production was gradually reorienta-
ted from raw materials to processed produets such as pulp and mechanical
engineering. Industrialization and urbanization were to a considerable extent
separate phenomena, as 19th Century exports relied on exploitation of natural
resources in rural regions.
The Period 1680-1715
The only systematic inquiry into inequality trends during this period is Kekke
Stadin's dissertation on small-town burghers. For seven towns, mainly in eastern
and south-eastern Sweden, she described social differentiation primarily on the
basis of tax registers. No other strata than burghers were studied 8).
5) A classic Statement on the absence of feudalism is E. F. H e c k s c h e r, An Econo¬
mic History of Sweden (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), ch. 2. For diverging Marxist viewpoints
see P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974); J. Linde-
g r e n, Den svenska militärstaten 1560 - 1720, in: Magtstaten i Norden i 1600-tallet og
de sociala konsekvenser, ed. E. Ladewig Petersen (Odense, 1984), 99 - 130.
6) On peasant expansion generally see $. M a r t i n i u s, Jordbrukets omvandling pa
1700 - och 1800-talen (Lund, 1982), M. F r i d h o 1 m et al, Industrialismens rötter
(Stockholm, 1976).
7) This aspect is stressed in much recent research at the Department of Economic History,
University of Stockholm. See, e. g., U. J o n s s o n, A. - M. K ö 11 and R. Petters-
s o n, "Eine Agrargesellschaft im Wandel," Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarso-
ziologie 28 (1980); U. Jonsson, Jordmagnater, landbönder och torpare i sydöstra
Södermanland 1800 - 1880 (Stockholm, 1980), ch. 5.
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This research abserved a clear tendency towards widening inequality. A small
group of well-to-do burghers managed to concentrate an increasing share of total
economic resources into their hands. This tendency was strongest in the econo¬
micaliy expanding towns, while stagnating ones exhibited a weaker trend toward
concentration, or even a decline in inequality. Five per cent of the richest
burghers often represented about fifty per cent of total taxis paid.
The dominance of an economic elite was most pronounced in trading centres,
where merchants generally formed an upper Stratum. One reason why wealth
was increasingly concentrated was, according to Stadin, that several important
economic activities demanded larger amounts of capital than previously. This
applies for instance to the iron trade. Towns such as Arboga near the iron pro¬
ducing regions tended to be set aside by direct transactions between iron pro-
ducers and Stockholm merchants. Small-town middlemen were increasingly
bypassed, and only a minority among them were capable of successful adap-
tation, for example by establishing themselves as owners of ironworks, usually
leaving the town 9).
Stadin interprets her results within a broader framework of emerging capi¬
talism. Only a small Upper Stratum among the burghers was capable of accumu-
lation to such an extent that it contributed to capitalistic forms of enterprise,
primarily with regard to ironworks, shipbuilding, and shipping companies. Their
Investments were modest but not unimportant. Members of this thin Stratum
were often closely related by marriage to Stockholm merchants. Middlemen,
a far larger segment of burghers were under pressure from merchants in the
capital, possessing greater resources gained from foreign trade. A commercial
and economic concentration to Stockholm was taking place at the expense of
several small and middle-sized towns. Economic functions were increasingly
specialized within a division of labour geared to demand from the European
metropolises. The new trends in economic Organization implied a higher degree
of efficiency but also a widening in overall economic inequality.
By 1715, there were probably less than twenty towns in Sweden proper
(excluding Finland) with a population exceeding 1,000 10). Trends in the urban
distribution of resources can only have affected the aggregate national picture
in a marginal fashion. No systematic study of inequality within the agrarian
sector during the period in question is, however, available. Rising land prices,
8) K. Stadin, Smastäder, smaborgare och stora samhällsförändringar (Uppsala, 1979)
especially ch. 5. Stadin argues that the analysis of tax records provides results that are
comparable over time.
9) Concentration tendencies favourable to the big merchants were more evident in the
export trade with bar iron than in internal trade with pig iron. I owe this Observation to
unpublished research by Professor Rolf Adamson, Department of Economic History,
University of Stockholm.
10) This rough estimate of mine is based on data in Stadin, p. 176.
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a major factor generally assumed to have contributed towards increasing dif¬
ferentiation later during the 18th Century, probably was of Httle importance du¬
ring this earlier period H).
The most interesting changes in stratification within the agrarian sector to¬
wards the end of the 17th Century are associated with the great reform in State
finances (the reduktion). In order to increase tax incomes, the crown confiscated
many possessions that had been transferred to the nobility earlier during the
Century. Still, most of the old aristocracy managed to save its most important
landed estates. In addition, several recentiy ennobled and enriched famihes
emerged as large landowners in the aftermath of the reduktion. Non-noble
merchants seldom were able to buy large estates. The actual balance between old
and new fortunes islittle known, although Eli F. Heckscher emphasized that the
net result of the reduktion consisted less in an overall leveling tendency than in
a transfer of wealth unto new hands 12). Heckscher probably underestimated the
effects on overall inequality in the distribution of land. The amount of land be¬
longing to the nobihty was substantially reduced, by something of the order
of a third. I find it hard to believe that inequality among private landowners
should not have been appreciably reduced, even though the position of the
peasantry was not automatically strengthened.
The Period 1715 -1850
The agrarian sector
The only hypothesis conceming long-term inequality trends so far advanced
in Swedish research was proposed by Maths Isacson (for references see Table 4
below). His investigation of a parish in the county of Kopparberg (for the divis¬
ion into counties see Figure 1) ledhimto separate two phases in the develop¬
ment of inequality among peasants. During the first period, stretching from the
end of the 17th Century throughout the 18th, inequality was reduced. Larger
farmsteads tended to be divided into two or more units, resulting in homogeni-
zation.
11) I know of only one investigation into land prices, covering some 60 purchases of
farmsteads in the county of Gotland 1689
- 1721. No marked price trend was discernible.
See G. Kellgren, Gotland 1690 - 1720 (Södertälje, 1942), pp. 209 - 10. Stable 17th
Century land prices, applying at least to transactions within kin, are also suggested by I.
Jonsson, Jordskatt och kameral Organisation i Norrland under äldre tid (Umeä, 1971),
p. 103.
12) E. F. H e c k s c h e r, Sveriges ekonomiska histora fran Gustav Vasa 1:2, pp. 336 -
59. For more recent accounts see K. Ä gr e n, The reduktion,in: Sweden's Age of Great-
ness, ed. M. Roberts, (London, 1973); and L. Magnusson, Reduktionen under
1600-talet: debatt och forskning (MalmÖ, 1985).
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Figure 1: The division of Sweden into counties.
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The second phase is connected with the agrarian revolution from the beginning
of the 19th Century. A group of large peasants emerged, which in Isacson's in¬
vestigation area was involved in iron production as well. Agrarian production
was growing at a faster rate than previously and substantial amounts of land
were reclaimed. Isacson believes that there were some advantages of scale for the
relatively large farmers. By 1850, a marked stratification among the peasants is
evident, and the distribution of wealth was more unequal than it been by 1715.
The small group of large peasants by the mid-nineteenth Century was differen¬
tiated from the rest of the peasantry not only with regard to wealth and produc-
tive capacity but also socially, e. g., by the ownership of wagons, gold, and silver.
Isacson thus argues for the existence ofa long-term U-shaped inequality curve,
reaching a minimum around 1800. He did not claim that these results necessari-
ly would apply to other areas than the one investigated. It is nonetheless interes¬
ting to discuss his findings in more general terms,
For the first half of the 19th Century there seems to be wide agreement that
inequality among peasants was rising. Several regionally based studies in addition
to Isacson's display such a pattern of differentiation (see Table 4 below). Chris¬
ter Winberg, dealing with a few parishes in the plains of Skaraborg county,
reports a quite marked increase in inequality with regard to the distribution
of land. He contends that the peasants in his area were so differentiated by 1850
as to make it meaningless to characterize this category as a social Stratum. For
two peasant-dominated parishes in southern Sweden, I also found evidence of
growing inequality among landowners and farmers between 1821 and 1862. The
Gini coefficient (G) increased from .42 to .51 in the plainland parish of Fleninge
and from .18 to .35 in the woodland parish of Loshult. Still, inequality among
property owners in agrarian society is in general likely to have been lower than
in the towns 13).
The gaps in our knowledge are greater when it comes to the first part of Isac¬
son's hypothesis, supposing an 18th Century homogenization. There is no agre¬
ement among researchers that it is reasonable to expect such a trend. In a study
dealing with the county of Skaraborg between the 1730s and the 1770s, Lars
Herlitz on the contrary supposes growing differentiation among peasants. Land
prices were rising rapidly, forcing many peasants to settle with small farming
units on which the labour force could not be effectively utilized. The growth in
production and incomes was unevenly distributed. These conclusions of Herlitz'
are not based on actual Observation of changes in the distribution of resources
but are merely indirect inferences from trends in land prices.
13) L. S o 1 t o w, 'The Swedish Census of Wealth at the Beginning of the 19th Cen¬
tury", Scandinavian Economic History Review 33 (1985), indicates a higher level of ine¬
quality in Swedish and Finnish towns than in rural areas according to the wealth census of
1800. Unfortunately, Stockholm is missing in this material.
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In other words there are two alternative hypotheses in the literature regarding
18th Century trends in social differentiation. fsacson's assertion is to some extent
contradicted by a study by Mats Morell reporting growing inequality in the dis¬
tribution of land in five parishes in the counties of Stockholm and Västmanland
ca. 1770 - 1825. Since this period is prior to the major changes associated with
the agricultural revolution, his results fit Herlitz' hypothesis of rising inequality
better. The same apphes to Winberg's study, revealing a decline in the share of
middle-sized farming units and a rising portion of small as well as large ones
between 1780 and 1810.
Table 1 exhibits four inequality measures for the parish of Luleä in Norrbotten
county. They all indicate widening inequality in the distribution of land between
1750 and 1824. Available evidence thus does not support a view of declining
inequality during the latter part of the 18th Century.
Table 1. Distribution of landholdings in Lutea" parish in 1543, 1750, and 1824.
Inequality indicator
Share held by top 10 per cent of owners
Share held by top 50 per cent of owners
Coefficient of Variation
Gini coefficient
Source: Calculations based on G. Enequist, Nedre Luledalens byar (Uppsala, 1937)
pp. 35, 139,221.
On the other hand, data for Lulea are not incompatible with Isacson's hypo¬
thesis in a deeper sense: there appears to be some kind of long-term curvilinear
or cyclical path in inequality. The distribution of land was clearly more equal in
1750 than in 1543; the latter is is fact very similar to the 1824 distribution. Isac¬
son certainly has a point in that we should not assume any long-run constancy
in the level of inequality before the beginning of modern economic growth.
Obviously far more work needs to be done in order to trace the very long-term
evolution in inequality and its possible regional variations. It should be stressed
that Lulea, being an area in Sweden's northernmost county where livestock
rather than arable production was essential, differs in many ways from the cen¬
tral plains. Inequality in northern Sweden is likely to have been comparatively
low 14).
More research into patterns of landownership and other aspects of the distri-
14) The Lulea data are based on actual land measurements rather than on the conventio-
nal, inflexible land tax assessment unit (the mantal).
Year
1543 1750 1824
20 17 20
70 62 70
.51 .34 .52
.28 .18 .28
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bution of material resources will be needed before we can determine the 18th
Century trends with any accuracy 15). it should be safe to assume, however,
that the trend toward widening inequality among peasants that is seen during
the first half of the 19th Century must have been far stronger than anything
during the previous Century.
So far we have dealt primarily with peasant farmers or owners. One of the
most striking elements in the total process of differentiation was, however,
the growth of rural strata below peasants in the Century after 1750. Especially
during the period ca. 1800 - 70, the lower strata comprising crofters or landless
increased dramatically. About 1750, groups below the peasants (primarily
crofters, cottars, and landless labourers) were only a quarter as numerous as
the peasants; a Century later the lower strata comprised as many people as the
peasants. Regardless of trends within the peasantry, this expansion of lower
agrarian strata must have contributed towards a widening of inequality in a
broader perspective. In this sense there can be Httle doubt that the Century
after 1750 must be regarded as a period of growing overall inequality lo).
What about the upper classes in rural society, the landed nobility and large
landowners in general? By the mid-eighteenth Century, less than half of one
per cent of Sweden's population held approximately a third of the land. Al¬
though this may seem a high figure, it is far from extreme in a European per¬
spective. The distribution was more uneven in, e. g., England and Wales, Prussia,
Lombardy, and Spain, but perhaps somewhat more even in France at the eve of
the Revolution 17).
Large landowners were declining in the long run. This was a temporally and
regionally differentiated process, involving shifts between various groups of large
landowners as well. The decline in the position of noble landowners began
15) More results on inequality in 16th century agrarian society will come forward in a
research project entitled "Agrarian Production, Prices, and Wages in Sixteenth-Century
Sweden", recentiy started by myself and Janken Myrdal at the Department of Economic
History, University of Stockholm.
16) Several detailed social mobility studies show that downward mobility from the
peasant to the lower strata increased dramatically during the first half of the 19th Century.
Facing rapidly rising land prices, sons or daughters of peasants frequently failed to attain
the position of their parents. Trends in social mobility thus conform to what is reasonable
to expect from economic inequality trends. Major studies inciude those of Winberg, Marti-
nius, and Söderberg listed in Table 4. See also J. O. Björkman, Bonde och . tjänsteh-
jon; om social stratifiering i äldre svensk agrarbygd (Uppsala, 1974), and I. Eriksson
and J. Rogers, Rural Labor and Population Change (Uppsala, 1978). KölTs thesis
(Table 4) includes an interesting analysis of marriage patterns as an indicator of social
distance. See also S. Carlsson, Fröknar, mamseller, jungfrur och pigor (Uppsala,
1977), and for on overview of social structure R. Miller and T. Gcrger, Social
Change in 19th-Century Swedish Agrarian Society (Stockholm, 1985).
17) S. Carlsson, Standssamhälle och ständspersoner 1700 - 1865 (Lund, 1973),
p. 118.
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and grew strongest in areas outside the central piainlands. The central plains,
where the largest estates were situated, were less affected. Especially in the de¬
cades around 1850, a not inconsiderable net transfer of land took place from
nobles to non-nobles including bourgeois as well as peasants. By 1862, 2.5 per
cent of the largest owners held 29 per cent of the value of landed property i8).
Stockholm
In order to trace some broad trends in inequality in Stockholm, the distri¬
bution of real property has been studied by means of three cross sections refer-
ring to the years 1715, 1799, and 1845, based on the following sources. Between
1713 and 1715, a yearly wealth tax was levied on real and personal property in
Sweden. For Stockholm, only the 1716 returns, pertaining to valuations carried
out during late 1715, are preserved. The registers report estimated values of sites,
buildings, and personal property. Values of sites and buildings are here added
for the purpose of obtaining comparability with the other cross-sections. Perso¬
nal property is left aside i9).
Apart from the wealth tax of the 1710's, no 18th-century valuation of realor
personal property exists at the national level. Taxation of real property remained
a municipal matter until 1810. For Stockholm, the source Situation is better
than for most of Sweden, since real property was re-evaluated on three occasi¬
ons during the Century (1737, 1787, and 1799). For this study I have only had
the opportunity to analyze the 1799 records20).
Starting in 1810, yearly real property valuations were carried out throughout
the Century. All of this valuable material is preserved. In rural areas valuations
were generally fixed in money terms between about 1815 and 1862. For instan¬
ce, a farmstead assessed to 1,000 rdr (riksdaler banco) in 1815 would still exhi-
bit the same value in the 1861 volumes, although ownership changes would be
recorded correctly. Of course this means that the sources do not reflect market
values well during most of this period. In Stockholm, however, valuations were
far more flexible in the short run. For practical reasons I chose to work with a
municipal register based on the 1845 tax register 21).
A stratified random sample was drawn from each register. All registers contain
18) On the position of noble and other large landowners see Carlsson, op. cit,
ch, 6. The 1862 distribution: S. M a r t i n i u s, Jordbruk och ekonomisk tillväxt i
Sverige 1830 - 1870 (Gothenburg,1970), ch. 2.
19) For a general account of the wealth tax of 1713 - 1716 see J. E. A 1 m q u i s t,
Om kontributionsränteriet, Karolinska förbundets arsbok 1917.
20) The 1737 municipal real property tax records are partly damaged.
21) For yearly aggregate real property values for Stockholm see F. T. Berg, Sta-
tistiska minnesblad öfver Stockholm, Statistisk Tidskrift 3 (1865), On 19th Century real
property tax registers see R. A d a m s o n, Järnavsättning och bruksfinansiering 1800 -
1860 (Gothenburg, 1966), ch. 9, and S. M a r t i n i u s, Peasant Destinies (Stockholm,
1977), ch. 2.
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the same information: the title and name of the proprietor and the estimated
value of the property, but no other personal characteristics such as age, and few
descriptions of houses or sites22).
Table 2 reports the share of real property held by specified percentiles of pro-
prietors, ranked from largest to smallest, and sample sizes.
Table 2. Percentage of real property in Stockholm held by specified shares of
property owners in 1715, 1799 and 1845.
Percentile
0-1
1-5
5-10
10-20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-60
60-70
70-80
80-90
90-100
Gini coefficient
N
Share Cumulative shares
1715 1799 1845 1715 1799 1845
12 9 11 12 9 11
30 24 23 42 33 34
21 20 19 63 53 53
20 21 19 83 74 72
9 10 10 92 84 82
4 7 6 96 91 88
2 4 5 98 95 93
1 3 3 99 98 96
0 1 2 99 99 98
1 0 1 100 99 99
0 1 1 100 100 100
0 0 0 100 100 100
.78 .70 .68
390 364 366
Sources: 1715: Karl XII:s kontributionsarkiv, skattningslängd 1716. 1799 and 1845:
Brandvaktskasseadministrationens arkiv, taxeringslängder 1799 and 1846. All in Stockholms
stadsarkiv.
The key result is that of a long-term overall decline in inequality. Most of the
change occurred between 1715 and 1799, when G feil from .78 to .70 23). What
22) The 30 largest proprietors were located in each register. The rest were drawn by
simple random sampling. As is well known with regard to highly skewed distributions such
as these, simple random samplingthroughout will underestimate inequality. See, e. g., F.
Nygird and A. Sandström, Measuring Income Inequality (Stockholm, 1981),
ch. 10.
23) A narrowing in inequality in Stockholm during the first half of the 19th Century is
also suggested by Soltow's study of the distribution of wealth among deceased. G declines
from .84 in 1790 and 1800 to .78 in 1850. The source is the municipal death lists (dödlis-
tor). This material is however highly incomplete, including only a minority of the deceased.
The consequences of the gaps are not discussed. See S o 1 t o w, The Swedish Census
of Wealth, p. 23.
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shifts between social strata account for the narrowing differentials? Who were
the winners? The losers?
Table 3 divides the samples into four strata. The first comprises persons of
standing or rank (ständspersoner) except merchants, dealers, and industrialists,
who make up the second group 24). The third consists of artisans and some
other people with a similar social standing, while the fourth comprises :' indivi¬
duals with a social position below that of the craftsmen: journeymen, labourers,
soldiers and civil servants in low positions, and unspecified widows. The table
also reports the share held by females (summed over all social strata).
Table 3. Distribution of real property in Stockholm by social category.
Category Percentage of wealth Percentage of sample
1715 1799 1845 1715 1799 1845
Persons of standing
Merchants, industrialists
Artisans
Lower Stratum
Total
Female owners
Persons of standing suffered a rather dramatic decline in their share of real
property during the 18th Century, from 74 to 41 per cent of the total. Their
shares were overtaken primarily by merchants and industrialists, and the artisans
also advanced noticeably. Between 1799 and 1845 the distribution was more
stable; the small changes taking place were continuations of 18th Century
trends. The lower Stratum, while comprising about a fifth of the number of pro-
prietors, held a fairly negligible portion of total real property.
When discussing the causes of the redistribution we have to keep in mind that
the 1715 taxation took place during the later stage of the Great Nordic War,
ending in 1721 when Sweden lost her Baltic provinces and her great power po¬
sition. By 1715 the war had been raging for a decade and a half and Sweden
had suffered heavy losses in Russia. Of course the war involved great strains on
the country. Still, modern research has tended to play down the adverse effects,
which clearly were not as disastrous to the economy as an older tradition main-
24) The Standsperson concept (from German Standesperson) refers to persons of high
extraction and particularly those standing above the burgher and peasant estates. Nobles
and priests were included, but from the latter 18th Century the concept also was taken to
comprise growing numbers of non-noble iron masters, officers, doctors, etc. See Carls¬
son, Ständssamhälle och ständspersoner, ch. 2.
74 41 35 23 20 18
12 33 37 8 20 21
13 23 25 47 37 43
1 3 3 22 23 18
00 100 100 100 100 100
35 14 11 21 20 14
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tained. Stockholm was never attacked, but at the time discussed here the capital
had received quite a number of refugees from Aland which had recentiy been
conquered by the Russians. These people are often described as destitute in the
1715 register.
The eighteenth-century leveling tendency particularly affected the nobles.
They very much dominated the upper tail of the 1715 distribution. Among the
top ten proprietors only one was a non-noble (the merchant, Paul Johan Heub-
lein). The largest owner was a noble woman, Elisabet Funck (1642 - 1719). The
daughter of a rieh mayor of Stockholm, she married Johan Funck, a dynamic
iron master and entrepreneur regarded as one of the richest persons of burgher
extraction in his time. He was ennobled in 1672 and died in 1679 at the height
of his career 25). Among the rest of the top proprietors a small number of well-
known noble families were well represented (e.g., Sparre, Tessin, De la Gardie,
Piper, Fleming, Stenbock, and Hörn).
By 1799, the Situation had changed significantly. Only three nobles remained
among the top ten (representing the famihes De Geer, Cronhjelm, and Rosen¬
adler). The largest proprietor was a textile manufacturer, Carl Gustaf Apiarie,
possessing the largest mill in Stockholm. The rest of the top ten now was quite
diversified, including a merchant, an ironworks entrepreneur, another textile
manufacturer, a high govemment official, an officer, and a wealthy widow.
In 1845, the largest owner was doctor, M. C. Retzius. The rest of the top ten
now included a stronger element of merchants, occupying positions two to
five. Furthermore, there were three nobles (families De Geer, Nordenfalk, and
Stael von Holstein), a textile manufacturer, and a brewer.
In his classic Interpretation of Swedish economic history, Heckscher emphasi-
zed two major changes in the 18th Century economy. The first was the emer¬
gence of a new, largely non-noble upper class based on the leading merchants,
particularly in Stockholm (the Skeppsbroadel), and the iron masters. The second
was the growing importance of the peasantry, similarly based on economic ex¬
pansion. Heckscher thought that the 18th Century in some respects could be
regarded as the age of the merchants, who were still being favoured by mercanti-
list policies aimed at stimulating the feeble towns. The merchants not only
controlled the important exports but also were more closely involved in indus¬
trial production, especially iron, than they were to be during the subsequent
Century.
Heckscher on the other hand very much played down the role of urban handi-
crafts and manufactories in economic growth. They did not form a point of
departure for the industrialization gaining momentum during the 19th Century.
The roots of modern industrialization rather were to be found in rural cot tage
production, particularly in textiles 26). •
25) On the Funck family see Svenskt biografiskt lexikon 16 (1964), p. 650.
26) E. F. H e c k s c h e r , Svenskt arbete och liv (Stockholm, 1968), pp. 148, 212,219.
71
Heckscher's conception of cottage industry is supported and reinforced by
recent Swedish research stressing the importance of the domestic market for
consumption goods. In a major study of the rise of mechanized textile factories,
Lennart Schön observes a close connection between agricultural growth, raising
domestic demand for textiles, and the expansion in rural cottage industry 27).
Heckscher anticipated Strategie elements in that part of the protoindustrializa¬
tion debate which points to the existence of such a positive hnk between cottage
industry and subsequent industrialization.
The limited investigation of Stockholm presented here can of course only
very partially form a basis for a reappraisal of Heckscher's Interpretation of the
Swedish 18th Century economy. Nevertheless, I will try to relate the results
to a larger framework.
With regard to the expansion of iron merchants and iron masters emphasized
by Heckscher, this cannot be expected to have made much of an impact on the
Stockholm real property market. Investments in moveables and ironworks were
more Strategie to the exporters than was investment in real property within the
capital 2**). The economic strength of the leading merchants, and even less of
the iron masters, will not show up in the holding of large possessions in Stock¬
holm. Other sources and methods will have to be used in order to determine the
extent of their expansion.
The advance of the merchant and industrialist group in Table 3 mainly invol¬
ved individuals other than those associated with the major merchant export
firms. Traders in grain, spices, or general groceries were prominent. Particular¬
ly in 1799, there was a not inconsiderable number of industrialists among the
larger proprietors. Even though the manufactories of the capital on the whole
were declining since the 1760s, this should not lead us to believe that possibi¬
lities of capital aecumulation were absent. A few textile and tobaeco manufac-
turers were able to compete at the highest level of the urban real property mar¬
ket.
During the 18th Century not only merchants and industrialists but also the
artisan category in Table 3 clearly improved its position versus the persons of
standing. While artisans formed a diminishing share of the proprietors, those
remaining increased. their share of total property. Artisan proprietors in other
words became fewer and richer. Brewers, representing a relatively capital inten¬
sive industry, are among the most prominent in 1799. At the other end of the
scale were the few and small owners from large trades with small costs of entry
such as shoemaking and tailoring.
This pattern may be compared to Ernst Söderlund's study of the Stockholm
27) L. S c h ö n, Frän hantverk tili fabriksindustri (Lund, 1979), ch. 5; S c h ö n, In¬
dustriealismens förutsättningar (Lund, 1982).
28) K. S a m u e 1 s s o n, De stora köpmanshusen i Stockholm 1730 - 1815 (Stock¬
holm, 1951), ch. 3.
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artisans, based on tax registers. On one hand, he stressed the secular Stagnation
of handicrafts in the capital during most of the 18th Century. Smail-scale rural
cottage production and other towns offered stiffening competition. On the
other hand Stagnation did not affect all handicrafts equally and did not preclude
polarizing tendencies. Some small groups among the masters succeeded in esta-
blishing capitalistic forms of enterprises, employing dozens of journeymen and
labourers in the building trades. Brewers, butchers, bakers, and goldsmiths for¬
med an upper Stratum at a considerable distance from the majority of mas¬
ters 29). Results in Table 3 seem to agree with a view of widening inequality
within the artisan group when this is taken to inciude the unpropertied mas¬
ters. Economic Stagnation among artisans should not be overemphasized since
the category was expanding at the expense of persons of standing.
The decline of persons of standing is the dominating feature of Table 3.
There is a lack of economic studies dealing with the nobility, among whom the
decline was striking. One possibility ist that some withdrew from the capital
in order to specialize as landowners. The counties surrounding Stockholm were
a stronghold of noble landowners well into the second half of the 19th Century.
One of the very few investigations into landed estates during the 18th Century
suggests fairly high levels of profitability. There is no reason to expect an eco¬
nomic crisis among noble landowners in this region 30).
Far from all nobles possessed land, however. A cohort study of the nobility
by Ingvar Elmroth reveals a secularly declining percentage holding landed es¬
tates. This share was high among those born or ennobled in 1650 - 1659 (56
per cent) but far lower in the 1700 - 1709 and 1750 - 1759 cohorts. Demo¬
graphic reproduction was significantly lower among the unpropertied, indicating
less favourable economic circumstances 31). A growing share became civil ser¬
vants or military men; this was partly an inevitable effect of the reduktion.
The weakened position of the Stockholm nobility during the 18th Century
may be seen as an expression of growing inequahty within this estate, making
itself particularly feit in the capital where the number of nobles in civil Service
was very high. It is only logical that the stable position of the landed nobility
in the lake Mälaren Valley should contrast to the retrogression in the capital.
There are reasons to believe that the major features of Heckscher's interpre-
tations are realistic. Summarizing the discussion above, some minor points
may still be made. First, reference to social categories should be supplemented
by the Observation that differentiation within the peasantry as well as within
the nobility and the Stockholm artisans in all likelihood was widening. Second,
Heckscher may have had a too negative view of the role of urban burghers and
29) E. S ö d e r 1 u n d, Stockholms hantverkarklass 1720 - 1772 (Stockholm, 1943),
ch. 8; S öder lund, Hantverkarna II (Stockholm, 1949), pp. 85 - 99.
30) L. Magnusson, Ty som ingenting angelägnare är an mina bönders conservation
(Uppsala, 1980), ch. 5.
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manufacturers. While the general discontinuity between handicrafts and manu-
facturies on one hand and modern factory industry on the other is undeniable,
possibihties of capital accumularion within the handicraft and manufactory
sectors were far from totally lacking. This somewhat more positive view resem-
bles Stadin's conceming the small-town burghers in the decades around 1700.
Third, regarding the Stockholm merchants, the advance of some iron expor-
ters may have been overstressed at the expense of broader layers of merchants
and dealers who often seem to have been fairly successful. Fourth, the diversity
of regional patterns makes generalization to the national level a less straight-
forward matter than Heckscher assumed. The establishment of national trends
more often than not requires large numbers of regional investigationSj few of
which have yet been carried out.
The results regarding female proprietors in Table 2 remain to be commented
upon. A surprisingly high share of real property in 1715 (35 per cent) was held
by women. This share was not more than 14 per cent in 1799 and 11 per cent in
1845. In 1715 as well as in 1799 females comprised about 20 per cent of the
sample. The 1715 female proprietors thus were remarkably wealthy but not un-
usually numerous. Wartime male mortality alone is not asufficient explanation.
Possibly the Great Nordic War led to disproportionate rise in mortality among
noblemen as many officers were killed. Anyhow this period seems to be associa¬
ted with an economicaliy strong position of propertied women.
The long-term inequality decline in Stockholm does not reinforce either of the
competing hypotheses regarding Swedish rural society referred to above. Table
4 summarizes most of the available results on secular trends.
The secular dechne in inequality in Stockholm does not conform to Kuznets'
well-known inverted U hypothesis, according to which inequality is supposed to
widen during early periods of industrialization and later to narrow. Kuznets
assumed that inequahty among the urban population would be far wider than
for an agricultural population organized in relatively small enterprises. This
would be the case particularly when the urban population was being swelled by
immigrants, either from the country's agricultural areas or from abroad. Once
the turbulent phases of urbanization and industrialization had passed, the rela¬
tive position of lower urban strata would improve, reducing overall inequa¬
hty 32).
The inverted U hypothesis in this original formulation is based on assumptions
of the emergence ofa dynamic growth process in which industrialization and ur¬
banization are closely tied. This does not provide a good description of the Swe¬
dish experience in the Century after 1750 where industrialization and urbani¬
zation were largely separate phenomena. Agrarian growth is hkely to have sur-
31) I. E 1 m r o t h , För kung och fosterland (Lund, 1981), chs. 4, 6.
32) S. Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure (London, 1966), pp. 273 - 5.
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Table 4. Sehernatic presentation of results on secular inequality trends in Swe¬
den, ca. 1720 -1850.
Area, Social Inequality trend
county category 1720 -1L800 1810-1850
By,
Kopparberg Peasants Falling Rising
Most of
Skaraborg Peasants Rising
Dala,
Skaraborg Peasants Rising
Skaning,
Skaraborg Peasants Rising
Julita and österäker,
Södermanland Peasants Rising
Fleninge,
Malmöhus All owners Rising
Loshult,
Kristianstad All owners Rising
Västerlövsta,
Västmanland All owners Rising
Stockholm city All owners Falling Falling
Sources: By: M. Isacson, Ekonomisk tillväxt och social differentiering 1680 - 1860
(Uppsala, 1979), Skaraborg: L. Herlitz, Jordegendom och ränta, (Gothenburg, 1974);
Dala: C. W i n b e r g, Folkökning och proletarisering (Gothenburg, 1975),. pp- 184 - 5;
Skaning: S. M a r t i n i u s, Peasant Destinies; the History of 552 Swedes Born 1810 - 12
(Stockholm, 1977). Julita and österäker: A. - M. K ö 1 1, Tradition och reform ivästra
Södermanlands jordbruk 1810 -1890, (Stockholm, 1983), pp. 46 - 7. Fleninge and Loshult:
J. Söderberg, Agrar fattigdom i Sydsverige under 1800-talet (Stockholm, 1978),
pp. 60
- 1. Västerlövsta: M. M o r e 1 1, "On the Stratification of the Swedish Peasant
Class", Scandinavian Economic History Review 28 (1980), p. 29.
passed urban economic growth. Under these conditions most of Sweden expe-
rienced a widening and subsequent narrowing in inequahty during the 18th and
19th centuries, exhibiting an inverted U curve albeit within another growth
context than that envisaged by Kuznets.
The larger framework within which Stockholm producers operated differed
radically from the agrarian arena. Contrary to advancing on a widening market,
as agricultural producers did, those in Stockholm were facing long-term econo¬
mic Stagnation and strong tendencies towards deindustrialization in the Century
after 1750. Trying to adapt to market contraction, Stockholm firms were often
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on the Schumpeterian negative side of development. Indications of low profi-
tability should of course not be taken to imply that no individual enterprise
were gaining large proflts; examples of success among manufacturers and crafts¬
men have already been presented. Secular economic Stagnation still should
have put serious barriers to capital accumularion, inhibiting a cumalative pro¬
cess of differentiation 33).
The Period 1850-1914
The second part of the 19th Century will be treated briefly here. There is
strong evidence to suggest that inequality was narrowing, but this rests on wages
and incomes rather than wealth.
Studies of industrial towns indicate that the share of low-income earners
declined while the share of high-income earners was rather stable. The middle
groups were the winners. In particular, the share of skilled labourers in the mid¬
dle income strata grew strongly because of substantially rising wages 34), a
detailed investigation into three factories points to a leveling in industrial wor¬
kers' wages during the last three decades of the 19th Century. This was partly
an effect of mechanization; the more handicraft labour participatedinthe pro¬
duction process, the greater were wage disparities 35).
The trade unions strived to reduce wage disparities. Homogenizing the working
class was seen as a way of improving collective action prospects and raising class
consciousness. However, the fairly weak unions can only marginally have affec-
ted the overall industrial pay structure at least before World War I. The main
reasons for the leveling tendency of the late 19th Century must be sought else-
where. One attempt at explanation Stresses that the industrial working class
succeeded in reproducing itself to a substantial degree from about the turn of
the Century onwards. A second generation of workers emerged whose links
with the agrarian environment were weak. This process combined with more
widespread mechanization served to reduce gaps among manual labour 36).
33) On economic Stagnation in Stockholm see most recentiy J. Söderberg, "Den
stagnerande staden; Stockholms tillväxtproblem 1760 - 1850 i ett jämförande europeiskt
perspektiv", Historisk Tidskrift 105 (1985).
34) B. ö h n g r e n, Folk i rörelse (Uppsala, 1974), ch. 5; ö h n g r e n, "Urbani-
seringen i Sverige 1840 - 1920," in: Urbaniseringsprocessen i Norden, ed. G. Authen
Blom, (Oslo, 1977), pp. 323-32. J. Söderberg and N. -G. Lundgren, Eko-
nomisk och geografisk koncentration 1850 -1980, (Lund, 1982), pp. 22 - 3.
35) B. B e r g 1 u n d, Industriarbetarklassens formering (Gothenburg, 1982), ch. 4.
For recent case-studies of the structure of wages see also L. C o r n e 11 , Sundsvallssdis-
triktets sagverksarbetare 1860 - 1890 (Gothenburg, 1982), ch. 7 (sawmills); T. Svens-
s o n, Fran ackord tili manadslön (Gothenburg, 1983), ch. 3 (shipbuilding); N.
- G. L u n d-
gre n, Skog för export; skogsarbete, teknik och försörjning i Lule älvdal 1870 -1970
(Umea, 1984), ch. 7 (forestry); K. Morger, Skebo bruk; teknik och social förändring
vid ett järnbruk under 1870-talet (Stockholm, 1985) (an ironworks).
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However, this line of reasoning does not explain the previous leveling trend.
The erosion of skill rewards seems to have begun well before the turn of the
Century. An economic analysis of the relative scarcity of unskilled labour,
rents, profit rates, and other factor market conditions is obviously needed
but still remains to be done. The Williamson hypothesis of industrialization
bias, stressing that industrialization in the early phase was more capital and skill
intensive than later on, is worth pursuing. In comparison with Britain, the early
spread of literacy in Sweden may well have promoted a higher skilled labour
supply response. At least it appears to have been so elastic as to reduce skill
rewards during the last decades of the 19th Century 37),
Two indications of the narrowing of pay ratios are presented in Figure 2. The
first illustrates the steeper rise in female as compared to male wages between
the 1880s and World War I. Female servants' wages in 1865/69 amounted to 44
per cent of the corresponding male wages: by 1910/13 this figure had risen to
63 per cent. The second aspect pertains to unskilled versus skilled male earnings.
From the 1890s unskilled linemen in the State railways clearly approached the
highly skilled enginemen. Leveling was strong during World War I 38).
Many other examples could be cited to the same effect. There can be httle
doubt that accelerating industrialization in the last decades of the 19th Century
was associated with a leveling in pay ratios.
Concluding Remarks
Interpreting American inequality data, Williamson and Lindert argue that
long-term stability appears to be the best description regarding the 18th Century.
The main period of increasing inequality was between 1820 and 1860, while
the latter part of the Century exhibits no evidence of rising inequality 39).
36) C. W i n b e r g, "Vem blev industriarbetare?",Fataburen 1984. Social mobility
studies on the late 19th and early 20th centuries inciude H. Norman, Fran Bergslagen
tili Nordamerika; studier i migrationsmönster, social rörlighet och demografisk struktur
med utgangspunkt frän örebro län 1851 - 1951 (Uppsala, 1974),, ch. 6; B. Kronborg
and T. N i 1 s s o n, Stadsflyttare; industrialisering , migration och social rörlighet med
utgangspunkt frän Halmstad 1870 - 1910 (Uppsala, 1975), ch. 7; Kronborg and
N i 1 s s o n, "Social Mobility, Migration, and Family Building in Urban Environments,"
in: Chance and Change; Social and Economic Studies in Historical Demography in the
Baltic Area, ed. S. Äkerman et al (Odense, 1978); S. Ä k e r m a n, "Swedish
Migration and Social Mobility: the Tale of Three Cities." Social Science History 1 (1977);
M. R o 1 e n, Skogsbygd i omvandling (Uppsala, 1979). See also J. Söderberg,
"Metoder att analysera social rörlighet," Historisk Tidskrift 98 (1978).
37) On literacy see E. Johansson, "The History of Literacy in Sweden, in Com¬
parison with some other Countries,
"
in: Literacy and Social Development in the West,
ed. H.J. Graff (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 151 - 83.
38) On narrowing gaps between lemale and male industrial wages see G. B a g g e et
al, Wages in Sweden 1860 - 1930 (Stockholm, 1933), I : 197, 422
- 3. In textiles, the ratio
of female to male wages seems to have been more constant.
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Figure 2: Aspects of the late 19th Century leveling in wages.
A. Female to male pay ratios: Female farm servants wages as per cent ofthose
of male farm servants, 1865 - 1914.
B. Unskilled to skilled pay ratios: Annual earnings of State railway linemen as
per cent ofthose of enginemen, 1863 - 1919.
Source: G. B a g g e et al., Wages in Sweden 1860- 1930, Stockholm, 1935,11: 79, 113-4.
The British pattern is somewhat different, indicating a rise in income inequali¬
ty from the end of the 17th Century to the mid-Victorian era. The upward
surge was most pronounced from the 1820s to mid-century. After the 1860s
there is a clear dechne in inequality 40).
39) J. G. Williamson and P. H. Lindert, American Inequality (New York,
1980)^ chs. 1 - 4, My comparison focusses on trends in rather than levels of inequality.
On levels, see the comparison between Sweden, Finland and the United States in S o 1-
t o w, The Swedish Census of Wealth at the Beginning of the 19th Century. According
to his results, Swedish wealth inequality was higher than in Finland because of the stronger
position of the nobility in the former country, and also higher than in the United States.
40) Williamson, Did British Capitalism Breed Inequality?
78
In the United States as well as in Britain, then, the decades preceding 1860
stand out as being marked by growing inequality. This would also seem to be the
case in Sweden. During other periods, the Swedish pattern is more similar to
the British than the American one. While the 18th Century is characterized by
widening inequality in Britain and Sweden (apart from Stockholm), no such
trend is seen in America. Evidence for Britain and Sweden also are more alike
insofar as the onset of a secular leveling trend is earlier than in the United Sta¬
tes: the last decades of the 19th Century are associated with declining inequality
in the two former countries but not in the latter.
In the very long run from the 16th to the early 20th Century there may be some
Swedish evidence suggesting the existence of an inequahty curve of the form of
a recumbent S. Data for LuleS parish presented above pointed to a dechne in
inequality between the mid-sixteenth and the mid-eighteenth centuries, and Isac-
son's hypothesis in a broadly similar way assumes a downward trend before the
beginning of modern economic growth. The upward turn during the first half
of the 19th Century and the subsequent downward turn during the second half
would seem to complete the right-hand side of the recumbent S. This is at best
a tentative hypothesis, waiting for further tests. Abundant pre-nineteenth-
century sources relating to the distribution of resources in agrarian as well as
urban society allow it to be checked.
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The Collar Line:
Clerical Workers in America at the Turn of the Century *)
Olivier Zunz
The growth of corporate capitalism and the dynamic organizational revolution
that swept the American industrial belt in the few decades preceding the First
World War profoundly and irreversibly altered such areas as work culture, edu¬
cation, family hfe, and consumption. Since that time, large corporations have
enjoyed increasing economic, social and cultural influence, have absorbed a
growing proportion of the working population, and have employed an ever
larger percentage of these workers in clerical occupations. The emergence of a
large, corporate white-collar work force in the period from the 1870s to the
1920s had a profound affect on class structure in America. In this paper, I will
focus on an important aspect of this change, on the development of the line —
real or imaginary — which separated blue-collar from white-collar workers in
American society. The reader will undoubtedly notice a discrepancy between the
large comparative framework that I set up and the narrow data base which I use to
test some of the propositions raised. This is in part the consequence of the
incompleteness of work in progress, in part of the dearth of historical literature
of the subject.
Understanding the extent to which the "collar line" was a significant social
and mental boundary at the time of the first great expansion of the white-collar
sector will illuminate the realities of lower-middle class life as weh as the rigi-
dities of the social system. Studies of several communities at the turn of the
Century show that between 22 % and 43 % of the sons of blue-collar workers
attained white-collar Status 1). Such studies are part of large body of scholar¬
ship on inequality and mobility which has helped us reach a balanced view of
social reality, free from the oversimplifications of the rags-to-riches myth 2).
*) I wish to thank Roberta Senechal and Charles Feigenoff for their assistance in preparing
this paper.
1) Stephan Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the Ame¬
rican Metropolis, 1880 -1970 (Cambridge, Mass, 1973), 246.
2) See Jeffrey G. Williamson and Peter H. Lindert, American Inequality:
A Macroeconomic History (New York; 1980), 62 - 63; Peter R. S h e r g o 1 d, Working-
Class Life: The "American Standard" in Comparative Perspective (Pittsburgh, 1982); and
for a recent debate on inequality, Robert E. G a 1 1 m a n, "Professor Pessen on the
Egalitarian Myth," Social Science History 2 (Winter 1978): 194 - 207; Edward Pessen,
"On a Recent Cliometric Attempt to Resurrect the Myth of Antebellum Egalitarianism,"
SSH 3 (Winter 1979): 207-27; G a 1 1 m a n, "The 'Egalitarian Myth,' Once Again,"
SSH 5 (Spring 1981): 223-34; P e s s e n, "The Beleaguered Myth of Antebellum Egali¬
tarianism: Cliometrics and Surmise to the Rescue," SSH 6 (Winter 1982): 111 -28; Stuart
M. B 1 u m i n, "Age and Inequality in Antebellum America: The Case of Kingston, New
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Most historians are in agreement that nineteenth-Century economic, technologi-
cal, and environmental change produced enough opportunities to benefit the
majority of individuals. These studies, however, also point to significant ine¬
quality, a fluid social system, and an element of the arbitrary which affects
the course of mobility. They give substance to those interpretations of Horatio
Alger's stories which stress luck as a mode of advancement and to the depic-
tion of downward mobility found in the novels of Theodore Dreiser and William
Dean Howells. The mere fact that a significant movement into white-collar
occupations existed — a movement greatly facilitated by the large number of
openings in clerical occupations in the economy — does not reveal much, how¬
ever, about the actual mingling between the blue-collar and white-collar en-
vironments. Were the sons entering a new world with a new set of rules and
thereby breaking with their parents? Or were the two universes intimately tied
by the unceasing upward and downward movement across the "collar line?"
Although it would be simplistic to equate the achievement of white-collar
employment with arrival in the middle class, it is reason able to see the shift
from manual to non-manual labor as an important event which should be exa¬
mined to determine whether it indicates a larger change, a move away from the
working class.
For the purposes of this prehminary exploration, I am knowingly leaving aside
or touching briefly on an embarrassing long list of sources. Numerous pamphlets,
books of etiquette, newspapers and magazines articles, books of advice, contem¬
porary reports on education, when taken together, combine to give a rieh des¬
cription of the white-collar world at the turn of the Century. I am currently
examining this literature with some excitement but will sacrifice comprehen-
siveness for the time being in order to give myself the opportunity to address
a more theoretical problem. Similarly, this paper knowingly leaves aside large
segments of the lower middle-class such as small independent entrepreneurs,
retailers, govemment workers, and teachers to concentrate on those clerical
workers hired by large bureaucratic corporations, those organizations which we¬
re most responsible for changing the work culture. In lieu of the synthesis which
I hope will be fortheoming in the not-too-distant future, I attempt here to ex-
plicate the meaning of the "collar line" only in the context ofa single American
experience, the growth of the American railroad industry in the late 19th
Century, and to set up this experience in a broader comparative perspective.
York," SSH 6 (Summer 1982): 369-79; G a 11 m a n, "Professor Blumin on Age and Ine¬
quality: Antebellum America," SSH 6 (Summer 1982): 381 - 84.
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A comparative framework: The German and British modeis
Early European social scientists such as Werner Sombart stressed the excep-
tionalism of the American pattern of inequality in comparison to his own
Germany. In his classic work, Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen
Sozialismus? (1906). Sombart focused almost exclusively on what he thought
were characteristics of the American worker who, as he put it, "mixes with
everyone
— in reality and not only in theory — as an equal" 3). But Sombart, wri¬
ting in 1906, paid little attention to the lower-middle class in his comparative
thinking. A new perspective has emerged as a result of the researches of German
historians into the origins of national socialism. Jürgen Kocka, in particular,
finds its roots in a related series of events: the rise of big business, the subse¬
quent creation of a large white-collar sector, and the attempt by the State to
protect (through special legislation) that sector from infiltration by the labor
movement 4), In his innovative study, Kocka contrasts the Situation in Ger¬
many, where the State had, in effect, artificially solidified the collar line, pit-
ting blue-collar and white-collar workers against each other, with the fluid
movement between the blue-collar and white-collar worlds which characterized
American society. He argues that it is this very fluidity which distinguished
the United States from Germany.
In Germany, Kocka posits, "older patterns of social perception and behavior"
led the middle class to define the emerging industrial working class as "inferiors
subject to discrimination and rule 5)." "The wish not to be a worker", he
continues, "was a central part of many white-collar employees' seif image —
something they shared in spite of many differences in other respects 6)." In its
anti-socialist stance, the State bureaucracy Consolidated this feeling and provi¬
ded a model for the growing class of white-collar workers. The process perhaps
culminated in 1911 when "the Imperial govemment conceded white-collar de¬
mands and enacted a law giving a special social security Status to non-manual
employees 7)." In Germany, where the blue-collar workers voted communist
or sociaHst, the white-collar workers reacted by joining the ranks of the
NSDAP 8).
In the US, instead, the loose social structure which allowed passage from
white to blue-collar work made it difficult for white-collar workers to feel
3) American edition with an introductory essay by C. T. Husbands and a foreword
by Michael Harrington (White Plains, N. Y.), 110.
4) Jürgen Kocka, White-Collar Workers in America, 1890 -1940: A Social-Political
History in International Perspective (Beverly Hills, 1980).
5) Ibid., 138.
6) Ibid., 139.
7) Ibid.
8) Ibid., 30.
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disadvantaged even during times of economic duress. The few studies available
on Klan membership seem to confirm Kocka's point 9). American white-collar
workers played only a small role in the renaissance of the Invisible Empire in
the twenties. Even though it is true the Ku Klux Klan gained some support
among the lower-middle class, primarily from its independent sectors but also
from white-collar employees, the lower middle class never represented more than
a "substantial minority", a minority which declined rapidly as the Klan grew.
The Klan of the 1920s recruited the bulk of its members mostly among Status
anxious blue-collar workers who found a refuge for their disappointments in
one-hundred-percent Americanism.
In both the United States and Germany the national govemment intervened
in response to tensions created by the Organization of the economy by large
firms. But in the United States, Kocka argues, "professionalization," especial¬
ly in certain fields (engineers, managers, lawyers, and te achers) mitigated the
effects of State Intervention 10). In short, in the United States, professional or¬
ganizations and professionals themselves provided modeis for the growing army
of white-collar workers, a function that in Germany feil into the hands of bure-
aucrats.
England offers another perspective for comparison. In England as in Germany
and America, the Standard of living of clerical workers varied from relative ease
to near poverty. With this diversity in mind, British historians have recentiy
tried to define the main characteristics of this heterogeneous group and in doing
so have raised the issue of the collar line. Geoffrey Crossick, for example, appro¬
aches the question from the Standpoint of the workers: "How does one distingu¬
ish the majority of... skilled men ... who found apprenticeships for their sons in
the same or some other skilled trades, from those others whose sons frequently
became clerks and who saw it as a social advance? Was there something excep¬
tional within the working class that made certain parents or children desire
white-collar work 2-1)?" Eric Hobsbawm, in turn, argues that the emergence of
a new and mainly white-collar lower middle class, "which wedged itself into the
intermediate position between the old labour aristocracy and the middle classes,
is one main reason for the growing incorporation of the labour aristo cracy into
a wider proletarian culture and movement" during the Edwardian period 12).
Hobsbawm recognizes the ambiguity of the collar line when he cites examples of
9) The best synthesis remains Kenneth T. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City,
1915 -1930 (New York, 1967).
10) Kocka, 53.
11) Geoffrey Crossick, "The Emergence of the Lower Middle Class in Britain: A
Discussion," in The Lower Middle Class in Britain ed. Geoffrey Crossick (London,
1977);37.
12) Eric Hobsbawn, Workers: Worlds of Labor (New York, 1984), 219.
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tradesmen who wore stiff collars in the Workshop but his main contention is
that the labor aristocracy's fate was tied to the increasing Proletariat, not with
embourgeoisement as the Leninists would have it 13).
By contrast, British clerks saw themselves firmly tied to the middle class.
The British clerks even shared some features with their German colleagues. They
feit the same "sense of honorable Status" which makes them "emphatically not
working class and stridently conscious of that fact 14)." In all other respects,
however, the British lower white-collar workers hardly resembled their German
counterparts. Their lives were unaffected by the intrusion of a State bureaucracy,
and they were not drawn by the forms of association that flourished in Germa¬
ny. The British clerical worker, believing firmly in the tradition of individual
mobility within a laissez faire society, did not emulate the bureaucrat as did
his German counterpart but instead took the gentleman of the traditional mer-
cantile world as his model. When George Bernard Shaw was a clerical worker in
the 1870's, he refused even to contemplate joining a trade union, for joining
would "have been considered a most ungentlemanly thing to do — almost as
outrageous as Coming to the office in corduroy trousers, with a belcher hand-
kerchief round my neck
— but snobbery apart, it would have been stupid, because
I should not have intended to remain a clerk. I should have taken theemployer's
point of view from the first i5)."
Many British "blackcoated" workers of the late nineteenth Century had very
modest means of living, but they clung to an ideology of a previous era, where
in the counting house, the relationship between clerk and employer was often
a personal and particular one, when clerks "mixed" with the sons of gentlemen,
and when they were expected to behave accordingly. As a contemporaneous
account of the 1870s puts it, "Clerks are, as a rule, of decent address and gent-
lemanly habits, patient and long-suffering, not given to noisily 'insisting upon
their rights' and are possessed of some delicacy when requesting an advance of
salary 16)". Other witnesses concur: "The clerks in established and well known
merchants' offices yield to no one in gentlemanly deportment, cultivated profi-
ciency and self-respect; and in appearance there is but httle difference between
many of them and the employers they serve 17)." Even though such testimonies
must be read with skepticism (the second one reads like puffery to me!) and a
thorough assessment of the clerks' class consciousness must await a new set of
13) Ibid., 237.
14) Crossick, 13.
15) Cited in Crossick, 24.
16) Charles Edward Parsons, Clerks: Their Position and Advancement, 1876, p. 2.
17) B. G. Orchard, The Clerks of Liverpool, 1871, p. 33. This text and the previous
one are cited in David Lockwood, The Blackcoated Worker: A Study in Class Con¬
sciousness (London), 1966), 29 - 30.
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studies, historians have generally concluded that, politically, clerical workers
drifted toward Toryism, "emphatically the party of property and stability IS)".
The American case
British and German historians have begun to document this great transforma¬
tion which accompanied the rise of a white-collar work force and to assess the
class position of clerical workers 19). V/hat do we know about the American
case? At mid-century, the fortunes of clerks were still intimately tied to that of
their employers. A Practical Treatise on Business published in Philadelphia in
1853 insists first that "the chief qualifications to be sought for in a clerk, next
to ability are honesty and politeness" only to add that "serenity of temper is a
virtue of which all men cannot boast — and probably without serious derogation
of their character or abihties; but it is a fundamental constituent in the charac¬
ter of a clerk and (my emphasis) a business man." Clerks are further encouraged
to show initiative by performing tasks "for which we receive no direct remunera-
tion" while employers are encouraged to follow the example of a bank manager
who installed a library in the bank for the use of clerks, "for their superior
knowledge is always useful 20)." The American "ideal type" is also well expres¬
sed in this extract from an 1841 publication, "Familiär Scenes in the Life of
a Clerk" published in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine: "The majority of clerks are
young men who have hopes and prospects of business before them.. . A good
clerk feels that he has an interest in the credit and success of his employer
beyond the amount of his salary; and with the close of every successful year,
he feels that he too, by his assiduity and fidelity has added something to his
capital — something to his future prospects, and something to his support if over-
taken with adversity; and a good merchant encourages and reciprocates all these
feelings 21)."
These two texts embody some of the characteristics often invoked to contrast
the American scene with that of the Continent: initiative; hope of mobility, and
simultaneously recognition of a possibihty of downward mobihty ("if overtaken
with adversity"). Nippers, a clerk in a Wall Street lawyer's office described in
Hermann Melville's Bartleby The Scrivener, was no gentleman but frankly in the
camp of the upwardly mobile. His employer complains of his "diseased ambi-
tion", which was "evinced by a certain impatience of the duties ofa mere copy-
18) Crossick, 40.
19) Too Httle work has been done on France to attempt a synthesis here. See nonetheless
the chapter by Yves Lequin in volume 4 of Histoire de la France Urbaine, ed. Maurice
Agulh on (Paris, 1983).
20) Edwin T. Freedley, A Practical Treatise on Business: Or how to Get, Save,
Spend, Give, Lend, and Bequeath Money with an Inquiry into the Chances of Success and
Causes of Failure in Business (Philadelphia, 1853), 119 - 20.
21) This testimony is cited in Margery W. D a v i e s, Woman's Place is at the Type-
writer: Office Work and Office Workers, 1870 - 1930 (Philadelphia; 1982),21.
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ist, and unwarrantable Usurpation of strictly professional affairs, such as the
drawing up oflegal documents." He was also "considerable ofa ward politican,
(and) occasionally did a httle business at the Justices' court 22)." Although
Bartleby himself was a gentleman who ends incarcerated in the Tombs, the
scrivener's message is one of independence as he relentlessly utters his motto,
"I prefer not to", whether he refuses to examine his copy, perform other duties,
and in the end leave the office.
In America in the middle of the 19th Century, clerks were few in number and
expected to become themselves businessmen. The particular Situation of clerks
at mid-century, close to their employers while exhibiting a significant degree
of independence led Michael Katz and his collaborators to inciude them in the
business class, not in the working class in the two-class model they presented
in their Social Organization of Early Industrial Capitalism. As they put it, "sons
of men in the business class often began their working lives in clerical occupa¬
tions, and the mobility of men out of clerical work and into proprietorship was
quite high. For many men clerical work was the initial phase of a career in com¬
merce. Clerks were paid a salary, not a wage; this was a critical distinction at
the time. It indicated that they could expect to work throughout an entire
year and did not experience the seasonal fluctuation to which men paid daily
wages were subjected 23)." Katz does qualify his Classification. He is well aware
that he describes the American social structure of the mid-nineteenth Century
at a unique and short-lived turning point, after artisans had lost their autonomy
and before white-collar workers had grown in numbers. He concedes that there
is difficulty "interpreting the class position of the great army of white-collar
workers and salaried professionals who first appear in the late nineteenth Cen¬
tury ... .Here, bureaucracy takes the place of the factory as the paradigmatic
form of Organization 2^)."
With growth, American clerical workers still stood apart. Critical obServers of
the time were clearly conscious of the change. One wrote in the Atlantic Month¬
ly in 1904 that while "for generations the small business, that is, the business
house as it was before the advent of the Great Corporation and the Trust, was a
school of character second in importance only to the Church", in the new world
of corporations "there are thousands of all grades of capacity who now have no
other feeling than that of the clerk, or the servant 2$)." His prediction that
"men who have grown up simply as clerks ... will become more and more men of
22) Cited in D a v i e s, 9-10.
23) Michael B. Katz, Michael J. D o u c e t, and Mark J. Stern, The Social
Organization of Early Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 45.
24) Katz's contribution to AHR forum on Edward Pessen's "Social Structure and
Politics in American History," American Historical Review 87 (1982), 1334.
25) Henry A. S t i m s o n, "The Small Business as a School of Manhood" Atlantic
Monthly 93 (March 1904): 337 - 40.
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detail" preceded by some.fifty years C. Wright Mills' analysis of the white-collar
man. Nonetheless in America, as in England and Germany, for the young men
and women who sought to work for the large corporations, the previous era of
partnership in the counting house served as a reference point. If in Germany,
State Intervention had prompted clerks to emulate the bureaucrat, and if in Eng¬
land, tradition led them to assume the manner of gentlemen, in America, late-
nineteenth clerks continued to model themselves after businessmen and to adopt
the criteria ofa business culture.
This Situation leads me to question Kocka's suggestive comparative analysis
that "without a relatively united proletariat, the line of division between blue-
collar worker and white-collar employee remained relatively diffuse in most are¬
as of life" in the United States 2*>). Kocka contrasted the American sales clerks'
union, which "allied (itself) with organized labor and shared the fundamental
positions of the labor movement", to the conservative German mercantile em¬
ployee associations which were decidedly middle class 2?). He also points out
that "objective criteria" in America, the low salaries and absence of social
protection by corporations brought white-collar and blue-collar workers toge¬
ther 28). At the same time, corporate training programs created to promote the
best manual workers to supervisory positions contributed to a society in which
objective criteria and mobihty combined to blur the "collar line." Similar ar¬
guments have been made by American historians who have analyzed the contra-
diction between work rules and middle-class ideals and argued, in particular,
that the position of the saleswoman hired by department Stores represents
"an extreme case of the dilemma of all workers under consumer capitalism—dri-
ven by the social relations of the workplace to see themselves as members of the
working class, cajoled by the rewards of mass consumption to see themselves
as middle-class 2^)." In this instance, the reasoning of these historians is based
exclusively on salesclerks — the lowliest category of Clerks — and applied to the
entire white-collar work force. It is misleading, however, to consider these mos¬
tly young and single women independently of the family context in which they
lived. Treating them as creations of the workplace hardly gives a realistic picture
of their lives and aspirations. And it is similarly misleading to take the stance
adopted by the American sales clerks' union as representative of clerical workers
in general.
26) Kocka, 139.
27) Ibid., 75.
28) Ibid., 116.
29) Susan Porter B e n s o n, "The Customers Ain't God," in Working-Class America:
Essays on Labor, Community, and American Society ed. Michael H. Frisch and
Daniel J. Walkowitz (Urbana, 1983), 205.
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The Office Workers of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad
The data base for this paper is admittedly limited to one group of clerical
workers, those who apphed to work for the Burlington railroad in the late 1800s
and those who were actually employed in the Chicago office as of June 1880.
Although this data base is limited, it is, I would argue, highly symbolic. The rail-
roads were the first big bureaucracies in America, several decades ahead of the
other sectors in instituting a new hierarchical work culture. The men who ran
the CBQ, James Murray Forbes, Charles Perkins, and later James J. Hill, are
among the leading figures in the history of American business. It is not their
careers which are at issue here, however, but those of the hundreds of white-
collar employees who worked unter the close supervision of middle-level mana-
gers. If, as Walter Licht recentiy demonstrated, the ehte of skilled railroad wor¬
kers, conductors and engineers, could not be bound by all the rules designed for
them because the realities of railroading forced them to confront many un-
known situations and make on-the-job decisions, clerical workers, tightly con-
trolledby a new breed of executives (whose profile 1*11 draw elsewhere), had to
go by the book 3°).
The hundreds of letters of apphcation sent to the CBQ office indicate little
affinity with the blue-collar perspective but instead clearly express an ideal of
conduct modeled after that of their prospective employers 31) 9 It may very
well be that apphcants designed their letters to appeal to their employers'
prejudices, but their expression of business values is too strong and too pervasive
to be dismissed. The objective socio-economic and demographic characteristics
of these clerical employees combine with the form and content of these letters
to reinforce our vision ofa distinct, homogeneous clerical culture.
First of all, most applicants were young, native-born Americans below 25 years
of age. They attended school in the 1880s and 1890s, where white-collar work
was put forward as the appropriate reward of an education. Indeed promoters
of vocational education during the period lodged strong protests against this
trend: "Throughout the second half of the 19th Century", as Joseph Kett has
remarked "educators voiced abundant complaints that native American boys
seemed to prefer the lowliest clerkships to honest manual labor ... These educa¬
tors argued that, among other benefits, vocational education would reduce
American dependence on foreign labor ... and attract native-born youth to ma¬
nual labor 32).»
30) Walter Licht, Working for the Railroad: The Organization of Work in the Nine¬
teenth Century (Princeton, 1983).
31) The archives of the CBQ are in the Newberry Library in Chicago.
32) Joseph F. Kett, "The Adolescence of Vocational Education," in Work, Youth,
and Schooling: Historical Perspectives on Vocationalism in American Education ed.Harvey
Kantor and David B. Tyack (Stanford, 1982), 91.
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The letters these young men and women wrote (the latter making up a small
although sizable fraction of applicants) emphasized common themes. They
believed in their own potential for upward mobility, in the individual's quest
for bettering himself, and they especially beheved that joining a large business
Organization was an appropriate means to realize their goals. They viewed a
clerkship as an occasion to perfect their skills and as a prelude to further job
opportunities and promotion. Many mention that they are willing to accept
a low salary to start, not only to limit the risk to the employer but also because
they are confident that their talent will lead to rapid promotion.
The apphcants also directly and indirectly stressed their know-how and ex¬
perience. Many point to an education in a small business college. Most hand-
written notes which make up about half of the letters show a fine hand, the
sign of a good education, while the typewritten ones have a very professional
look. All show a sense of the proper etiquette and good working knowledge of
standardized formulae, a knowledge that was practiced as a form of art.
Along with proper etiquette, the apphcants guarantee their good character.
Lester Taylor, a former Stenographie and typewriter instruetor from Milwau-
kee, who proclaims himself a master of "phonology", who is able to "write
blindfolded on Remington typewriting machine", and who had worked for
Deering Harvester in Kansas, assures CBQ officials of his "character and abili-
ty." Another applicant, a young man of 19 living with his parents, points to his
previous experience as book keeper and bill clerk, but also emphasizes that he
does not smoke cigarettes. He gives several references for his "character, habits,
and ability." Another applicant of about the same age says; "I have no bad
habits such as smoking, chewing, drinking or swearing", the latter an annoying
habit of telephone Operators that contributed much to the early feminization
of this occupation.
There are a few exceptions to the general pattern. Two formerly well-paid
executives of the railroad who had fallen from their managerial positions—so-
bering reminders of the possibility of downward mobihty-wrote to their former
colleagues in the hope of obtaining low-level clerical positions for which they
were clearly overquahfied. There is a single instance ofa veteranof the Spanish-
American war among the applicants, the kind of applicant who persistently
searched for jobs in the federal govemment but who was rare in the business
world. There is only one instance of an applicant stressing family poverty. Of
the handful of letters from immigrants, all were fluent in English and evinced
socialization into the white-collar world. One of them reminded the railroad
of the usefulness of bilingualism for writing Instructions for foreign labor. And
finally, there are a few rearguard applications from scriveners who complained
that "typewriters" (i. e. young female typists) had displaced them from their
jobs.
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These letters show some traffic between firms. One applicant worked for the
Chicago and Alton railroad Co. in the auditor's office when a change of owner¬
ship, leading to restructuring, forced him to look for another position. Others
had positions in insurance companies, banks, or other large employers of white-
collar workers when they applied. This sort of horizontal exchange characteri-
zes an already well-established class of workers.
We can study the socio-economic characteristics of actual workers busy in
the Chicago office in June, 1880 as well as their famihes by combining infor¬
mation contained in the CBQ payroll, which gives a detailed description of their
positions and salaries, with that of the U.S. census taken that same month,
which lists these workers and their households. These two sources enable us to
understand their social Status and demographic strategies within the context of
the family economy. The payroll books of the CBQ line listed a total of 271 cle¬
rical workers employed in the Chicago office as of June 1880, with their posi¬
tions, departments, and salaries. We were able to identify addresses from other
sources for 147 CBQ workers and successfully located 117 of them in the cen¬
sus. To study these people in the context of their living environment— other
family members, fellow boarders in boarding houses, other non kin-related mem¬
bers of their households — we assembled the socio-economic characteristics of
824 Chicago residents in the city or its immediate suburbs.
Male heads of households working in the Chicago office of the CBQ (a total
of 38) were among the older clerks (that is, they were above 25), were generally
native-born Americans (or immigrants from Great Britain), and clearly exhibi-
ted a middle-class life style. Most of these heads of households working for the
railroad had been married only recentiy, were making $67 a month on the ave¬
rage, and were supporting small nuclear families. By comparison, unskilled wor¬
kers in 1880 usually made less than $300 per year and few skilled workers
brought home $500.
Only rarely did any of these men mingle residentially with blue-collar wor¬
kers. About half of this group of clerks heads of households lived in Chicago,
the other half in the newly-created suburbs. Of the suburbanites, only three
lived in north side Chicago: one lived in Waukegan, off the Chicago, Milwau-
kee and St. Paul Railroad while two lived in Evanston. Most located their house¬
holds along the CBQ line, between Chicago and Aurora, that is, toward the
west, in Clyde, Riverside, Western Spring, Hinsdale, and Downers Grove. Only
one of them lived in Riverside, the exclusive suburb created by Federick Law
Olmsted and Calvert Vaux, whose CBQ railroad Station and adjoining Water
Tower are landmarks of American suburban architecture. Eight famihes headed
by a CBQ clerical worker had located further down the line in Downers Grove,
a quiet commuting suburb incorporated seven years earlier in 1873, with streets
shaded by the growing maple trees the settlers had planted in hope of obtaining
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a sugar supply 33) t
The better paid among them often employed servants in their homes. Thomas
Jackson, for example, was a claim clerk in the general freight department. Thirty
years old, he was making over $100 a month and lived in Evanston with his wife
(also native born) and four children. Mrs. Jackson, who stayed home, was hel¬
ped by a cook. Seven other clerks who were heads of households also employed
servants. In other famihes, despite the relatively high salaries of these clerks, the
family economy was practiced. Jacob Wilson, a passenger agent making $90 a
month, lived with his wife and five children. His oldest daughter, who was 19,
was employed as a school teacher, These families, however, did not practice
the complex pooling of incomes from several skilled and unskilled occupations
that characterized the immigrant working class family at the same period. Occu¬
pations usually pursued by other members of the household, whether family
members or boarders, were clerkships (in Stores, or for the board of trade),
law, medicine, and teaching. Only in one case did members ofa CBQ employee 's
household (a daughter and a boarder) practice dressmaking, a typically immi¬
grant occupation. Not surprisingly, this lone case was found in the household of
one of the few immigrants in the office.
Other clerks at CBQ had not yet established a household of their own. Twen¬
ty-six whom I could locate with certainty in the 1880 census were young men
only beginning their careers and still living with their parents. Practically all
these households show a distinct white-collar hfestyle. These CBQ employees
were themselves the sons of clerical workers, dealers, or manufacturers. In eight
instances, their famihes earnings were comfortable enough to allow them to em¬
ploy a servant, hke in the family of CBQ clerk Delbert Rodgers, the son of
Theodore Rodgers, a lumber and hardware dealer who lived in Downers Grove.
In four famihes, one or two sons working for the CBQ supported a widowed
mother; in a few instances, both fathers and sons were clerking in the same
office. Of these clerks, only two had working sisters. In one household where
the two brothers worked for the CBQ and supported their mothers as well as
several younger brothers and sisters, one of the sisters also worked as a railroad
clerk (although not a CBQ). In one other household the father was also a CBQ
clerical worker, one sister a school teacher and the other employed in a book
bindery. Altogether only six of the twenty-six sons clerking at CBQ came from
blue-collar families, where the father was a carpenter, or a piano tuner, and in a
unique case of mtra-railroad/intra-famihal crossing of the collar line, a railroad
fireman.
Unfortunately, we have been able to locate very few daughters in the Census
among CBQ workers. Of the initial sixteen women listed in the payroll, in 1880,
33) The WPA Guide to Illinois, 1939 (New edition with an introduction by Neil Harris
and Michael C o n z e n (New York, 1983), 543.
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a time when a clerical job was still a man's purview, and the base Company pay¬
roll providing no residential clue, we were able to find only two young women
who, we can say with certainty, worked for the CBQ in the 1880 census. In both
cases, these two native-born women lived with their Irish parents, and their
family combined blue- and white-collar workers. It is, however, impossible to
generahze on the basis of such small numbers.
Except for a few odd cases (sons-in-law, grandsons, etc.), the remaining clerical
workers were all boarders. They were a part of the large urban population that
had left their famihes, but had not yet established their own. We traced forty-
one boarders and lodgers altogether, roughly divided into two groups, either
boarding in families or in boarding houses. Boarders sharing space with a family
usually chose to live with other white-collar workers and members of the middle
class. As we know, it was quite common for American middle-class families to
rent rooms to young men. In one case, a Riverside doctor housed a CBQ worker;
in another case, also in Riverside, the only head household/CBQ clerk hving
there rented a room to a fellow office worker. A similar arrangement in Chicago
proper comprised three CBQ clerks. Sometimes a widow rented rooms to her
son's CBQ colleagues. In yet another instance of four housemates, one was an
executive of the CBQ and his brother a clerk in the same department while the
other two were respectively a merchant and an architect. Boarders usually lived
in families headed by someone of the same or of a superior occupational Status.
Out of fifteen "familial" arrangements, only in three instances do we find a
clerical employee boarding in the home ofa blue-collar worker.
As for the slightly smaller half (13 cases) in the boarding houses near their
offices in the city center, the Situation is somewhat more complex. Only among
the residents of boarding houses do we find more prominent examples of resi¬
dential mixtures of blue- and white-collar workers. In one instance of a large
boarding house with twenty-six residents, railroad brakemen, railroad machi-
nists, telegraph Operators, engineers, conductors, and CBQ clerks all lived to¬
gether. This association by industry reflects the specialization so well described
for an earlier era by Thomas Butler Gunn in his Physiology ofNew York Boar¬
ding Houses3ty, Yet other boarding houses in the city were occupied by people
of the same occupation — namely clerks in a variety of industries and commer-
cial ventures as well as members of the teaching profession, a new ordering re-
flecting the changing times.
On the basis of this evidence and on work in progress on their neighborhoods
and family hfe, I would conclude that CBQ clerical workers were part of a
white-collar world. They lived in daily contact with middle-level executives,
businessmen, and professionals and were well separated from the working class.
It is hard to imagine a better drawn "collar-line" than at CBQ. Even though the
34) Thomas Butler Gunn, The Physiology of New York Boarding Houses (New
York, 1875).
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railroad had been in Operation long enough for the offsprings of their blue-
collar workers to have reached working age, none of the clerical employees
were sons or daughters of that elite blue-collar group — the engineers — and only
one was the son ofa railroad fireman,
Work in progress on Ford Motor Company will provide a second case study 30
to 40 years later (between 1908 and 1920), a case study that will have the ad¬
vantage of including many more young women and be centered on an essentially
blue-collar city. Whereas the railroad represents a prototypical bureaucracy,
the quixotic Henry Ford was legendary for cursing bureaucratic complications.
Georgia E. Boyer, one of the first women clerks recalls a day at the Piquette
plant when "during lunch hour, Mr. Ford went into the Accounting Department
and picking up all the ledgers and other books pertaining to bookkeeping, he
threw them out of the window onto the street. When the accountants returned
from lunch they were amazed to find their books gone. Mr. Ford told them
that he saw no reason for keeping a set of books. He said, 'Put all the money
we take in in a big barrel, and when a shipment of material comes in, reach into
the barrel and take out enough money to pay for it 35)'." ßut for all the legen¬
dary stories about his antipathy to bureaucracy, Ford and James Couzens
actively created a large pool of clerical employees subdivided into a variety
of departments to process the ever increasing paperwork the booming automo¬
bile industry generated. According to my prehminary count, they hired over
1200 clerical workers between 1908 and 1912 in their efforts to maintain a con-
stant pool of about 500 workers. In 1910, 446 white-collar employees were on
Ford's payroll. We were able to trace over half of them (250) in the 1910 cen¬
sus, 180 men and 70 women; 82 heads of households, 57 sons, 46 daughters, 43
boarders. What was their class position in the blue-collar city of the automobile
industry? The Detroit-Dearborn complex will be a critical test case of the
thesis that I advance.
In the meantime, I must conclude (provisionally) that the absence of an in¬
stitutional Separation between blue- and white-collar workers, a Separation
reinforced in Germany by the State, and the absence of the British gentlemanly
tradition did not mean that blue and white-collar workers mingled easily in Ame¬
rica. There is some evidence of fluidity, but overwhelmingly the white-collar
world seemed well separated, whether one looks at the Organization of neigh-
borhoods, family Organization, intergenerational career patterns, schooling, no-
ral codes, and technical culture. Fluidity was indeed an important part of Ame¬
rican society but its effects were largely mitigated by well engrained socio-cul-
35) 'The Reminiscences of Miss Georgia E. Boyer," Ford Motor Company Archives,
Oral History Section, January 1954, 9.
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tural divisions that maintained rigid hierarchies in the evolving social structure 36).
36) Two years have passed since the 1985 Stuttgart Conference where I read this paper.
I have now completed my study of several other large corporate offices in the 1910s — not
only the Ford headquarters in Detroit but also Dupont in Wilmington and Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. in New York. These clerical workers* collective biography confirms
the existence of a distinct collar line albeit with significant shifts in the clerks* socio¬
economic characteristics. The results will be reported in my forthcoming book, "The
Social Contours of Corporate America'*.
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Social Inequalities in 20th Century Poland *)
Janusz Zarnowski
Scholars conducting research into social inequality encounter serious theore¬
tical and practical difficulties which are frequently as great for historians äs for
sociologists. To what extent do inequalities correspond to the functional struc¬
ture of society and which differences can be calied inequalities? Do inequalities
he on one plane or can they be reduced to a single hierarchy? Can social ine¬
qualities be examined solely on the basis of quantitative indices, which usually
refer to occupation and education, or should one also use factors which cannot
be presented in figures *)? These are but a few of the problems encountered in
research on this topic.
In spite of such obstacles the quantitative approach to the history of social
inequalities seems to be absolutely essential. It is beyond any doubt that this
aspect of historical development contains at least some measurable elements.
This is the reason for debating the history of social inequality at the meeting of
the International Commission for the Application of Quantitative Methods in
History. The Pohsh case can be instructive, although it introduces some compli¬
cations to the scheme of evolution of inequality proposed in other papers pre¬
sented at this session. Its development cannot follow the same sequence in an
early industrialized country and in an only partly industrialized one. Since
Pohsh society belonged to the latter category, all comparisons pertain only to
the groups living in centers and areas covered by industrial civilization. The
coexistence of two different social and economic structures within Pohsh
society modified to some extent the process of industrialization in Poland.
Nevertheless, this transformation as well as that of social inequality bears some
resemblance to the development of Western European societies in the late
XIXth Century and in the XXth Century.
Research into social inequalities can be conducted with reference to practi-
cally the entire history of Poland. I will deal here only with the 20th Century.
However, even if we confine our research to such a historically short period, we
*) I am going to deal with questions which have been for some time the subject of inten¬
sive sociological studies in contemporary Poland but which have not been examined from
the historical point of view. This will therefore be a provisional, preliminary study.
1) In his book "Industrialisierung und soziale Ungleichheit. Europa im 19. Jahrhundert.
Eine Bilanz'* (Göttingen, 1983), Hartmut Kaelble enumerates some factors of social
inequality: "die Verteilung etwa von Vermögen, von Einkommen, von Qualität der Arbeits¬
bedingungen, von Bildung, von Wohnungsqualität, von Gesundheitschancen und medi¬
zinischer Versorgung, von Erholungsmöglichkeiten und Freizeit, von Rechtssicherheit, von
Chancen autonomer Gestaltung der eigenen Lebenssituation und Bewältigung kritischer
Lebenssituation, von Ansehen und sozialen Kontaktmöglichkeiten, von Mobilitätschancen"
(PP-15-14).
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shall come across difficulties which are specific to Poland, the most banal being
the lack of detailed information, especially of exact figures. An even more diffi¬
cult problem is the question: Is it possible to compare social inequalities under
different socio-economic and political Systems 2)? It would be wrong to give
up comparisons, for even an incomplete study can be of great scientific and prac¬
tical importance. It is worth pointing out in this connection that comparisons
of societies living under different social Systems have already been made by
sociologists 3).
Before the problem of inequalities is examined by quantitative methods it
must first be considered from the subjective point of view. Systems of values
he at the root of every socio-occupational hierarchy. In the case of Polish so¬
ciety, we come across the interaction of social hierarchies based on different
Systems of values. Up to 1939 (or 1944), in addition to the industrial structure,
there existed in Poland a pre-capitalist social structure characterized by a com-
paratively primitive agriculture with many remains of natural economy and
relics of traditional peasant culture. At the other end of the scale were large
landed estates which were organized mostly according to pre-capitalist princip-
les. The peasants and the semifeudal landowners formed a specific social hierar¬
chy. To this can be added the majority of the petty bourgeoisie, whose commer¬
ce and production were largely pre-capitalist in character. In view of the fact
that the petty bourgeoisie consisted mainly of Jews, structural inequalities
were compounded by cultural and ethnic differences. People under the influence
of urban-industrial civilization formed another structure. According to my
estimates, modern economy and civilization embraced a minority of the popu¬
lation of the pre-war Polish State (which at that time had large territories in the
east inhabited mostly by a non-Polish population) 4).
A practical result of this interaction was, for instance, the high rank assigned
in social hierarchy to owners of large landed estates, a rank which frequently
was not justified by income (the Situation of big landowners was very difficult
during a considerable part of the inter-war period). Another result was the dicho-
tomous concept of social hierarchy in traditional peasant culture (the peasants
and the "lords" being its main components), What was specifically Polish was
the position of the intelligentsia, which in the 19th Century was defined in very
broad terms. In this group the discrepancy between individual Status factors
was probably the greatest (especially between education and position in society
2) To be more exact, they have discussed questions of social mobility, closely connected
with the problem of inequality: Max Haller and Bogdan W. Mach, Structural
Changes and Mobility in Capitalist and Socialist Society. A Comparison of Men in Austria
and Poland (VASMA Projekt, November 1981); E. Allart and W. W e s o 1 o w s k i,
Social Structure and Change, Finland-Poland, Comparative Perspective, (Warszawa, 1978).
3) It amounted to about 10 million, out ofa total population of 32 million in 1931.
4) Kaelble, Industrialisierung, alone N. 1.
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on the one hand and income on the other). The post World War I period has
witnessed a process of far-reaching social integration, as a result of which the
different and divergent social hierarchies have been largely merged.
Social Inequalities before World War I
We know much about the general aspect of inequalities before the First World
War, and there are many narrative sources dealing with this subject. The Situati¬
on is worse in regard to detailed, especially Statistical, data, but not all research
possibilities have yet been exhausted. To keep our reflections in orderlet use
the scheme applied by Kaelble in one of his books 5). He examines social ine-
qualites in regard to income, position in the work place, education, housing,
illness and death, and considers the same questions from the point of view of
class division. Not all these aspects are known to us.
The process of industrialization brought enormous changes in income and
prosperity to Poland. It was in the 19th Century that large bourgeois fortunes
were created in this country. In Poland this was the only period of boom for a
sizeable group of millionaires
- like the famous Kronenbergs and Blochs - who
were mostly of Jewish or German origin; this was an additional obstacle to the
consolidation of the bourgeoisie and the rallying of the enlightened classes
behind it. The bourgeoisie emerged mainly in the Congress Kingdom, which
was under Russian rule. There was practically no big Polish bourgeoisie in the
Austrian and Prussian parts of Poland. In the early years of the 20th Century
individualistic capitalism declined, and Poland saw the appearance of anonymous
joint-stock companies and foreign capital in a new role (with directing centres
abroad). The concentration of wealth and income increased in the first 15 years
of the 20th Century, and turnover and capital became increasingly large. The
bourgeoisie's share of social income and assets must have also risen, but the
bourgeois class lost its individualistic character. its lower ranks, that is the mid¬
dle bourgeoisie, just managed to keep its head above water, while the petty
bourgeoisie was slowly entering a period of crisis, which strongly affected this
social group in Poland in later years. This is, however, only a hypothetical sketch
of the Situation.
At the other end of the scale was the working class, whose Standard of living
was, on the whole, extremely low6), but whose Situation gradually improved.
5) Average yearly wages of textile workers in 1894 in roubles: USA 1300, Great Britain
936, Germany 707, Congress Kingdom 427, Russia 350. For more details see: E. Ka -
c z y n* s k a, in: Polska klasa robotnicza, Zarys dziejöw (The Polish Working Class, An Out¬
line of Its History), vol. I, part 2, (Warszawa, 1978), pp. 274 - 308.
6) I have presented a preliminary analysis of the social hierarchy and inequalities in inter¬
war Poland in my book Spoteczerfstwo Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918 - 1939 (Polish
Society 1918 - 1939), (Warszawa, 1973), Chapter X. Most of the dara referring to the years
1918 - 1939 comes from this book.
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We do not know to what extent this improvement was due to general economic
development - this must have been the most important factor - and to what
extent it resulted from a change in the distribution of national income in favour
of the working class. We know more about the evolution of income within this
class. The initial gap between skilled factory "artisans" and the badly paid
unskilled workers was bridged by many intermediate rungs which finally pro¬
duced a continuum. However, the difference between the top and the bottom
of this ladder, far from decreasing, was becoming ever greater; the highest wages,
which were at first 2-4 times as high as the lowest, were often 7-10 times higher
than the lowest wages on the eve of World War I. The top limit of the highest
wages was raised, but the bottom limit rose much more slowly. On the whole,
the Situation in the Congress Kingdom did not differ much from that in the
Polish territories under Prussia (Upper Silesia, Poznan region, Pomerania), where
the rise in wages was quite considerable, especially in the case of skilled workers,
or from the Situation in Teschen Silesia (Austria).
We know less about handicrafts and small-scale industry. In these occupations
the differences in wages were not so great and were mostly connected with
traditional occupational categories (journeyman - apprentice). In any case, the
wages of workers employed in large factories were higher than the pay of those
working in small establishments.
We do not have enough data to present a synthesis of the inequalities in in¬
come within the group of non-manual workers (calied brain workers in Poland)
or the difference between the pay of manual and non-manual workers. In Poland
the term "non-manual worker" referred to a social group, the intelligentsia,
which enjoyed great social prestige. This fact might have had an influence on the
evaluation of work and even on the salaries of this category of people. In any
case, there were sharp differences in factories between the wages of workers
and the pay of salaried personnel and technical supervisory staffs. Within the
group of non-manual workers the differences in income were extremely great.
Professional people or factory directors enjoyed much greater prosperity and a
higher social Status than civil servants of lower ranks, post-office clerks and cle¬
rical workers. The differences within this group were much greater than between
workers. The salaries of at least a half of the non-manual workers were not hig¬
her than a worker's wage.
In towns and the industrial sector, there is no doubt that although the type
of production remained capitalist, the former gross and brutal inequalities within
the workplace diminished at the beginning of the 20th Century. This applies,
among other things, to relations between owners, managers and supervisory
staffs on the one hand, and workers on the other. These changes were linked
to the growth of democratic customs resulting from the weakening of sharp
archaic divisions between the individual estates, as well as to the influence of the
1905 revolution, which raised the prestige of the working class.
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Another question is inequality in access to education. The majority of indus¬
trial workers in the Congress Kingdom were illiterate. Although ilhteracy was
decreasing and on the eve of World War I more than a half of all workers (not
only in industry) could read and write (Polish education existed only in the
Austrian part of Poland; in the rest of the country Instruction was given in
Russian or in German), worker's access to education was still restricted. In this
respect the disproportions increased. The level of general and vocational educa¬
tion of skilled workers was rising, while the masses of unskilled workers remai-
ned illiterate. Illiteracy was rare in the Polish territories under Prussia; the Situ¬
ation was worse in Galicia and the worst in the Russian-ruled Congress Kingdom.
In view of the denationalization policy conducted by Prussia and Russia, even
the enlightened classes of Polish society had difficulties in gaining access to
secondary schools and, especially, universities, but this did not apply to Galicia.
In sum, the inequalities in access to education slightly diminished before 1914.
There were gross inequalities in housing. In industrial centers the overcrowding
in workers* flats was simply unbelievable (3-4 persons, sometimes even more
than 10, per room); a large number of workers lived in uninhabitable quarters,
some in peasant-type cottages. In contrast, the bourgeoisie usually had large
flats, though many of them were old fashioned and lacked modern conveniences.
At the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th, the Situation
of factory workers improved a little owing to the growth of housebuilding and
the construction of workers' flats by many factories. However, since the techni¬
cal Standards of apartments for the prosperous classes rose steadily, inequality
in this respect probably did not lessen.
There were also great inequalities in health care. For lack of Space I cannot
present them in detail, but the general picture was similar to the housing Situ¬
ation: inequalities in health care rose to a new level, so to speak, in view of a
certain improvement in the Situation of the lower social strata (among other
things, thanks to medical care in factories) and a simultaneous improvement
in the Standards of medical care for the prosperous classes.
In the countryside, especially in the territories under Russia and Austria, an
archaic socio-economic structure predominated. The inequalities were institu¬
tionalized, their antagonistic embodiments being the big landowner and the
peasant. Although there were great differences in the income of peasants, the
main inequality was between the manor house and the peasant cottage. It con¬
cemed land ownership (a large landed estate was several score or several hund¬
red times as big as a peasant holding) and of course also income. The housing
conditions of the two groups could not even be compared and are best reflected
in the words "manor house" and "cottage". The Situation was similar in regard
to educational chances. Illiteracy prevailed in the villages of the Congress King¬
dom, was quite large in Galicia, and small in the Prussian part of Poland. There
were also glaring inequalities in health care. The rural semi-proletariat and prole-
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tariat hved on an even lower level than the peasants. Other inequalities and a
different hierarchy existed on manorial farms employing agricultural laborers.
With the passage of time, however, the economic and cultural level of a consi¬
derable part of peasant Stratum improved and thus the inequality in the country-
side possibly decreased somewhat.
Social inequalities corresponded to class divisions; at one end of the scale were
capitalists and land-owners, at the opposite end, workers and peasants. The mid¬
dle rungs of the social ladder presented a more complex picture, since the most
characteristic part of non-manual workers, namely the intelligentsia, occupied
a high rung as far as prestige and education were concemed, but held varied po¬
sitions in regard to income and living Standards; the lower ranks of this group
did not differ much from the lower social strata while its highest ranks enjoyed
a position similar to that of the privileged classes. The position of the petty
bourgeoisie was also ambiguous; a part of this group did not differ from the
Proletariat; the rest (with the exception of the Poznan region) did not enjoy
respect, and had a modest Standard of living.
Generally speaking, the inequality curve within the part of Polish society
living in industrialized areas followed an incomplete inverted U pattern. Since
the process of industrialization began in Poland in 1860 (earlier in Silesia), this
concerns only the second half of the 19th Century and the beginning of the
20th Century. By an incomplete inverted U I mean the fact that the rise of
inequality at the beginning of the process was far more rapid and pronounced
than the decrease at its end.
The inter-war period
Let me State at the beginning that the First World War disordered or even ab-
olished many of the old hierarchies and inequalities. Its natural result was a
change in mutual relations and in the evaluation of manual and non-manual
work. War-time conditions favoured the owners of goods. From the material
point of view the hardest blow was dealt to the intelligentsia and non-manual
workers and also to workers in large industrial centers. At the end of the war and
after its conclusion the difference between the pay of manual and non-manual
workers was much smaller than before, and so were the differences between
the wages of various groups of manual workers. It seems that the reduction of
the gap between the wages of manual and non-manual workers has become a
permanent feature.
Inter-war Poland experienced a relatively rapid integration of society and a
reduction of differences between the Systems of social distances which had
existed in the three parts of the partitioned country. However, as late as 1939,
the differences between the territories which had been under Prussia and those
under Russia and Austria were still considerable. Another feature of Polish
inter-war society was the continued existence of pre-capitalist structures along-
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side a modern industrial sector, although this dichotomy was somewhat lesse-
ned. An acute economic crisis affected the developments of Polish society, and
many of the features characteristic of the pre-war period were still apparent in
the years 1918
- 1939. I shall deal here only with the changes which took place
in the new period 7).
Regarding living Standards and incomes in 1918 - 1939, as well as many other
questions, the sources at our disposal are more abundant than for earlier panels,
but are, unfortunately, only fragmentary. Attempts were made during those
years to present a general picture of social inequalities in Poland, and I shall
make use of these data here. On the basis of estimates of national income and
its distribution, Micha! Kalecki and Ludwik Landau, two distinguished econo¬
mists, calculated the monthly expenditure of four-person families of various
socio-occupational groups in 1929 and 1933 8) (the exchange rate of the dollar
was 8,90 zlotys in 1929, 7,20 in 1933 before its devaluation, and 5,30 in 1935).
Table 1
Classes and strata Expenditure in zlotys
1929 1933a)
Persons living on profit and professional
people
Non-manual workers
1,300
640
800
445
Petty bourgeoisie
Manual workers
Peasants
345
265
175
185
135
73-151b)
a) wages and prices dropped in the years 1929 - 1933
b) my own estimates. Kalecki and Landau have not given figures for peasants in 1933.
Expenditures do not, of course, reflect the structure of incomes, which diffe-
• red much more. I have distinguished the following levels of income and consum¬
ption in the years 1918 - 1939 in my book: 1) the financial elite, aristocracy,
big bourgeoisie (several thousand families), 2) the prosperous bourgeoisie,
landowners, senior civil servants (several hundred thousand persons), 3) the
typical level ot the intelligentsia: clerical workers, less prosperous representa¬
tives of the professions, secondary school teachers, prosperous petty bourge-
7) Cf. footnote 6.
8) Micha* Kalecki and Ludwik Landau, Szacunek dochodu spotecznego w
1929 r. (An Estimate of the Social Income in 1929) (Warszawa, 1934); by the same authors:
Dochod spofeczny w 1933 i podstawy badan periodycznych nad zmianami dochodu (The
Social Income in 1933 and Foundations of Periodic Research into Changes in Income),
(Warszawa, 1935).
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oisie (over a million people), 4) clerical workers of lower ranks, the working
class elite, petty bourgeoisie (3,5 million), 5) unskilled workers, proletarian
artisans (5 - 6 million), 6) peasants (a variegated group of 15 million), 7) rural
semi-proletariat, the poorest urban strata, persons permanently unemployed
during the crisis (4 million).
Kalecki and Landau also estimated the distribution of Poland's national in¬
come. They put the national income in 1929 at 26.000 million zlotys and
the income of hired labour at about 8.000 million (of which non-manual wor¬
kers earned 2.500 million, manual workers 4.300 million, and agricultural
labourers 1.600 million zlotys). The petty bourgeoisie obtained 3.500 million,
small holders 8.700 million, the propertied classes and professional people
2.200 million. These figures give some idea of the proportions in the distri¬
bution of the national income. The estimates for 1933 reflect changes brought
by the crisis, which was the most important event in this respect in the years
1918 - 1939. According to the authors' estimates, the real income of non-manu¬
al workers rose as a result of the Depression (it reached an index of 104) while
the income of manual workers dropped (78); the incomes of the petty bour¬
geoisie also dropped (81), and there was a slight decrease in the income of the
bourgeoisie and professional people (95). The industrial goods consumption
index was 47 (!) for peasants and agricultural labourers, and 85 for big land¬
owners. Generally speaking, the changes indicated by these figures meant a
growth of social inequalities at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the
1930s. Unfortunately there are no estimates for other years. In the last few
years before the war, the working class might have slightly increased its share of
the national income, but this is only a hypothesis.
Hanna Jedruszczak analyses in detail the share and differentiations of workers'
wages in the years 1924
- 1939 9). She estimates that in 1937 the share of wages
(of manual and non-manual workers) in the national income was about 20 per
cent higher than in 1928, and 50 per cent higher than in 1933, which was the
worst year. I will not deal here with the large fluctuations in relative wages in
the years 1918
- 1928, since this is of Httle importance for our question. A
number of studies published before and after World War II give quite an exact
picture of the Situation. There is also a large amount of information on diffe¬
rences in workers' wages. There is no point in discussing this data in detail,
since no comparisons can be made, in view of the lack of information on the
period preceding World War I. However, it is worth pointing out that the diffe¬
rences dependent on region, branch of industry and the size of work places
were no smaller than the differences between the wages of skilled and unskilled
workers. According to Landau, in 1929 the average monthly wage of workers
9) Hanna Jedruszczak, Pfcice robotnikow w Polsce 1924 -1939 (Workers' Wages
in Poland 1924 - 1929) (Warszawa, 1963), p. 300.
102
employed in sawmills was two-and-a-half times lower than in fertilizer fac¬
tories. In the same year industrial workers in the lowest wage bracket (6 per
cent of the total) earned 8-10 times less than workers belonging to the best
paid group (12 per cent). Wages in small factories were frequently no more than
a half of what was paid for similar jobs in large factories. It is quite difficult
to ascertain wage differences resulting from qualifications, there being no uni¬
form criteria of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled work. According to compa¬
rative studies these differences are said to have been relatively large in Poland,
but factors other than qualifications frequently led to even greater differences
in wages.
Other studies have shown that the differences between the incomes of manual
and non-manual workers were not very great. Table 1 gives some idea of the
differences in wages and expenditures between manual and non-manual workers.
In 1929 the Situation was as follows:
Table 2
Monthly wage Percentage
workers
of:manual Percentage of non-manual
workers
up to 150 zlotys 49 17
150-300 zlotys 39 39
over 300 zlotys 12 44
Total 100 100
Source: L. Landau, see fn. 10, pp. 245 - 246.
It seems that the difference in the income of manual and non-manual workers,
after being reduced during World War I, began to increase again during the eco¬
nomic crisis. This was probably due to the fact that a large proportion of non-
manual workers were civil servants. As is known, their salaries and employment
tend to be stable.
The inter-war period did not bring major changes in the position of the diffe¬
rent categories of people in the work place, but the Status of the working class
as a whole rose as a result of the democratization of customs and the activity
of the working class and trade union movements. This had an impact on rela¬
tions in work places. Moreover, there appeared a category of manual workers
employed in State institutions - State monopolies, railways, post-office - who
earned well, enjoyed prestige and could expect social promotion, at least for
their children. During the crisis which affected Poland at the end of the 1920s
10) The data come from the study: Ludwik Landau, Rfcice w Polsce w zwi^zku z
rozwojem gospodarczym (The Connection between Wages and Economic Development
in Poland)(Warszawa, 1935), repr.:L. Landau, Wybor pism (Selected Works) (Wars-
zawa,1957).
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and the beginning of the 1930s, a sharp dividing line began to separate workers
with guaranteed employment from a new group of those permanently unem¬
ployed.
Let us now examine the educational chances of various social groups. In 1937,
Marian Falski published an interesting and well documented book conceming
the social background of school pupils and students.
Table 3
Number of children reaching the last grade of secondary
school and the first year of university study out of 100
children of a given group who attended the first grade of
a primary school. The data refer to 1935/1936.
Occupational
groups
Big businessmen
Big landowners
Professional people 74.1
Last grade of secondary
school (12th year of
schooling)
40.6
39.5
Civil servants
Small businessmen
Small holders
Rural semi-
proletariat
State officials of
lower ranks
Domestic servants
Workers employed
in commerce and
industry
Agricultural
labourers
Rentiers
33.9
4.8
1.0
0.5
6.0
1.7
1.3
0.2
48.5
First year of university
study.
29.1
26.4
53.6
23.6
1.8
0.4
0.2
1.7
0.7
0.4
0.1
24.0
Source: M. Falski, Srodowisko spoleczne mkodziezy a jej wyksztaicenie
(The Social Differentiation of Youth and its Education) (Warszawa, 1937), p. 62.
We know that the opportunities of peasant children decreased during the inter¬
war period because of a permanent agrarian crisis, According to Stanislaw
Rychlinski, an eminent social researcher, the Stagnation of the economy halted
upward social mobility, and this in turn hampered the democratization of cul¬
ture in Poland.
104
We also have information on inequalities in housing. I shall confine myself
to the percentage of persons of each social group who lived in dwellings with
a lower density of occupation than two persons per room, which was then re¬
garded as the tolerable minimum condition. This density was enjoyed by 77 per
cent of the members of the propertied classes and professional people, 78 per
cent of non-manual workers, 44 per cent of small-scale producers and shop¬
keepers, 29 per cent of manual workers and labourers, and 19 per cent of pea¬
sants. Once again the inequalities in housing, as in other fields, were on the
whole linked to class divisions.
For lack of Space I cannot present a detailed picture of inequalities in the field
of medical care, but it seems that on the whole they did not change much com¬
pared with the period preceding World War I. The health service for hired labor
covered about one-sixth of Polish society (not all manual workers had the
right to social insurance), but financial difficulties (the crisis) put medical care
out of the reach ofa large part of the peasantry. A considerable part of the intel¬
ligentsia benefited from progress in medicine, and this had a positive effect
on the health of the younger generation, but it also increased inequality in this
respect. These are however only hypotheses.
This short survey shows that compared with pre-war times,social inequalities
did not undergo any radical change during the inter-war period; what changed
was their distribution, e. g. non-manual workers employed in State institutions
improved their position, and a change could be noticed in access to education
(elementary schooling embraced practically the entire younger generation as a
result of which illiteracy decreased).
Social changes resulting from the war and the revolution
The war was not only a cataclysm and a break in the normal development of
Polish society, but also a factor leading to major changes in social structure.
These transformations have been discussed by Waclaw Dfcigoborski H). For lack
of Space I cannot repeat his conclusions. Let me only point out that the exter-
mination of Jews meant the liquidation of the majority of the petty bourgeoisie
and of a half of the bourgeoisie. On the whole, the partial destruction of the old
social structures (especially in the territories incorporated into the Reich) fa¬
cilitated the introduction of social reforms after 1944. The occupation of the
country led to the extermination of a part of the propertied classes and of the
intelligentsia, and to the degradation of a part of the working class (forced la¬
bour) and of the peasantry (mass evictions). This policy of extermination and
persecution blurred social inequalities among a large part of Polish society. The
mass deportations of Poles from the eastern territories in the years 1939 - 1941
11) WacJäw Dfugoborski, "Die deutsche Besatzungspolitik und die Verände¬
rungen der sozialen Struktur Polens 1939 - 1945'* in: W. Di u g o b o r s k i, ed., Zweiter
Weltkrieg und sozialer Wandel (Göttingen, 1981),
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also levelled social differences. However, some of these changes were transi-
tory, and many people regained their previous social Status after the war. The
Nazi socio-national hierarchy, composed of all the ranks from Reichsbürger
down to the inmates of ghettos and concentration camps, was of course only
temporary.
The changes made in the years 1945 - 1985 have led to the liquidation of the
uppermost rung of the old socio-occupational hierarchy. In practice, however,
the majority of the propertied classes and of the petty bourgeoisie was either
physically or economicaliy destroyed during the war. The remaining compo-
nentsof the social structure are: workers, peasants - farmers (the short period of
forcible collectivisation in the years 1950
- 1955 failed to eliminate this group),
the intelligentsia (a group which according to a new definition now comprises
only people with a university education), clerical workers, and owners of com-
mercial and industrial establishments (the so-called private sector, mostly small-
scale producers and shopkeepers). The large-scale industrialization launched in
the late 1940s has resulted in great structural mobility. Millions of peasants
have come to towns and found employment in industry, hundreds of thousands,
if not millions, of people from working class and peasant families have taken up
non-manual jobs or joined the group of the intelligentsia, and the country has
undergone a process of intensive urbanization. Between 1938 and 1983 the
social structure changed as follows:
Table 4
Year Workers Farmers Non-manual Others Total Town Country Total
and other workers
manual
employees
1938 30 50 6 14 100 30 70 100
1983 44 27 23 6 100 60 40 100
Efforts have been made to give people of working class and peasant origin
greater access to posts of authority, to the intelligentsia, to secondary and uni¬
versity schools. Changes in the social structure were the quiekest in the 1950s;
later on they lost momentum, and in the 1970s some Symptoms of ossification
could be noticed 12). The introduction of the new political and economic Sys¬
tem has created structures providing ground for privileges and preferences which
12) Melanie T a t u r, Arbeitssituation und Arbeiterschaft in Polen 1970 - 1980 (Frank¬
furt, 1983), pp. 32, 83, 93; Maria J a r o sz, Nier6wnos*ci spoJeczne (Social Inequalities)
(Warszawa, 1984).
106
are an important element of inequality, although they can hardly be put in
figures.
In analysing the hierarchy of social inequalities we cannot disregard its ideo¬
logical background in a socialist State. The ideological principles envisage equa¬
lity of chances and assign the main and decisive social and political role to the
working class. Inequality is to be abolished at a higher stage of development
while at present there may be inequality resulting from differences in the input
of work. These official principles do not differ much from the views expressed
in various opinion polls. Egalitarianism is the dominant ideology of Polish so¬
ciety, which theoretically recognizes the right to a better remuneration for
better work. This is the ideological background, so to speak, of present-day
inequalities.
Major changes have taken place in the structure of income in post-war Poland.
The distance between manual and non-manual work has in practice been eli-
minated. Some kinds of non-manual work have been degraded to a level below
certain manual jobs. In public opinion, as well as in sociological and Statistical
studies, clerical workers are a separate group whose incomes are lower than
those of skilled workers. In this respect the Situation in Poland does not differ
from that in other countries. Before the war the ratio of white-collar to blue-
collar workers was 1:5; it is now 1:2. However, even some categories of pro¬
fessional people and university men receive lower salaries than skilled and even
semi-skilled workers. At the top of the social ladder are representatives of the
private sector (private commerce, industry and gardening) and the most pros¬
perous peasants. Opinions differ about the ratio between the incomes of farmers
and the incomes of persons employed in non-agricultural branches of the econo¬
my, but it is certain that farmers occupy a relatively high position in the hierar¬
chy, much higher than before. Certain groups of workers whose work is now the
main prop of the economy (coal miners) also belong to the elite as far as in¬
comes are concemed.
These remarks seem to indicate that class division is no longer the main cause
of social inequality, at least in regard to income. Some corrections must how¬
ever be made in this general picture in view of the high income of a part of the
private sector and the privileges enjoyed by the political-administrative elite
(opportunities of buying goods at reduced prices and purchasing unobtainable
commodities, access to Services in short supply, etc.). This is naturally not re-
flected in statistics.
The distribution of the national income was as follows in 1983 (in thousand
million zlotys):
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Table 5
Wages and salaries 1.730,8 29,2
Other incomes 92,8 1,6
Net income of farmers 709,8 11,9
Net income of owners of non-agricultural
business 154,9 2,6
Social insurance contributions and other
payments 1.527,1 25,8
Taxes 400,0 6,8
Profits and losses (balances) + 1.308,6 22,1
Total 5.924,0 100,0
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1984 (Statistical Yearbook, 1984) Central Statistical
Office.
Note: Depreciation has been deducted from the national income.
These figures cannot be compared with the pre-war estimates made by Kalecki
and Landau in view of differences in the meaning of the term "national income"
and in the methods used in calculations. It seems that the share of wages is
similar, but there has been a drop in the share of businessmen (but their number
has decreased too).
Table 6
Groups of population Ratio of incomes
Years 1975 1980 1981
Hired labour 1.18 1.09 1.03
of which
senior officials of economic administration
social and political organizations, other
State functionaries
Other groups of hired labour
Farmers
Pensioners
Persons living on social assistance
Total
Source: M. Jarosz, Nierownosci Spoteczne (Social Inequalities), p. 87.
2.26 2.05 1.78
1.08 1.01 0.95
0.79 0.99 1.25
0.61 0.70 0.68
0.21 0.25 0.24
1.00 1.00 1.00
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The table shows the extent of differences as well as a trend towards their
reduction, typical of periods of crisis. I have already said that the position of
farmers has improved. According to Jarosz, the differences in the incomes of
hired labour have been reduced since 1982. This has been confirmed by the
results of the latest research (not yet published) conducted by the Institute
of Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, which, moreover, indicates
that the highest position is held by owners of commercial and industrial esta-
blishments (the private sector). Jarosz has not taken this sector into account;
if she had, the inequalities would have been greater. The index for senior offi-
cials has been calculated only on the basis of their salaries and other forms of
monetary remuneration 13).
There is much information on differences in wages and incomes in the earlier
periods of the 40 post-war years. It would be a laborious task to analyse trends
in the development of inequalities during that time. I shall confine myself to
the last few years. The average monthly remuneration of manual and non-manu¬
al workers changed as follows:
Table 7
Year 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983
Manual workers 4.565 5.762 7.388 11.158 14.124
Non-manual
workers 4.931 5.843 7.353 11.099 13.667
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny (Statistical Yearbook, 1984), p. 156.
In addition to a rise in nominal wages (inflation), the table shows a clear
change in proportions between the wages of blue-collar and white-collar workers.
According to other data, the difference between the average wage of unskilled
workers and the salary of specialists with university education (the two extreme
rungs of the social hierarchy) was approximately 1:2 previously (e. g. in the
1960s), which is a moderate difference 14). However, these average figures
conceal great differences. Let us have a look at incomes per household member
in 1980 (Table 6). The picture presented in Table 6 is of course influenced by
family structure (especially the number of children).
In an analysis of wages, the group of hired labour can now be taken as a whole
13) There is yet another, specific factor of prosperity in Poland, namely, contacts with
western countries (relatives, parcels, work) owing to the extremely high black-market
(semilegal) rate of exchange of convertible currencies.
14) For instance, Zr6*fnicowanie spoleczne (Social Differences), ed. W. Wesoiowski
(Warszawa, 1974), pp. 159 - 160. But the differences in total incomes (not only wages and
salaries) were greater.
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since the incomes of manual and non-manual workers do not differ much. The
differences between them are now much smaller than before the war (research
into this question has been conducted by M. Kalecki and L. Beskid), especially
if we exclude miners, who for some time past have been an exceptionally privi-
leged group. However, there are still considerable differences within the group
of hired labour. In 1983, the highest pay of the lowest income bracket (up to
6.000 zlotys a month), which embraces 1.6 per cent of all persons employed,
was five times lower than the lowest pay of the highest income bracket (30.000
zlotys and more a month) embracing 2.4 per cent of all employed people. On
the whole, egalitarian trends have been strong and are now dominant, but
there are also opposite trends which, though weaker, lead to a differentiation
of wages. Class division is the basis of inequality mainly in the highest income
bracket (owners of private businesses) and the lowest one (unskilled workers).
In the middle of the scale class division no longer exerts an influence on in¬
come.
Table 8
Households with a monthly
income per person of:
(in 1980)
less than 1.500 zlotys
1.500-2.000 zlotys
2.000-2.500"
2.500-3.000
"
3.000-4.000"
4.000-5.000"
more than 5.000 zlotys
Manual Non- Peasar
workers manual
workers
100.0 100.0 100.0
4.7 1.2 14.3
10.8 5.4 13.3
16.4 9.0 17.2
17.6 14.6 14.4
26.7 26.4 17.2
13.9 20.0 9.7
9.9 23.4 13.9
Source: M. Jarosz, Nieröwnosci spoleczne, p. 94.
I have devoted so much Space to inequalities in income that there is not much
left for other kinds of inequality. Differences in housing correspond to the
division into classes, but they are not sharp.
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Table 9
Housing Conditions in 1980
Specification
Average living Space in Square metres
Average number of rooms per dwelling
Average living Space per person in
Square metres
Average number of persons per room
Working
class
families
47.7
2.9
13.0
1.2
Families of Peasant
non-manual
workers
49.9 61.3
3.2 3.2
15.8
1.0
16.6
1.1
Source: J. Jarosz, Nieröwnosd spoteczne, p. 111.
In view of the specific features of certain occupations (intellectuals, producers
working at home etc.), the differences are not significant. But these figures, as
well as other data used by myself, do not embrace members of the most pros¬
perous social groups who refuse to fill in questionnaires. If they were included,
the inequalities would be much sharper.
The data on inequahty in educational chances are extremely interesting. The
general level of education has greatly risen since pre-war times. During the last
40 years the authorities have unchangingly aimed at ensuring equal chances
in education, even by giving preferential Status to working class and peasant
youths in admission to the higher levels of education, especially to universities.
Great successes were achieved in this respect during the stormy period of social
changes in the early 1950s. But since then working class and peasant youth has
been more and more underrepresented at the higher levels of the educational
system, while young people from the families of white-collar workers have been
overrepresented.
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Table 10
Graduation Levels according to Social Origin
during the 1979 -1980 School Year
Typeof Years of Blue- Peasants White- Artisans Others Total
school schooling collar collar (
workers workers
Elementary 1-8 51.9 24.3 18.1
Primary
vocational 9-10/11 59.8 28.6 7.2
Lycees 9-12 37.4 10.5 47.6
University
schools 13-16/18 32.4 10.9 52.2
1.8 3.9 100.0
1.9 2.5 100.0
2.5 2.0 100.0
2.1 2.4 100.0
Source: M. Jarosz, NierSwnoici spoteczne, pp. 137 - 150.
Note : Evening schools and correspondence courses have not been taken into considera¬
tion. They would have rectified the picture in favor of working class and peasant youth, but
they are considered to be on a lower level than their counterparts.
One can say that two modeis of education have come into being: a model
typical of working class and peasant youth (primary vocational schools) and
another type for children of white-collar workers (lycees ending with matri-
culation). The problem is all the more important as education is the main Chan¬
nel facilitating social mobility. On the other hand, the fact that the income of
blue-collar workers is now the same or even higher than those of white-collar
workers has eliminated one of the incentives of social mobility, and makes it
difficult to determine its direction (upward or downward). As a result, social
positions and even some professions (e. g. that of physicians) are becoming
hereditary to some extent.
It is difficult to define the post-war changes in the System of social inequalities
unequivocally because of their multidirectional character. Besides, I have dis-
regarded some important aspects of the problem, e. g. inequality in work pla-
ces, where great changes have also taken place 15). Compared with previous
periods, important changes have been made to level differences (changed pro-
portions in the remuneration of manual and clerical workers, much easier
access to secondary and university schools for the previously unprivileged clas¬
ses, elimination of the old propertied classes). However, not all inequalities have
been removed, and new sources of wealth and prosperity have appeared (new
categories of privileged persons, new types of wealth and prosperity in the case
15) The position of workers has certainly improved and that of lower-rank clerical wor¬
kers has deteriorated. An analysis of workers' pronouncements (1956, 1970, 1980) shows
that inequalities and conflicts between workers and managers have not been removed.
112
of the private sector and persons who have relatives or jobs abroad). The ide¬
ology of egalitarianism has gained wide popularity. The last ten years have wit-
nessed a partial disintegration of the old class inequalities between workers,
peasants and salaried employees as well as Symptoms of an ossification of social
positions and structures and a reduction of social mobility. One can also notice
an undesirable accumulation of negative social factors in certain groups, and this
has led to the emergence of new unprivileged groups. One can say that on the
whole social differences are sharper than one would assume on the basis of
Statistical data.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this survey is that the evolution of
social inequalities in Poland can be divided into two main periods separated by
World War II. A characteristic feature of the System of social inequalities up to
1939 was the parallel existence of structures typical of the capitalist System and
of considerable relics of the pre-capitalist pattern. The developing capitalist-
urban society generated sharp inequalities that slightly relaxed since the late
19th Century. Inequalities within rural society slightly decreased up to 1939
as well. During the last 40 years many old inequalities have been eliminated,
especially those connected with the big industrial and landed property and with
the differences between wage earners and salaried. However, new inequalities
have appeared. They result from the privileged position of superior State and
party officials and similar groups and from the existence of a private sector
of the economy offering possibilities of getting rieh. It is difficult to State
whether new inequalities are more or less considerable than the old ones were.
In my opinion, however, the top (private big business, big landed property) and
bottom (lowest categories of journeymen, unemployed) of the old hierarchy
have been cut and therefore the new inequalities, though important, are less
sharp than the former ones. So the process of attenuating inequalities goes on.
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III. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
Transitions from Agricultural to Industrial Societies:
Some Introductory Remarks i)
Patrice Bourdelais
From the end of the 18th Century on mankind has experienced the most
fundamental transformation since the stone age -- the industrial revolution. Its
impact is so profound that contemporaries began to analyze it and the term
"industrial revolution*' appeared in the writings of Marx and Engels as well as
John Stuart Mill in the middle of the 19th Century. By nineteen hundred it
had become common usage (Arnold Toynbee). Thus the question discussed
below, if broadened to inciude the whole process of transition from rural to
industrial society, is one of the great "classics" of contemporary historiography.
The innovation in approaches derives not only from the apphcation of recent
quantitative methods, but also from a change of perspective, since historians
usually analyze the past in the light of their own time.
I. The evolution of the problem
At the beginning of the present Century, Mantoux in the first major work on
the industrial revolution placed primary emphasis on industry and technolo-
gical change 2). At that time the phenomenon was limited to England, Germany
and France, since the power of the United States was not perceived until the
First World War. Growth seemed uninterrupted, driven by periodic revolutions
in steam, electrical and then oil technology. But this view was strongly criticized
in the 1950s, since the Great Depression suggested the idea that growth was not
solely dependent upon technology. J. U. Nef showed that the acceleration of
technical progress occurred about 1780 rather than in 1750, if one looks at the
metallurgical sector and the use of steam power instead of limiting oneself to
changes in textile production 3). For him the industrial revolution is not a
break but simply an acceleration; it is a part of a long term development of tech¬
nical progress. The countries involved in this speed-up had already experienced
a first revolution of metallurgical and mining techniques during the Renais-
1) Translated by H. Best and Hannelore F. Jarausch as well as edited by K. H. Jarausch.
2) P. Mantoux, La Revolution industrielle au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1905).
3) J. U. N e f, La Naissance de la civilization industrielle et le monde contemporain
(Paris, 1954).
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sance. According to T. S. Ashton, technical innovation was therefore of seconda¬
ry importance 4). How could it have had such a powerful effect, if favorable
conditions had not already existed in the non-industrial sectors? Such prerequi-
sites for the profitable introduction of new techniques might consist of agri¬
cultural improvement, the accumulation of capital and labor as well as the for¬
mation of internal and external markets.
This controversy which might seem out of date has, on the contrary, been
revived by sophisticated quantitative studies. For example, M. Yamaguchi takes
a macro-approach on the sources of Japanese economic development (1880 -
1970). He attempts to measure the effects of differential rates of technical
change in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors as well as of population
growth on Japanese economic development in every decade for this period.
His originality lies in the utilization of a model which includes nine exogenous
variables and eight endogenous variables. The model distinguishes an agricultural
sector, a non-agricultural one, intersectoral relationships and demand factors
(population, per capita income, terms of trade, and import as well as export. He
concludes that in the whole period technical change contributed more to growth
than traditional factors, perhaps because of its weight since the Second World
War. Population growth had a bad effect on per capita income, because resources
for increased food production had to be drawn from the non-agricultural sector,
Technical change had a double effect: in agriculture it tended to push resources
out, and in the non-agricultural sector it tended to draw resources in. Further,
it would be very interesting to distinguish different periods in the factor of
growth so as to answer the questions: how was accumulation, which allowed
initial Investments for technical change, possible and when did it occur? How did
people leave agriculture and go into industrial work?
Gradually analyses of transitions from rural to industrial societies have begun
to emphasize the extent and irreversibility of growth. Economic historians
are trying to measure growth-rates to determine the timing of the take-off and
the stages of growth 5). But Marxist historians oppose such a reduction of their
role and of their subject matter. For instance, P. Vilar, in distinguishing different
phases in the transition between "feudalism" and capitalism, refuses to separate
the study of production levels and fluctuations from their social context 6).
As will become clear, this refusal is shared by numerous non-Marxist historians.
The scope of historical research has increased greatly since the 1960s 7). The
widespread discovery of underdevelopment and of social inequality during
4) T. S. Ashtom The Industrial Revolution (London, 1937).
5) W. W. R o s t o w, The Process of Economic Growth (New York, 1952).
6) For example, P. Vilar, "Developpement historique et progres social. Les etapes
et les criteres", La Pensee, No. 4, 1961.
7) E. L e Roy L a d u r i e, Le Territoire de l'historien (Paris, 1973 and 1978), 2 vols.
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growth has stimulated a concern for the differences of growth in each country
and the inequities which it produces or simply perpetuates.
For that reason we prefer to speak in the plural of "transitions" from agri¬
cultural to industrial society. The "industrial revolution" participates more or
less directly in the passage of one type of economy or society to another, be¬
cause neither the causes nor the sequence of transitions should be measured
by the onset of growth in North-West Europe. This is so because the impact
of the initially developed countries on the international market changes the
conditions for the development of the rest of the world. Industry does not
necessarily stay put at its birthplace 8).
The essay of F. Dopico, for example, presents a new Interpretation of the
relative chronology of Spain's backwardness in the transition. The notion of
advancement or retardation must be seen in the context of the Situation in
other countries. Therefore, F. Dopico reconsiders the demographic and econo¬
mic levels and the terms of international comparisons. He shows that Spain was
not in as good a position to benefit from industrialization as Great Britain,
France or Germany. But if one compares it to neighboring Mediterranean coun¬
tries, Spain's backwardness is not so striking. For example, at the beginning of
the 20th Century, the per capita gross national product was similar in Italy and
Spain (but then we have to explain the slowness of growth in the Mediterranean
world). After the Second World War, the differences became greater and greater.
In 1950 Spanish per capital income was 79 % of Italy's and by 1960 it was only
69 %. That seems to be a result of the civil war and of the autarchic policy of the
Franco era. This is a good example of the national peculiarity of the transition
and of the influence of political choices in retarding economic and cultural de¬
velopment.
In other countries and different continents growth may take place without
industrialization. In the case of Argentina between 1880 and 1930, a good exam¬
ple of Latin America development, capitalist control of the agricultural sector
through credit and the domination of the banking system by the United States
stimulated and organized growth, but limited it at the same time (Castillo-
Tulchin). More important than industrial development was the maintenance
of social control by a fraction of the dominant class through the use of usurious
credit and the exploitation of Argentine agriculture by international Investors
via the manipulation of the commercial and financial structure. Regional diffe¬
rences in modes of agrarian production, population density, degree of urban-
ization, immigration patterns and so on seem to have been decisive for the
degree and direction what development did take place.
Without question the focus of much research has remained relatively tradi¬
tional, namely the economic and political preconditions of growth. The prin-
8) L. B e r g e r o n, Les Revolutions europeennes et le partage du monde (Paris, 1968).
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cipal reason is apparently the unevenness of historical literature. While there are
relatively numerous case studies and syntheses on the big European nations, ana¬
lyses of countries remote from these centers are terribly few 9). Moreover, in
the latter area historians are still working on those aspects traditionally consi¬
dered most basic, such as economic and political conditions.
During the last twenty years, the frontiers of historical investigation have,
nevertheless, expanded considerably. Today historians explore the changes
of daily life and populär culture. Physiological anthropology has become a pro¬
mising field of research on the past, perhaps even an auxihary science of history!
For example the relationship between industriahzation and the wellbeing of
a population has become a controversial issue among historians. J. Komlos ana-
lyzes the case for the Habsburg monarchy in the eighteenth Century by studying
the relationship between the height by age profile of young males and the nutri-
tional Status of the population. He shows that the spread of malnutrition pre¬
ceded the rapid industrialization of the 1760s and 1770s and that the diminu-
tion in real income took place before the onset of industrial growth. The height
profile suggests that weavers, for example, were not poor because they wove,
"rather they wove because otherwise they would have been poorer". The Stan¬
dard of living had begun to deteriorate prior to the spread of industrialization
because of the growth of the agricultural labor force. "Protoindustrialization in
Bohemia helped prevent the utter collapse of the local economy".
The connection between nutrition and height may not be as simple as it seems
here. But the utilization of an unusual indicator makes it possible to conclude
that the deterioration of living Standards precedes the onset of protoindustri-
alization and in some ways supports it. Therefore, this study contributes to the
reevaluation of the positive aspects of industrialization which have long been
neglected in favor of the hard working conditions, emphasized by social and
moral observers in the 19th Century.
II. The interplay of time and Space
Through these different contributions, the great debate about the territorial
dimension of social analysis seems to be implicitly-and provisionally- closed.
But for the subject treated here, it remains crucial. The French sociological
school of the turn of the Century reproached geographers for their regional
approach whose overly narrow framework concealed the true explanatory
relationships. Beginning with a definition of the phenomenon to be studied,
Simiand proposed multiplying the sites of Observation instead of starting with
a division of the territory to which one limits one's investigation. In our session,
9) For example, H. Habakku k, M. Postan, The Industrial Revolution and
after (Cambridge, 1965), vol. 4 of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe. Cf. also
F. Braudel, E. Labrousse, Histoire economique et sociale de la France (Paris,
1976).
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most of our colleagues have chosen the national perspective. Is this the most
relevant level of analysis for the transition or is this choice only dictated by the
availability of sources? Luden Febvre affirmed his preference for the case study
approach, the only one compatible with the need for data of quality and for the
collection of multiple pieces of information 1°).
Finally, numerous historians have followed the path suggested by Max Sor-
re H). It satisfied sociologists without at the same time offending geographers!
By the diversity of sites selected, the region has become a kind of "spatial labo¬
ratory". It offered, through the ränge of combinations found elsewhere, the
possibility of multiplying comparisons and observing repetitions and divergences.
By distinguishing several larger regions in the series of cross-sections which he
analyses in relation to economic transformations, Komlos remains faithful to
this approach.
But given or contrived Space is only a simple framework. When one observes
the diversity of the countries and periods involved in the question of "transiti¬
ons", one may legitimately wonder how Space and time interact in a complete
historical analysis. In present practice, reductionism seems to dominate. There
are many ways of conflating one of the two dimensions with the other so as
to work along a single axis! The Braudel of La Mediterranee offers one main
example ^2). For him Space is a way of introducing into history the dimension
of the longest time, neglected until now. Geography "helps to rediscover the
slowest structural realities, to organize perspective according to the slope of the
plus longue duree". But if Space is "solidified time", should one not fear the
risk that it may vanish as a distinctive dimension of human activity? The evo¬
lution of Braudel's thought seems to indicate that he had not underestimated
this danger. In Le Capitalisme the analysis of preindustrial France which he pro-
poses rests on a double System: the progression from basic cells to the "count¬
ry", to the region, then finally to the national market and various zones, such as
mountains and plains, north and south, interior and periphery 13). A complex
order of time corresponds to this pluralistic Organization of territory. This
approach can easily and successfully be transposed to another country and a
more recent period (Castillo-Tulchin). Playing with the linkages of time and
space, estabhshing the points at which these two dimensions coincide is no
longer in the realm of speculation.
10) L. F e b v r e, La Terre et revolution humaine. Introduction geographique a l'his-
toire (Paris, 1922); and F. S i m i a n d, "Methode historique et science sociale", Revue
de Synthese historique, 1903.
11) M. S o r r e, Les Pyrenees mediterraneenes. Etüde geographie biologique (Paris,
1913).
12) F. B r a u d e 1, La Mediterranee et le monde mediterraneen ä l'epoque de Philippe
II (Paris, 1949), 2nd ed., 1966).
13) F. Braudel, Civilisation materielle, Economie et capitalisme, XVe - XVIIe siecle
(Paris, 1979).
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III. New directions of research
There are, of course, numerous aspects of the question which have barely
been touched upon i4). For instance changes occurring in the agricultural
sector, the transportation network or the banking System accompanied econo¬
mic development. The very important phenomenon of proto-industrialization
is only indirectly dealt with (Komlos). With the exception of Castillo-Tulchin,
social aspects have remained outside the discussion, not to mention cultural
changes such as reading and writing, religion, the world view, the conception
of the family or demographic patterns 15). Treating them was not the assign¬
ment of the contributors.
Instead of enumerating the aspects of change which could not Iegitimately
be included due to the brevity of time devoted to this vast question, I would
hke to linger over one approach which seems particularly promising: the link-
age of individual data. To the extent that grand economic and social syntheses
are available, historical questions have become finer and more demanding. Now
the discussion focuses on the familial and individual factors of the rural exodus,
on following the social itinerary of emigrants towards the city. Marriage strate¬
gies, voluntary birth control, regulär school attendance must be linked with
individual trajectories i6). As a framework for potential social or professional
mobihty and as crucible for a new acculturation, the firm becomes the criti¬
cal place. This level of the causes and consequences of the transition from an
agricultural to an industrial society cannot be treated by methods of aggregate
analysis, even if they are sophisticated. One must therefore have recourse to the
collection of nominal data in a necessarily restricted spatial area, unless one
chooses to draw a national sample 1?). In the latter case, the investigation can
be enriched by defining regional disparities, but it lacks the support of several
types of nominal sources.
When one limits the scope of research on the connection between mobihty
and industrialization to the small region of Creusot and a few communes which
provided numerous groups of immigrants (and consequently to a sample of
emigrants outside of the industrial center), it remains possible to link the data
14) D. Levine, Family Formation in the Age of Nascent Capitalism (New York,
1979); i d e m, Proletarianization and Family History (London, 1984); and P. B a i -
roch and A. M. P i u z, eds., Les passages des economies traditionelles europeennes
aux societes industrielles (Geneva, 1985).
15) H. M e d i c k, Industrialisierung von der Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1977).
16) Besides the research cited below, there are the projects directed by CL Desama at the
University of Liege (in Belgium) and by Y. Lequin at the University of Lyon (in France).
17) Survey of "three thousand families*' directed by J. D u p a q u i e r, presented in
"l'enquete des 3000 families*', Population, No 2, 1984.
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of census lists and of pupils enroUed in school with the information supphed
by personnel records of the Schneider factories. Thus multivariate analyses
can be conducted and homogenous groups constituted over several decades 18).
Undoubtledly this means returning to the monographic case study which-alth-
ough territorially structured in a different way-opens, as Lucien Febvre saw it,
the way to a new synthesis.
18) For example, G. Bouchard, Les Saguenayens. Introduction a la population
du Saguenay (Quebec, 1986); and P. Bourdelais, "L'industrialisation et ses mobili-
tes (1836 - 1936)", Annales ESC, No 5, 1984.
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Patterns of Children's Growth in East-Central-Europe
in the Eighteenth Century *)
John Komlos
Recent research has established a clear link between human stature and the
nutritional Status of populations *). My intention here is to exploit this known
hnk and on the basis of the cycling in human stature in the eighteenth Century
make inferences on the economic conditions, primarily agricultural, of the time.
My analysis of the stature of boys in the Habsburg monarchy in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries is based on three sources which inciude some of
the earliest data on heights hitherto extracted from any archive 2). The first
source is the military academy founded by Maria Theresia in the 1750s to train
officers. Five hundred sixty observations have survived on aristocratic adoles¬
cents born in the 1730s and 1740s 3), The second data set of 366 observations
stems from an orphanage, the Josephinische Waisenhaus, founded by Maria
Theresia's son Joseph II, and contains information on children of various ages
born in the 1760s and 1770s 4). The third, and major, source of data for this
study is schools run by the military for sons of ordinary soldlers 5). Exactly
*) The support of an NICHD National Research Service Award 2T32 HD07168 from the
Center for Population Research is gratefully acknowledged Computation was done at the
Computing center of the Wirtschaftsuniversitat, Vienna. I appreciate the hospitahty of the
rector of the university, Professor Herbert Matis, and the help of Walter Story, director of
the center, m bringing this study to fruition I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of
Klaus Erhard, Erich Foltyn, Paul Mageh, Asha Narang, and Nona Schlegel in extracting the
data from the archives and rendenng them machine readable. Markus Hein helped with the
computation diligently I benefited greatly from comments by Professors J. M Tanner
and Richard Steckel. This study is a slightly revised version of a paper forthcoming in the
Annais of Human Biology, repubhshd here with permission of the editors of that Journal
I would also hke to express my gratitude to Professor Robert Fogel for awakening my inte¬
rest in the history of human stature.
1) Robert Fogel, S. Engerman, Roderick F 1 o u d, R. M a r g o, K.
S o k o 1 o f f, Richard Steckel, J. Trussell, G. Villa f 1 o r, and Kenneth
Wächter, "Secular Changes in American and British Stature and Nutntion/' Journal
of Interdiseiplinary History 14 (1983), p. 445, Robert Fogel, S. Engerman, and
J. Trussell, "Exploring the Uses of Data on Height. The Analysis of Long-Term
Trends in Nutntion, Labor Welfare, and Labor Productivity," Social Science History 6
(1982), p. 401.
2) James M. Tanner, A History of the Study of Human Growth (Cambridge, 1981).
James M. T a n n e r, Fetus into Man. Physical Growth from Conception to Maturity
(Cambridge, Mass., 1978).
3) Knegsarchiv, Vienna, Theresianische Militärakademie, Faszikel, 434
4) Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Josephinische Waisenhaus, Faszikel, 3922.
5) Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Erziehungshauser Musterhsten, Faszikel, 3925, 3926, 3927 All
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25,071 valid data have been put on tape from this source. Besides height (to the
nearest 0.6 centimeter), age (year and month) and birthplace of the boys were
also recorded 6).
Regression analysis indicates that height of aristo cratic adolescents generally
did not depend on their place of birth (Equation 1, Table 1). Those born m Bo-
hemia, however, were significantly taller than the average. A number of features
of the height of the aristocrats stand out (see Table 1).
1. Those born between 1735 and 1744 were shorter than those born during
the next decade (Table 2). Stature of the youth mcreased significantly in the late
1740s and early 1750s by three to six cm, depending on their ages.
2. Inspite of the mcreases in average height, aristocratic youth aged 14 and
above were not taller than boys in the orphanage born two decades later (Tab¬
le 2).
That average height of the aristocratic youth born between 1745 and 1755
increased imphes that their nutritional Status was improving. All increases in
stature were attained prior to entering the military academy, and hence could
not be attributed to changes in the diet boys received at the Institution. Adult
Hunganan peasant recruits into the Habsburg army at the same time experienced
similar increases in stature 7). This pattern is plausible since we know that agri¬
cultural conditions were good and improving in Europe and North America in
the 1730s and 1740s 8). Although one might have thought that the income of
data from Faszikel 3926 and 3927 have been recorded From Faszikel 3925 only those
children's heights were recorded who were born in Galicia, Moravia, Hungary, Bohemia,
and Lower Austria Consequently the data set could be expanded from this faszikel by a
few thousand records of children of other nationahties Although senal measurements
are available on many of the boys, these were not obtained, since looking up the names
of the boys in subsequent years would have been quite a task Although it would have
been a statistically more accurate method than the one chosen, especially for calcu
lating growth velocities, it was not feasible within the time available to me Children entered
the military school System at all ages and remarned in it usually for a number of years
Hence, many multiple observations are in the sample.
6) Eighteen nationahties were distinguished. The name and rehgion, also available, were
not recorded. Height was measured in Austrian units Schuh, Zoll, and Strich, 4 Strich =
1 Zoll and 12 Zoll = 1 Schuh, 1 Schuh = 31,6 cm Age is as of the previous birthday
7) John K o m 1 o s, "Stature and Nutntion in the Habsburg Monarchy The Standard
of Living and Economic Development in the Eighteenth Century." American Histoncal
Review, 90 (Dee, 1985), pp. 1149 - 1161.
8) R. M Hartwell, "The Causes of the Industnal Revolution An Essay in Metho-
l°gy". ln R. M. H a r t w e 1 1 (ed.), The Causes of the Industnal Revolution in England
(New York, 1967), p. 87. Herbert M a t i s, "Die Rolle der Landwirtschaft im Merkantü-
system - Produktionsstruktur und gesellschaftliche Verhaltnisse im Agrarbereich," in:
Herbert M a t l s (ed.), Von der Glückseligkeit des Staates; Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesell
schaft in Österreich im Zeitalter des aufgeklarten Absolutismus (Berlin, 1981), p 273.
In the Bntish colomes of North America the quantity of food, particularly pork, found
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Intercept
(1)
142.6 *
(2)
143.1 *
Birth-Year
1740/44 - 1.4 - 1.3
1745/49 3.2* 3.3*
1750s 5.6* 5.9
*
Birthplace
Moravia 1.1
Bohemia 2.7*
Gahcia - 2.2
Hungary
Lower Austria
0.3
- 0.4
Italy - 0.3
Age
11 -10.4 * -10.4
*
12 - 7.2* - 7.4*
13 - 3.0* - 3.1
*
15 5.6* 5.7*
16 9.5* 9.9 *
N = 556 556
R2 = .40 .39
F = 23.8
Table 1. Equations 1-2. Dependent variable: Height in centimeters of Habsburg
Aristocrats, 1735 -1755.
* Significant at the 1% level
Equation (1): Intercept indicates the height of a 14-year-old born outside of the six pro-
vinces before 1740.
Equation (2): Intercept indicates the height ofa 14-year-old born before 1740. Birthplace
is not taken into consideration.
Note: All independent variables are dummy variables.
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the aristocracy was sufficiently large so that their food intake would not have
been affected by favorable harvest conditions, that is not born out by the evi¬
dence. Cadets attending the academy were recruited from the lower ranks of the
aristocracy, sons of aristocrats who lacked sufficient finances to educate their
sons themselves, although those whose father served in govemment admini¬
stration for 20 years or who were sons of "brave" officers were also admitted.
Maria Theresia usually chose the poorest candidates 9). As a consequence of this
selection bias, it is more plausible that the nutritional Status of the lower aristo¬
cracy was improving at that time. The fall in cereal prices could have made
sufficient impact on their real income to affect their nutritional Status. One
might note that their higher income compared to the rest of the population
could have provided a greater quantity of food, but not necessarily better quali¬
ty. In addition, they drank the same water and were exposed to the same dise¬
ases which laid claim to nutrients as the population at large 10).
In spite of the increases in their stature, aristocratic youth in the Habsburg
monarchy remained relatively short. They were shorter than German aristocrats
in the Carlschule H) who, in turn, were shorter than English aristocrats of the
same age attending Sandhurst Military Academy 12). This pattern supports the
notion that aristocrats in different countries were accustomed to a different diet,
probably because of different real incomes. Since real incomes of various classes
of the population differed from one another, so did their height 13). German
aristocrats were taller than middle class boys of the same age in spite of their
consuming the same institutional food after they were eight years old 14), indi-
cating the importance of early nutrition to human growth.
Since data on German and Habsburg aristocratic youth are separated by a
generation, a direct comparison is not totally warranted during a period when
in inventories increased greatly in the 1730s and 1740s. This correlates well with con-
temporaneous increases in stature in the colonies. Sarah M c M a h o n,
"Provisions Laid
up for the Family: Towards a History of Diet in New England, 1650
- 1850", Historical
Methods 14 (1981), 1, pp. 22 - 30; Robert Fogel, "Nutrition and the Decline in Mor¬
tality since 1700; Some Preliminary Findings," in: Stanley Engerman and Robert
G a 1 1 m a n (eds.), Long Term Factors in American Economic Growth (Chicago, 1987).
9) Th. Leitner von Leitnertreu, Geschichte der Wiener Neustädter Militär¬
akademie (Hermannstadt, 1852).
10) Susan C. Watkins and Etienne van de Walle, "Nutrition, Mortality, and
Population Size: Malthus' Court of Last Resort," Journal of Interdiseiplinary History, 14
(1983), p. 224.
11J Waltraud Hartmann, "Beobachtungen zur Akzeleration des Längenwachstums
in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts" (Doctoral dissertation, Frankfurt, 1970), pp.
87-119; and Table 10.
12) Personal communication from Professor Roderick Floud.
13) Richard Steckel, "Height and Per Capita Income," Historical Methods 16
(1983), l,pp. 1-7.
14) Hartmann, "Beobachtungen," pp. 9, 25.
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nutritional Status was changing rapidly in Europe. Nonetheless, one might
note that Habsburg aristocrats born between 1745 and 1755 were about the
same height as German aristocratic youth born between 1760 and 1780 until
age 13 (Figure 1). Thereafter, German aristocratic youth experienced an earlier
and greater adolescent growth spurt than Habsburg aristocratic youth, whose
height became closer to that of German middle class boys between the ages of
14 and 18.
That the Habsburg aristocratic youth were not taller than boys in the Austrian
orphanage is truly puzzling because one would have expected that the diet of or¬
phans was inferior to that of aristocrats. The two data sets, however, are separa¬
ted from one another by two decades, so it is conceivable that the aristocrats'
height continued to increase and by the 1760s they would have been taller than
the orphans.
The pattern of Variation of the lower class boys' height by place of birth is
complex because differences in the growth pattern appear over time as well as
at various ages. Among orphans born in the 1760s and 1770s, Galician boys
alone were significantly shorter than average (Table 3, Equation 3). Considering
the whole period thereafter, only Carinthian and Croatian boys were consistent-
ly taller than average. Croatians were on average 2.4 cm taller than Bohemians.
(There are, however, only 412 Croatians in the sample). Boys of Bohemian,
Lower Austrian, and Hungarian birth, whose stature averages were not signifi¬
cantly different from one another, comprised 40 percent of the whole sample
(Table 3, Equation 4).
1760-79a 1760-1815b
(3) (4)
Intercept 106.0
* 109.6 *
Birthyear
1760 2.8 *
1770 - 0.5
1790 - 1.5 *
1800 - 1.6*
1805 - 1.5*
1810 - 0.7 *
Birthplace
Moravia - 0.7 - 0.6*
Silesia 2.3 - 1:7 *
Galicia - 6.6* - 1.2 *
Styria - 0.8 - 1.0 *
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Hungary 0.7 0.2
Upper Austria - 5.2
- 1.0 *
Lower Austria - 4.3 0.2
Other - 0.6 0.2
Carinthia 0.6 *
Italy 0.0
Germany
- 0.3
France - 0.5
Tyrol - 0.8
*
Transyl-
vania 0.4
Croatia 2.4
*
•
Age
7+ 8.2 * 4.4 *
8+ 11.3 * 8.4*
9+ 16.4* 12.0 *
10+ 22.6 * 15.9 *
11+ 28.4 * 20.1 *
12+ 30.4 * 24.0 *
13+ 34.7 * 28.4 *
14+ 40.2 * 33.0 *
15+ 46.6 * 38.3 *
16+ 50.0 * 44.6 *
17+ 51.6 * 50.3*
18+ 58.0 * 52.3*
F = 120.7 3251.6
P = .0001 .0001
R2 = 0.83 0.81
N = 489 25,071
Table 3. Equations 3 - 4. (Dependent variable: Height in cm)
Equation (3): Intercept indicates the height of a 6-year-old boy born in Bohe-
mia.
Equation (4): Intercept indicates the height of a 6-year-old Bohemian born in
the 1780s.
Note: a = orphans, b = students
All independent variables are dummy variables,
* Coefficient significant at the 1% level.
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The overall pattern varied greatly from decade to decade (Table 4), and dif¬
ferences in stature by place of birth were generally very small (Figures 2 - 5).
Nonetheless, the following features are evident. Hungarian boys born in the
1790s experienced the adolescent growth spurt earlier than other nationalities
and were therefore taller than average after age 13 (Figure 2). The growth expe¬
rience of Lower Austrian boys born in the 1790s was just the reverse ofthat
of the Hungarians. They were taller than average at younger ages, but the diffe¬
rence vanished after age 14 (Figure 3). Lower Austrian boys born in the 1800s
were substantially taller than average at all ages (Figure 4). During the decades
of the 1800s, Galician boys were somewhat shorter than average until age 11,
but not thereafter (Figure 5). Because of these variations no definitive conclu¬
sion can be made on height differences by place of birth.
While the analysis of boys' height by place of birth remains ambiguous, a strik¬
ing trend in stature emerges over time. Increases in height at all ages experienced
by the aristocratic youth in the 1740s and 1750s were reversed after the 1760s.
Orphans as well as students in military schools declined in stature consistently
at all ages throughout the period between 1760 and 1800 (Figure 6 and Table
2). The difference between heights attained in the 1760s or 1770s and those of
the 1780s ranged from 0.3 to 4.5 cm at various ages. Even though the number of
observations in the beginning of the period is small, the pattern is consistent at
all ages, thereby supporting this generalization. This phenomenon is all the more
extraordinary since one would have expected boys in orphanages, on which the
sample of the 1760s and 1770s is based, to have been less well nourished than
those in military schools. The decline in height is not because the data stem from
different institutions: the stature ofboys of all ages continued to decline until the
early nineteenth Century. In the 1790s the decline was no longer substantial,
It was generally less than one cm with the exception of boys 15 years or older.
Their average height declined in the 1790s by three cm or more (Table 2).
The nutritional Status of the boys did not stabilize until those cohorts who
were measured after the end of the Napoleonic Wars (Figure 7). The growth
curve of those born in the 1800s is not depicted in Figure 7; however, it coin¬
cides with the curve marked 1790s. Eighteen-year-olds born after 1800 were,
however, taller than those born in the 1790s. This pattern is unexpected be¬
cause unusually bad harvests prevailed throughout Europe in 1816 -17, and the
end of the Napoleonic Wars has not been associated with an increase in the
Standard of living, or with increased economic activity 15).
15) John Post, The Last Great Subsistence Crisis in the Western World (Baltimore,
1977). John K o m 1 o s, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union: Economic Deve¬
lopment in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 1983), p. 99.
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Figure 6: Height of Boys in the Habsburg Monarchy by Date of Birth
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6 yrs 10 yrs 13 yrs 14 yrs 15 yrs 16 yrs 18 yrs
1) 1800 Habsburg
Monarchy 108 124 137 141 146 152 162
2) 1760/80 German
Middle Class 128 140 144 150 155 163
3) 1760/80 German
Aristoerat 131 144 151 156 161 167
4) 1800 London pooi 132 135 142 147
5) 1800 London
gentry 148 156 161
6) 1800 France 167 170
7) United States
slave 127 142 146 152 159 166
8) 1840 United
States 167 171
9) 1900 Russian
poor Jews 147 153 162
10) 1920 Vienna 152 155 160
11) 1923 Vienna 151 158 164
12) 1981 Austria 124 141 166 180
Table 5. Comparison of the Height of Boys of Selected Ages in Various Count¬
ries 1800 - 1981 (cm)
Sources;
Row 1: Table 2.
Rows2and3: Hartmann, 1970.
Rows 4 and 5: Personal communication from Professor Roderick Floud.
Row 6: Jean S u t t e r, Rene I z a c and Tran Ngoc Toan, "L'Evolution
de la Taille des Polytechniciens," Population (July - Sept., 1958) pp. 373 - 406.
Row 7: Richard Steckel, "Slave Height Profiles from Coastwise Manifests," Ex¬
plorations in Economic History, 16 (1979), 363 - 380. Average stature during early nine¬
teenth Century.
Row 8: Archive, United States Military Academy, West Point. Number of observations: 514.
Stature at ages other than reported above was: 17: 169.2 cm; 19: 171.6 cm; 20: 172.7 cm.
Rows 9, 10 and 11: Nobel, 1924.
Row 12: österreichischen Statistischen Zentralamt.
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Growth increments (growth per annum) during adolescence are another
indicator of nutritional Status. The age at which the greatest increment is rea¬
ched, and its size is sensitive to nutritional Status. The lower the Status, the later
is the greatest increment experienced, and the smaller it is. Analysis of the
growth increment over time confirms that the nutritional intake of boys under
consideration was declining between 1760 and 1800, and that the decline
was reversed thereafter 16).
The diminution of height throughout the late eighteenth Century is in accor¬
dance with what is known about economic circumstances of the period, parti¬
cularly about agricultural conditions 1?). The rise in grain prices and concomi-
tant fall in real wages imply a decline in the Standard of living; data on the trend
in stature substantiate this notion with direct evidence. Adult male heights
in the Habsburg monarchy also diminished during the latter half of the Cen¬
tury 18). Data on Swedish conscripts evinced a similar pattern, with the decline
particularly noticeable among 19-, 20-, and 21-year-old soldiers, but less so with
those over 25 ^). Slum boys in London also suffered enormously during the
last decades of the eighteenth Century. They did, however, experience a phäno¬
menal increase in stature after the end of the war in 1815. The increase in a
matter of years was as much as 12 centimeters. The pattern of the stature of
American slaves, too, followed a very similar cycle of deterioration and recupe-
ration around the turn of the Century 20), This evidence indicates that the nutri¬
tional crisis was not confined to East-Central Europe, but the free American
population, with access to a vast frontier, was not affected 21).
The nutritional Status of boys in military boarding schools compares favorably
with the height of poor London boys. Boys in our sample were four to six cm taller
than poor London boys. American slaves, however, were considerably taller in
the early nineteenth Century (Table 5). Gentry boys attending Sandhurst Mili¬
tary Academy in England were also much taller. Compared with early twentieth-
century Standards, boys of the Habsburg monarchy were small in stature. At age
16) For a more extensive analysis of this aspect of the data, see the version of this articie
in the Annais of Human Biology.
17) Wilhelm Abel, Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur (Hamburg, 1966; Ist ed., 1935),
p. 241. Wilhelm Abel, Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im vorindustriellen Europa
(Berlin 1974), p. 14.
18) K o m 1 o s, "Stature and Nutrition in the Habsburg Monarchy".
19) Lars G. Sandberg and Richard Steckel, "Soldier, Soldier, What Made
You Grow so Tall?" Economy and History 23 (1980), 2, pp. 91 - 105. I thank Richard
Steckel for sending me an updated version of their calculations.
20) Richard S t e c k e 1, "Slave Height Profiles from Coastwide Manifests," Explo¬
rations in Economic History, 16 (1979), pp. 363 - 380.
21) Roderick F 1 o u d and Kenneth Wächter, "Poverty and Physical Stature,
Evidence on the Standard of Living of London Boys, 1770 -1870," Social Science History
6 (1982), 4, pp. 432 - 433; Fogel, "Nutrition and the Decline in Mortality since 1700".
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14, for instance, they lagged ten cm behind the norm in Western Europe
established around 1900. At the turn of the twentieth Century there were,
however, still some European populations with whom the Habsburg boys were
comparable, such as poverty-stricken Russian Jews (Table 5). Viennese children
who lived through the First World War were only slightly taller in 1920. Shortly
after the war, however, their nutritional Status begann to improve 22),
Compared with contemporary Austrian children, boys in the Habsburg mili¬
tary schools appear to have been tiny (Table 5). They were between 16 to 18 cm
shorter — a difference of about four years of growth. In fact, there is
not a single European population or population in North of South America of
European ancestry with whom the Habsburg boys of the eighteenth or early
nineteenth Century are comparable. Children of Taipei, Hong Kong, Japan, Alas¬
ka, and South Korea are also all taller. One can find comparable heights only
among such truly underdeveloped nations as Thailand, India, rural Burma, some
areas of Mexico, or among the Maya in Guatemala, the Hutu in Rwanda, the
Bush negroes of Surinam, and Bolivian children of mixed ancestry 23).
In conclusion, this study, based on the earliest data hitherto discovered on the
height of boys and adolescents, shows that stature of those born in the late
1740s increased. This process was reversed for those born after the 1760s. This
evidence confirms directly for the first time the notion often expressed in the
literature that the rise in cereal prices during the second half of the eighteenth
Century had a detrimental effect on the Standard of living 2^). The deterioration,
however, was not a consequence of industrialization since the data stem from an
overwhelmingly agricultural society. Nor was the deterioration caused by the Na¬
poleonic Wars; the diminution in stature preceded the outbreak of conflict. To
be sure, the adverse effect of the war is detectable: height recovered somewhat
after its conclusion, but not nearly to the levels of the 1760s. The decline in
nutritional Status is most easily explained by the acceleration of population
growth which caused per capita agricultural output to diminish because of di-
minishing returns to labor in this sector. In sum, the secular pattern of stature
of boys in the Habsburg monarchy enables one to gain an insight into the
changes in economic conditions of this society.
22) C. Pirquet, "Eine einfache Tafel zur Bestimmung von Wachstum und Ernäh¬
rungszustand bei Kindern," Zeitschrift für Kinderheilkunde 6 (1913), p. 255; E. N o b e 1,
"Anthropometrische Untersuchungen an Jugendlichen in Wien," Zeitschrift für Kinder¬
heilkunde 36 (1924), pp. 13 -16.
23) Phyllis B. E v e 1 e t h and James M. T a n n e r, Worldwide Variation in Human
Growth (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 277, 307, 331, 388.
24) A b e 1, Massenarmut.
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The Transformation of Spanish Society 1800 -1950
State of the Art
Fausto Dopico
I. The Problem of Statistics
The study of Spanish economic history has improved markedly in the last few
decades, as anyone familiär with the limitations and tenuousness of research in
this field in the past 50 years will appreciate. For the wealth of information,
both qualitative and quantitative, now available about our economic past, we
can thank the pioneering works of Ramon Carande,Jaume Vicens Vives and Luis
Garcia de Valdeavellano, and contributions of foreign researchers such as E. J.
Hamilton and P. Vilar. Nonetheless, there has always been a striking difference
in the amount and availability of information about the 19th and 20th centuries
as compared to the 16th - 18th centuries; this difference is due both to the dif¬
ferent world roles played by Spain in these periods and to the difficulties in ob-
taining adequate documents about the 19th and 20th centuries.
Though archival documents from the 16th to 18th centuries have attracted the
attention of researchers the world over, the documentation of the period 1800 -
1950 is, if not downright scanty, certainly irregulär, scattered, unsystematic
and often of dubious quality. The vicissitudes of political life and the persistent
public debt, combined with corruption and neglect, all contributed to a noto-
rious incapacity of Spanish governments in this period to periodically register,
file, maintain and publish adequate Statistical series and data about the princi-
pal economic activities of the country.
Still and all, the beginnings of what has come to be calied the
* 'Statistical
era" had been very promising in Spain. In the 18th Century, the royal govem¬
ment expended considerable effort to determine the number, income and goods
of people and institutions. The most spectacular result of this effort, which at¬
tempted to establish the basis for a far-ranging fiscal reform, was the publication
of the Castro del Marques de la Ensenada, an extraordinarily useful document
for demographic and socioeconomic research about the twenty-two registered
provinces (which, around the middle of the 18th Century, represented 70 % of
the Spanish population).
Towards the end of 1786 and the beginning of 1787, the Floridabianca Census
was taken. This census, originally done with no fiscal purpose in mind, is extreme-
ly good for its time, without doubt the most complete census of that period
in Spain. Covering the whole country, it includes age distributions which, if
not completely adequate by present-day Standards, certainly allow an analysis
of its reliability and permit the formulation of important hypotheses about the
behavior of the Spanish population at the time.
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The wars with England and France, the Napoleonic invasion, the crisis of the
Ancien Regime, the Carlist Wars and military insurrections led to a political
instability which was evident in the central administration's inability to continue
the Statistical ordering begun by the Enlightenment Bourbons. During the first
half of the 19th Century, there was almost no systematic preparation of statistics
about the State and evolution of the principal socioeconomic indicators. In
1841, the author of the first Spanish translation of a statistics text wrote, "In
Spain (this is something very difficult and shameful to admit) both those who
govern and those governed are in the dark about everything from the exact num¬
ber of the population to the slightest information about our present strengths,
resources and production from this rieh and privileged earth... This lack of
statistics is feit equally in the tributary system and in the fields of agriculture,
manufacturing and commerce. The Government obviously wants to protect
these latter, but to make available scanty Statistical information which is insuf¬
ficient and inaecurate usually only prejudices, rather than protects, these three
main branches of industry." (A.P.F. de Sampaio, 1841). As an example of this
dearth of information, what should be a straightforward study of the overall
evolution of the population during the first half of the 19th Century is severely
restricted by the lack of reliable data, since the surveys available are crude
reckonings undertaken for administrative and fiscal purposes - a far cry from
what can be considered a stätistically acceptable census.
In spite of these problems, abundant and varied - though scattered - documen-
tation does exist at local, municipal and provincial levels. These documents
have served as the basis for numerous monographs, whose usefulness, because
of differing methodologies, does not nearly match the effort required to produce
them. This is also true for hundreds of studies on land disentailment (G. Rueda,
1981), in which the same stereotypes and generalizations are repeated over and
over again, doubtless because of the absence of well-designed, collective and
large-scale surveys.
The Situation improved somewhat with the creation, in 1856, of the King's
Statistical Commission. In 1857 the first population census designed by an
Organization dedicated exclusively to Statistical studies was done, and shortly
thereafter, the first Statistical annuals and information on vital statistics (births,
deaths and marriages) appeared. These publications were füll of errors, inade-
quacies and breaks in chronology, but little by little, Spain began regulating
the gathering and analysis of statistics. There have been regulär population
censuses and information on vital statistics since the beginning of the present
Century, and Statistical Annuals have appeared since 1914.
The Spanish Civil War of 1936 - 1939 aggravated the already troublesome
problem of Statistical documentation. In 1945, in the preamble to the law
creating the National Institute of Statistics, the Franco govemment itself ad-
mitted to the backwardness and sorry State of existing Statistical Services. That
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same year the first estimate of national income published by a State body, The
Committee on the National Economy, appeared. Derived indirectly from pro¬
duction statistics, it is burdened by conceptual and methodologic deficiencies,
as well as by the limited reliability of the sources on which it is based (E. Fuen-
tes, 1969).
In 1950, Spain still had no national accounting (begun only in 1954), nor any-
thing that could remotely be calied a census of wealth, agrarian production
or industrial production. There was no one official Statistical series that could
be used to attempt an overall evaluation of a key problem in Spain's economic,
social and political history: the structure of land ownership. Until the end of
the 1950's, the Situation remained frankly unsatisfactory, and only following
the Statistical restructuring of 1957 did official bodies begin to produce more or
less reliable information and to improve both their methods and the reliability
of their data.
If we accept the idea of a relationship between the degree of a country's
social and economic development and the quality of its statistics, we can hardly
wonder at Spain's backward State in this field. In 1950, the real per capita gross
domestic income was 22 % that of the United States, 37 % that of Great Britain,
32 % of Belgium's, 45 % of France's, and 79 % of Italy's. Other indicators give
us a picture ofa country with half its active population dedicated to agriculture,
and with an infant mortality rate of about 70o/oo e*c.
The calculation of the principal indicators of wealth and of national economic
flow is a constant preoccupation of socioeconomic thought, at least of the "po¬
litical arithmetic" of the I7th Century. Per capita income is certainly inadequate
for providing an accurate picture of the development of a country's socioeco¬
nomic structures and international position; still, when some sort of indicator
is needed, it is undeniably useful for measuring and comparing degrees of deve¬
lopment.
In our case, there are serious obstacles in determining the evolution of per
capita income. The first estimate of national income, made by Arthur Young
(1793), was considered totally untenable by G. Tortella (1983). Even assuming
its reliability, difficulties still exist in comparing this estimate to later ones.
There are no price series that allow the deflation of macroeconomic indicators
from such an early date. It is not simply a technical question (the choosing and
weighting of sufficiently significant sets of series), but also a methodological
one. If one cannot speak, until well into the 19th Century, of an integrated
Spanish market, what theoretical sense is there in, and how does one devise, a
representative series of prices for the Spanish economy as a whole?
Given the difficulties for direct calculation of the national income, especially
during the last Century, Tortella (1983) proposed a very useful series (G. Tor¬
tella, 1974; F. Bustelo and G. Tortella, 1976). Tortella assumes the existence
during the last Century, Tortella (1983) proposed an approximation based on
money supply data, about he has provided a very useful series ( G. Tortella,
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1974; F. Bustelo and G. Tortella, 1976). Tortella assumes the existence
of a remarkable stability in the evolution of income velocity, which is confirm-
ed, in his opinion, by the Spanish data. While the proposal -already tried in other
countries- is interesting, it cannot blind us to the Statistical difficulties inherent
in its application. Also, monetary series are subject to error, especially because
of the incomplete accounting of banking deposits. Further, there is the problem
of the direction of the relationship between money supply and money income,
with the convenience of using delayed variables in one direction or the other.
And finally, there is the basic theoretical discussion about the assumed stability
of money demand (N. Kaldor, 1982).
Lacking more reliable data, researchers have availed themselves of M. G. Mul-
hall's estimates for a number of years of the past Century. Tortella feels that
Mulhall's numbers, duly corrected by L. Prados (1982), are provisionally accep¬
table, given their agreement with money supply data and their dovetailing with
J. Alcaide's national income series (1976). Still, these series are not sufficiently
consistent to verify each other's accuracy.
In any case, given that this is a formative period marked by internal market
consolidation, one would expect, as a consequence of increasing monetarization
of the economy, a continued decline in income velocity. Such a trend is not seen
in the last third of the nineteenth and first years of the twentieth centuries.
I will return in some detail to Alcaide's estimates later. Mulhall's, because
of his rudimentary method and the limitations of his sectorial data, cannot pro¬
vide an adequate basis for Staging and evaluating the rhythms of growth of the
Spanish economy.
For the period 1900 - 1936, various estimates exist for particular years; under-
taken privately, they are meticulously done, but the results are debatable and
their Utility questionable. Subsequently, the Consejo de Economia Nacional
(CEN, or National Economic Council) produced an historical series going back
to 1906. Its methodological errors are considerable Q. Velarde, 1973; P.
Schwartz, 1977) and its use for the period in question is therefore highly
questionable. J. Alcaide (1976) has reviewed the CEN's calculation of the natio¬
nal income, correcting some of the most obvious errors, but he does not ade-
quately explain serious problems which remain with the methodology used for
the new estimate. In addition, inadequacies of the primary statistics used as the
basis for the indices are becoming evident as they are compared with present
research on production in the different economic sectors.
Economic historians have spent a great deal of effort explaining the historical
bases of economic development - or underdevelopment. Placing a country in
its international context, and deter'mining the stages of transformation of its
social and economic structures, is difficult when there is no handy indicator
with which to measure per capita production, per capita income or work produc¬
tivity. It is for this reason that I have emphasized the deficiencies in Spanish
statistics and the limitations of the commonly employed macroeconomic indi¬
cators.
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We should not wonder, then, at the a priori and ideological positions which
plague explanations of Spain's relative backwardness compared to western Eu¬
ropean development. In the last few years, however, our knowledge of basic
aspects of Spanish society in the last two hundred years has improved conside¬
rably, and many unfounded stereotypes are giving way to more substantial
hypotheses.
II. Demographic Transition
One would think, given the existence of a few general censuses for the end of
the eighteenth Century (1787 and 1797) and the progressive regularization of
census and vital statistics publications in the second half of the nineteenth Cen¬
tury, that the evolution of the Spanish population from 1800 to 1950 would
be fairly well characterized: researchers should have been able to discern the
principal characteristics of Spain's demographic transition with no more than the
usual problems.
In 1968, Massimo Livi Bacci, attracted by the wealth of demographic data for
the end of the eighteenth Century, undertook a study of the evolution of the
population during the eighteenth Century and of demographic variables, es¬
pecially marriage and fertility, from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning
of the twentieth Century. The force and influence of Livi Bacci's personality
in Spain, his pioneering use of careful methodology based on the theory of stab¬
le populations and on Princeton's life tables, as well as the unquestionable qua¬
lity of the study itself, were factors which discouraged, rather than encouraged,
greater clarification about the transition in fertility during these years; thus,
some of his main conclusions have still to receive a proper analysis.
Livi Bacci, noting a constant age structure in the Aranda (1768), Florida¬
bianca (1787) and Godoy (1797) censuses, concluded that the Spanish popu¬
lation was growing at an annual cumulative rate of about 0.43%. Based on this,
he proposed a series of estimates for mortality and marital fertility which he
compared with data from the second half of the nineteenth Century and the
first years of the twentieth.
Analyses of the censuses of the second half of the eighteenth Century using
similarity indices show considerable constancy in age structure. One is led to
the conclusion, then, that there was a partially stable population and that there¬
fore the stable population model with regard to fertility, mortality and popu¬
lation growth could be applied here.
A( careful study of the Aranda, Floridabianca and Godoy censuses, however,
reveals a systematic bias in their age composition, so that they do not accurately
reflect the population distribution of the actual population. The main problem
is an underestimation of the number of girls in the first years of life. The annual
growth rate (the other parameter necessary to select the appropriate table) is
also of doubtful value, as it has been calculated assuming the same degree of
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hidden population for the 1768 and 1797 censuses -a risky assumption, since the
two were taken using different criteria.
The distortions are even more important when we analyze the Situation by
regions, since the methodology employed when one assumes a homogeneous
mortality throughout the country tends to overestimate fertility in areas of
relatively low mortality, and vice versa. Work in progress shows that these
distortions can be significant and that therefore some of Livi Bacci's main con-
clusions must be critically examined with this in mind. An example is his conclu¬
sion that there was a substantial decline in marital fertility between 1787 and
1860. This would require us to accept the idea that birth control was widely
used throughout the country at the time. Armand Saez (1979) studied the ge¬
nerations of 1871 - 1875, whose fertile period was between 1886 and 1920.
The completed fertility rate for these generations is 4.58, comparable to that
of Finnish and Italian women and higher than that found in other western Euro¬
pean countries, with the exception of Portugal. This indicates that Spaniards
were not among the first to adopt family planning, as there is much evidence
that the decline in fertility before 1900 was moderate, and limited principally
to Catalunya, the Baleares and Madrid.
Figures for the country as a whole conceal the existence of different regional
demographic behavior with regard to marriage, fertility and mortality. R. Row-
land (1985) believes there are probably two different marriage patterns, extend-
ing into Portugal and divided by a line extending approximately from the wes¬
tern Pyrenees to Lisbon. To the north and west of this line, women traditio¬
nally married later, and their average age at marriage was about the same as that
of women from the northwest of Europe. To the south and east of the line,
marriage took place earlier. The factors which explain these two different pat¬
terns lie essentially in the different underlying family structures, in inheritance
patterns and in the structure of authority within the home. Though these are
factors which tend to be quite stable, the influence of migratory movements
grew increasingly until, in the twentieth Century, traditional patterns were re-
placed by newer ones.
Different demographic patterns, different patterns of landholdings and diffe¬
rent patterns of land inheritance led in turn to different regional patterns of so¬
cioeconomic evolution. Thus, in some parts of the north and northwest, the in-
tensification of some factors which limited marriage possibilities and the existen¬
ce of a structured emigration within the System itself acting as a safety valve,
served as moderating forces in the unraveling of traditional society and en¬
couraged a process of "growth without modernization" (M. X. Rodriguez Galdo,
1985). In the south and central parts of the country, the consequences of the
unraveling of the traditional agrarian system and of population growth were
more explosive, with the demands of the common people for agrarian reform -
demands which were very difficult to accede to without profound changes in
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the System - becoming extremely intense and occasionally desperate.
Both the demographic transition process and migratory movements explain
the change in the size of the Spanish population from the end of the eighteenth
Century to 1950 (Table III). As with many other European countries, Spain
showed a negative migratory balance up to 1950. Emigration was moderate,
though considerable, in some regions (F. Dopico and M. X. Rodriguez Galdo,
1981; J. Hemandez Garcia, 1977) in the first half of the nineteenth Century,
increased in the second half (J. Nadal, 1984; V. Perez Moreda, 1984) and be¬
came particularly significant in the first decades of the twentieth Century (A.
Garcia Barbancho, 1967). Internal and external migrations, closely related to
the ups and downs of the industrialization and urbanization processes and to
the international economic Situation, caused striking regional differences which
intensified after 1950.
III. Agrarian "Backwardness"
It has been said that the State of agricultural development at the beginning
of this Century was so poor, and production and consumption so meager that
agricultural growth in the nineteenth Century must have been restricted to the
minimum needed to keep up with population growth. There is certainly evidence
to support this assertion, the clearest being the high percentage of the total
active population dedicated to the primary sector: in 1910 this was more than
70 % (Table IV). Such an overwhelming percentage would prove too big a bür¬
den for any Consolidated process of economic modernization.
The hypothesis of an "agriculture rooted in the past, changing hardly at all
in 100 years" (R. Tamames, 1973) was, until very recentiy, believed valid also
for the first third of the twentieth Century. The only exception to this was the
recognition given to the dynamism of exporting agriculture of the eastern coastal
region (R. Perpina, 1952).
With such a perspective, it is hardly surprising that agrarian Stagnation should
be seen as one of the principal causes of Spain's backwardness. Agriculture
could not possibly have fulfilled the functions normally assigned to it in the
industrializing process: the freeing of manpower, the production of cheap food,
the creation of a demand for industrial produets, the accumulation of capital
which could be poured into other sectors, etc.
All these aspects need to be examined more closely, however. In the first
place, Spanish agriculture should not be thought of as homogeneous, and less
still can its evolution be compared to that of large-scale agriculture, as occasio¬
nally is done in texts and review articles. In Spain, family agriculture constitutes
the structure of much agrarian life, even in those areas traditionally considered
more "latifundistas" (agriculture of large estates), such as Andalusia. In the se¬
cond place, the image of a rigid, unresponsive agriculture is far from accurate
for the nineteenth and twentieth Century.
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The nineteenth Century was a period of fundamental changes in agrarian owner¬
ship and production. The writings of enlightened and liberal thinkers, calling
for the dismantling of the "obstacles" that hindered agrarian development,
were not merely an ideological reflection of the progressive thinking of the time.
The conversion of feudal land to private land; the disentailment of ecclesiasti-
cal and municipal properties; the abolition of entailed estates; the banning ofa
series of privileges and servitudes, were all of such magnitude that they could
not possibly have left the agrarian structure untouched, no matter how much the
bourgeois revolution in Spain respected the nobility's land rights and no matter
how often the nobility was favored - which it sometimes was.
The cultivation of lands that had previously lain fallow, made easier by the
disentailment of ecclesiastical and communal goods, was a constant throughout
a good part of the nineteenth Century. The traditional and generally accepted
view sees in this increase in cultivable land the key to the increase in production,
which reached its height in the middle of the Century. This kind of process al¬
ways carries with it the danger of the use of marginal lands. There came a point,
which G. Tortella (1984) puts around 1850, when yield from land worked and
productivity of the work force began to decrease. According to the traditional
view, the agricultural decline was the triggering factor for the food crises of
1856 - 57 and 1868, and led to a particularly delicate Situation in the 1880's,
when the European agrarian crisis became evident in Spain.
The thesis that agricultural backwardness was the fundamental, or at least a
very important, factor in industrial development is coherent and convincing, and
may be at least partially true, at least for big-scale grain agriculture. However,
there are no production and productivity statistics which might back up this the¬
sis for agriculture more generally. Furthermore, it is much too simple an ex-
planation for something as complex as Spanish agriculture.
In those areas where small scale agriculture predominated, the sowing of new
land was important, but insufficient, to cover new rural needs arising from po¬
pulation growth and increased monetarization of the economy. The decrease
in fallow land, the introduction of new crops, the intensification of land use,
the increased use of stables to house livestock, the ordering of the rotating crop
system, and the selective reorientation of lands, were all important factors
in the Basque, Cantabrian, Asturian and Galician countryside in the nineteenth
Century.
The dynamism of agriculture on the Mediterranean coast during the second
half of the nineteenth Century is generally recognized. Even such authors as E.
Temime, A. Broder and G. Chastagnaret (1982), who paint a picture of a parti¬
cularly stagnant Spanish agriculture at the time, admit that small and medium
scale farms, which centered principally on the increase in production and profit
from oranges and other horticultural produets, progressed notably.
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Nor is it accurate to talk of agriculture in the south and in Castile as semipara-
lyzed during this time (A. M. Bernal, 1984; A. Garcia Sanz and J. Sanz, 1984).
And the country's important vineyards showed admirable flexibility, increasing
production significantly when external circumstances - the spread of phylloxera
in France - opened the way for a remarkable increase in exports (L. Prados,
1982).
Though the end-of-the-century agricultural crisis arrived somewhat later in
Spain, it hit hard (R. Garrabou, 1975). The important agrarian landowners and
entrepreneurs now supported protectionist policies, thus uniting them with
Basque and Catalan industrial interests and making possible that phase of Spa¬
nish economic evolution which has been calied the "nationalist road of Spanish
capitalism" (J. Munoz, S. Roldan, A. Serrano, 1978).
Protectionism was not the only response to the crisis. In the first part of the
twentieth Century the sowing of new lands continued, especially in regions
where "latifundista" agriculture predominated. Most important, however, were
the changes in crop structure and the introduction of industrial input.
Tables V and VI summarize some of the changes in the crop system during
these years, such a reorientation to those goods more easily commercialized
within the country, or for which there was some foreign demand (oil, citric
produets, nuts and dried fruits, beets). The increase in the production of pota-
toes is testimony to the intensification of crops in regions in which they were
grown. The significant growth in the value of livestock produets was due basi-
cally to better quality animals and some specialization in cattle in the north.
Those factors which from a technological point of view define an agrarian
modernization process (use of artificial fertilizer, mechanization, species selec¬
tion, sanitary improvement, etc.) were barely in evidence at the end of the
nineteenth Century. The Situation changed substantially in the following deca¬
des, as is shown by the use of mineral nutrients: in 1907, 5.2 kg. of inorganic
nutrients (N + P2O5 + K^O) per sownheetar were used; in 1930 this had increas¬
ed to 17.6 kg per heetar. Although total overall use remained modest in compa¬
rison to more advanced European agriculture, this represents a considerable in¬
crease.
If we use advanced European agriculture as the reference point, then acqui-
sition of machinery and metal equipment was modest, but if we take into ac¬
count the State of Spanish agriculture at the time, it was substantial: by 1932
Spain had one harvester or mowing machine per 84 heetars sown, one threshing
machine for every 1544 heetars and one traction engine for every 4820 culti-
vated heetars.
The value of the total agrarian product grew at a rate of 1.4 % between 1900
and 1931. Production per active male population increased in the same period
by arate of 1.8%.
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From 1910 on, increase in productivity was favored by a significant rural
exodus and by the mechanization process. Agriculture more than fulfilled its
function as a supplier of a work force to other sectors, to the point that not
everyone could be absorbed and many had to emigrate, especially to Latin Ame¬
rica.
The increase in production, the acquisition of equipment and the low agri¬
cultural salaries lead us to assume there was a certain ability to accumulate ca¬
pital on the part of proprietors and entrepreneurs. Buying land was considered
a good "Investment", and the price of land tended to rise not only where small
scale agriculture was the norm, but also in the south of the country.
The liberal agricultural policy caused a considerable increase in the number of
hired hands in the countryside during the nineteenth Century. Seasonal unem¬
ployment and low wages, however, limited to an enormous extent the acquisi¬
tion of consumption goods. The response to the demand for production goods,
on the other hand, had to be met by imports as well as by national production.
And in some areas of family agriculture the percentages of selfconsumption and
replacement as a means of production remained high.
Agriculture only partially fulfilled those functions normally expected of it
in the industrialization process, and did not help reduce industrial costs in this
period, probably because of the strong protectionism which prevailed at the
time. Nonetheless, it is hardly the "guilty party" that traditional historiography
makes it out to be. Precisely because economic growth is the result of a series
of complex forces which influence and interconnect with each other, agriculture
was, in general terms, also part of the slowness (in comparison to more advanc¬
ed western European countries) of the modernization process in Spain.
One thing, however, is particularly difficult to evaluate adequately in quanti¬
tative terms: the social price of the growth model ultimately chosen. The "agra¬
rian problem" was one of the great unsettled questions inherited by the Second
Republic. The conflict became extremely accentuated in regions of large estates,
where laborers demanded wide-ranging reforms which would give them control
of the lands they worked. This was the focus of some of the greatest tensions in
Spanish society in the years before the Civil War, and undoubtedly contributed
to its outbreak.
IV. Characteristics of the Industrialization Process
Ten years ago Jordi Nadal published El fracaso de la Revolucion Industrial en
Espana, 1814 - 1913, refining and completing his contribution to The Fontana
Economic History of Europe. The book is an interpretative synthesis of the evo¬
lution of Spanish society in the hundred years between 1814 and 1913, and is
backed up by the author's own abundant research and impressive erudition.
Even today, Nadal's own critics are obliged to refer continually to his hypothe¬
sis and data and admit that his lines of argument, or at least many of them, are
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still the axis around which the continuing discussion about Spanish industriah¬
zation before the First World War rotates.
Since then, numerous monographic works have appeared about the industri¬
alization process, especially in regard to the analysis of the principal industrial
sectors, the role of banking, the role of foreign business, the conduct of political
and economic authorities and the unique situations of the different regional eco¬
nomies. Nadal himself recentiy published a review of these studies (1984). I
will limit myself here to an analysis of those few which are of special interest
because of their contribution to our knowledge of the evolution of industrial
production, because of their Statistical methods or because of the polemical
character of their conclusions.
Nadal believes that the Spanish case "is less that of the late joiner' than that
of an attempt, mostly aborted, to be one of the 'first comers'." But the fact
that during the nineteenth Century the difference between Spain and other Eu¬
ropean countries grew does not mean that the point from which each started
was the same. Most authors of the Enlightenment and a great number of rulers
were conscious of Spain's backwardness in comparison to countries such as
Great Britain, France or Holland, and more than once tried to discover in these
countries' evolution the magic formula which would overcome it. Few of them,
despite their patriotism, would have accepted I. Berend's and G. Ranki's State¬
ment, "At the beginning of the nineteenth Century, Spain was one of the wealth-
ier countries of Europe." (1982).
Spanish society of late feudalism was not, however, incompatible with the
development of some industrial production, in spite of the very grave treasury
problems, the extremely unequal distribution of wealth and the lack of an inte¬
grated "national" market. In addition to a series of initiatives in manufacturing
and rural industry, there were some singular attempts to adopt the most ad¬
vanced technology of the time: for example, as in experiments in the Andalusian
iron and steel industry and in the industrial nucleus of Sargadelos in Galicia.
The most notable industrial development during these years was, beyond any
doubt, that of Catalunya. Pierre Vilar (1964 - 1968) has studied the speciali¬
zation process of Catalunyan agriculture in the eighteenth Century, the in¬
crease in production and exportation of wine and "aguardiente" and the expan¬
sion of Catalunya's internal market. Both agricultural changes and the increase
in monetarization of the economy, in a region with a certain industrial and com-
mercial tradition and a fairer distribution of income than that seen in the rest of
Spain (J. Maluquer de Motes, 1984), made it possible for the cotton industry to
serve as the foundation for the development of a significant industrialization.
The cotton industry became more and more mechanized during the 1800's, and
toward the middle of the Century was holding its own quite nicely (J. Nadal,
1975; J. Maluquer de Motes, 1976). The Catalan textile industry successfully
took advantage of the possibilities offered by the West Indies (until the loss of
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the last remaining colonies in 1898), the slow increase of internal textile con¬
sumption and the increasing Substitution of wool and linen by cotton. In 1890,
the consumption of textiles was 3.3 kg per inhabitant; of this, more than 80 %
was cotton (N. Sanchez-Albornoz, 1981).
Though at the end of the nineteenth Century the Catalan industrial structure
was centered on textile production, the repatriation of capital from the West
Indies, the development of the internal market and an important urbanizing
process led to significant diversification in the first decades of the twentieth
Century. An indication of this growing dynamism is Catalan energy consump¬
tion, which in 1933 rose to 1035 kg equivalents of coal per inhabitant, or about
2.3 times the national average.
In the second third of the nineteenth Century, various circumstances -agricul¬
tural expansion, mechanization of the cotton industry, renovation of the navy,
the first stage of railway construction- increased the demand for iron and steel
produets. Still, production was unable to respond adequately, mainly because
of the duty free Status declared in 1855 for construction materials necessary
for the building and initial functioning of the railroad. Nadal believes this policy
was a serious obstacle for the consolidation of the iron and steel industry. A.
Gomez Mendoza (1982) disagrees, and maintains the industry would not have
been able to increase its capacity to meet demand, that costs would have in¬
creased and, when construction declined, the industry would have found itself
with an excess capacity.
There were other factors limiting increased availability of iron and steel pro¬
duets, particularly the difficulties in obtaining quality coal. This was a prineipal
factor in the decline of the Andalusian iron and steel industry, which had been
predominant until the beginning of the 1860's (J. Nadal, 1975; C. Garcia Mon-
toro, 1978). Asturias, which produced more than half of Spain's coal, took
over in the following years, but its coal was inferior in quality and expensive
to convert to coke.
Around Bilbao there were mines of iron ore which, because they were easily
exploited and because the ore had a very low proportion of phosphoruS; were
well suited to the Bessemer method. Between 1878 and 1900, 58 million tons of
ore were exported to Great Britain (M. Flinn, 1955; M. Gonzalez Portilla, 1981).
A substantial part of the profits from these exports remained in Basque hands,
contributing significantly to development of the iron and steel industry, to naval
construction, to the rise of the hydroelectric industry, to the chemical and
paper industry and to growth in the insurance and banking sectors (E. Fernandez
de Pinedo, 1983). The momentum of the Basque iron and steel industry -which,
benefitting from protectionist laws would soon supply a considerable propor¬
tion of the national demand- was futher aided by being able to import English
coal on the same boats that sent iron ore to England.
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Catalunya and the Basque country were clearly the stars in Spanish industrial
development during this period. Their long tradition of business and industry
and their comparative advantages allowed them to make the most of the for¬
mation and consolidation of the national market. The limits of this market,
however, restricted the possibilities of their main productive sectors, while at
the same time restricting initiatives arising in other parts of the country. In some
cases, other regions suffered deindustrialization and the Substitution of their
traditional produets by those of the more industrialized areas. Thus, heavy
regional concentration (in particular, Catalunya and the Basque country) became
aprineipal characteristic of the Spanish model of industrialization.
Another is the importance of the consumer goods industry, a point made by
J. Nadal (1975) in his testing of Hoffman's thesis for Spain.
The complete dominance of the textile and food industries is evident in fiscal
statistics for the middle of the nineteenth Century (J. Nadal, 1984) and in sta¬
tistics of industrial production (A. Carreras, 1983). This predominance, which
was not surprising at the time, given the minimal development of the secondary
sector, later became a structural constant. With the exception of a significant
decline in the years of Primo de Rivera's dietatorship, consumer goods and those
intermediate goods needed for their production represented about half of all
Spanish industrial production. This began to change after the Civil War (Tab¬
le VII).
During the period between the two world wars, the analysis of price evolution
gave rise to considerably increased use of quantitative techniques in historical
studies. In Spain, the most sophisticated Statistical methods have been used to
study agricultural prices and associated topics (the formation of a national mar¬
ket, the development of transportation). These methods generally go no further
than traditional econometric methods, with the exception of certain demo¬
graphic studies (F. Dopico, 1985; R. Rowland, 1985) or regional studies (J.
Cruz, 1980; F. Dopico, 1982; X. Cordero and M. X. Rodriguez Galdo, 1981;
X. Cordero, F. Dopico and M. X. Rodriquez Galdo, 1984).
Gonzalo Anes' study, Las crisis agrarias en la Espana moderna (1970), points
up the lack of an integrated Spanish market during the final years of the Ancien
Regime. N. Sanchez-Albornoz (1974, 1975, 1981), using correlation matrices
and factorial analysis, studied the behavior of agricultural prices from 1856 to
1890, the economic regions defined by these prices, and the movement toward
a unified market. The Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural (1980, 1981) ex¬
tended this series up to the first years of the present Century.
The Box-Jenkins methodology has opened up new possibilities in the analysis
of time series. D. Pena and N. Sanchez-Albornoz (1983, 1984) have been pio¬
neers in the application of this type of technique to historical studies, using
once again agricultural price series.
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In the 1880's Spain achieved a remarkable integration in the grain market,
much greater than in previous periods, and the convergence of regional prices
continued thereafter. Capitalism's degree of penetration in the economic fabric
should not, however, be judged solely by the establishment of a uniform natio¬
nal price. Thus, at the end of the last Century there were still certain regions with
high levels of self-consumption on their farms.
The improvement of transport does not by itself create a national market, but
it does contribute powerfully to its formation and expansion, encourage the di¬
vision of labor and aid regional specialization. The characteristics of the con¬
struction of the Spanish railway network and its significance for the overall
economy have been the object of a prolonged debate which continues despite
the wealth of research on the subject.
Without denying the advantages the railroad offered, G. Tortella (1975) and
J. Nadal (1975) have described negative aspects of its construction, particularly
its rate of construction, geographic layout and financing and tariff protection.
A Gomez Mendoza undertook a radical re-examination of these various aspects
(1982), and whether or not one agrees with the author's ideas and conclusions,
Ferrocarriles y cambio economico en Espaha, 1855 - 1913 is clearly the most
rigorous and thorough apphcation of the methods and techniques of the "new
economic history" yet offered on a Spanish topic.
The role played by foreign business in Spanish economic evolution is also the
subject of some controversy in Spanish historiography. In a book with a sug¬
gestive subtitle, "Growth and Underdevelopment", J. Nadal Farreras (1978)
points out the subordinate role Spain played in economic and business rela¬
tionships with Great Britain. L. Prados (1982, 1984), on the other hand, main-
tains that classical (and neoclassical) arguments in favor of foreign business are
applicable to Spain.
Closely related to this is the subject of foreign Investment, and it is no less
polemical a topic. R. Anes (1970), A. Broder (1976) and M. T. Costa (1983)
have studied foreign financing before World War I. From 1855 to 1890 invest-
ments were concentrated mainly in railroads and mining, and later diversified
(water, electricity, transport, the chemical industry, etc.). While G. Tortella
(1981) emphasizes the positive and dynamic aspects of foreign investment,
J. Harrison (1980) sees in foreign control of the principal mining companies a
Symptom of underdevelopment; J. Nadal and Broder insist that a sizeable por-
tion of the money from foreign sales never returned to the country. The cha¬
racteristics of foreign business and foreign financing in Spain led J. Munoz,
S. Roldan and A. Serrano (1978) to speak of the existence ofa "subordinate"
model of industrialization in the second half of the last Century.
This is not the place to embark on a discussion of the different ways in which
the State can participate in the industrialization process. However, J. Harrison's
forceful Statement attributing most of the backwardness to "a series of govern-
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ments bent on a variety of mistaken and counterproductive policies" needs to
be qualified and applied to particular cases. Nonetheless, it is certainly true that
the Spanish State took a leading role throughout the industrializing process,
and not only in the usual ways (establishment of the institutional framework,
fiscal policy, monetary policy, taxes, etc.). The effects of monetary policy have
recentiy been studied by P. Martin Acena (1981, 1984). Fiscal policy was in
general regressive and discriminatory, and led to a sizeable and chronic debt
(R. Anes and P. Tedde, 1976; J. Fontana, 1977; P. Tedde, 1981, 1984). Foreign
trade policy was strongly protective, except for the short period following the
Figuerola Tariff of 1869. Some other decisions did decisively influence the
evolution of Spanish capitalism: the opening up of the country to foreign
Investment in 1855, the mining legislation of 1868, the consolidation of protec-
tionism in the tariff of 1891 and its subsequent accentuation, the interventio-
nism and corporativism of Primo de Rivera's dictatorhip (1923 - 1930) and the
profound consequences of Franco's autarchic policy after the Civil War. In short,
there emerged a framework characterized by protectionism, interventionism
and political authoritatianism. Still, This cannot be seen as the effect of decisions
by a series of incompetent rulers (which obviously not all of them were), but as
the result of complex conditionings and powerful interests and of their reactions
when faced with the Opposition of the dominated social classes.
V. The Evolution of Industrial Production
A. Carrera's (1983, 1984) careful construction of an annual index of indus¬
trial production permits us to estimate a growth rate and to detect certain signi¬
ficant stages.
Although the annual cumulative growth rate of 4.6 % obtained for the period
1831 - 1861 is little more than guesswork, it confirms the considerable industri¬
alizing momentum of the mid-1800's which Nadal's book and other works
have already made clear. The growth rate was noticeably less in the following
years (2.3 % between 1861 and 1890 and 2.0 % between 1890 and 1913),
almost as though it were suffering the consequences of the previous growth,
although in reality the industrializing process was only just beginning.
Between 1913 and 1916 industrial production grew at an annual rate of 2.9 %.
Both energy production and capital goods production continued to grow from
1916 to 1918, thus compensating for the decline in production of consumer
goods. There was a modest post-war decline, and then, in 1922, levels once
again approached those of 1916 and 1918. Spanish neutrality in the first World
War had other consequences: a positive balance of trade (it had traditionally
shown a deficit); changes in the industrial structure, including the growing
replacement of imported goods by national produets, a trend strengthened by
increasing protectionism; the substantial rise in business profits; the expansion
of the banking sector, etc. (S. Roldan, J. L. Garcia Delgado and J. Mufioz, 1973;
J. Fontana and J. Nadal, 1976).
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The deterioration of the social and political Situation, pressures from power¬
ful economic groups and the conspiracy within the Upper echelons of the mili¬
tary, led to the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in September 1923.
A Carrera's industrial production index shows a 5.5 % per annum increase from
1922 to 1929, completely in step with European growth at that time. J. Velarde
(1968) believes the key to economic growth during this period was the growth
in pubÜc investment - especially the policy of public works - and the numerous
effects derived from this growth. This policy has been calied pre-Keynesian;
even if we accept that judgment, it was a pre-Keynesianism that was imposed
by circumstances rather then chosen by economic authorities, who were most
decidedly in favor ofa balanced budget (A. Melguizo, 1979).
In fact, a considerable portion of industrial growth during the dictatorship
came from the production of producer goods (Table VIII), This type of growth
has its limits and costs, however, as recent works have shown (J. L. Garcia Del-
gado, 1983).
The Statements of Indalecio Prieto, the first Minister of Finance and later
Minister of Public Works in the first years of the RepubHc, have served as the
basis for sometimes merciless criticism of Republican policy. This criticism
revolves around the reduction in public investment - already begun in the tran¬
sition govemment of Berenguer - and around the failure to draw up an anti-
cyclical policy which would have allowed the govemment to cope with the inter¬
national economic crisis. A recent articie by F. Comin and P. Martin Aceiia
(1984) tries to de-mythify the state's role both in the growth of the twenties
as well as in the subsequent Stagnation. They show that the Republican govern-
ments followed neither a monetary nor a restrictive fiscal policy, and that the
behaviour of the private sector was decisive in shaping the economic Situation.
Between 1929 and 1935, the index of industrial production showed a 0.4 %
annual rate of decrease, certainly moderate in the context of the world depres¬
sion. The Depression affected the different industrial sectors differently. While
production of consumer goods, aided by the Republic's wage policy, rose mode-
rately, that of capital goods declined sharply.
Though both the economic and international political context posed a number
of difficulties for the Republican governments, limiting their manoeuvrability,
their main problems were structural. Hundreds of years of tradition had result¬
ed, in the first third of the twentieth Century, in a highly uneven distribution of
wealth, property and income, so that the Coming to power of a Republican
govemment built up hopes in those on the lower end of the scale for economic
and social change. Myriad ideological and political factors served to radicalize
the Situation increasingly until the outbreak of the Civil War.
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VI. Conclusions
Most historians recognize Spain's backwardness in the transition from an agra¬
rian to an industrial society. This backwardness, however, is a function of seeing
the country in relation to development in the advanced western countries. Many
economic, social and cultural factors hindered a growth which would be both
centered in Spain and possessed of sufficient momentum to bring forth a trans¬
formation comparable to that of such countries as Great Britain, France or Ger¬
many. Nor was Spain in a condition to benefit, as were Belgium, Switzerland and
Denmark, from the effects of industrialization in the larger European countries.
Their geographic characteristics, business and production structures and links
with other countries were all quite different. Still, Spain had sufficient capacity
and geographic and economic proximity so that capitalist development was not
just the mere creation of enclaves within the country.
If we look at other neighboring countries such as Portugal or the Mediterra¬
nean countries, then Spain's backwardness is not so striking. Portugal, which
followed a very different growth strategy, had a per capita income in 1950 that
was one third less than that of Spain. I have already expressed my skepticism
about Spanish estimates for the first decades of this Century, but if we accept
the validity of P. Bairoch's estimates (1976) for very broad comparisons then
we can see that the per capita gross national product at the beginning of the
Century was similar in Italy and Spain. Though in the first part of the Century
Italian growth was already somewhat greater and its industrial structure more
diversified and competitive (A. Carreras, 1973), the differences became especi¬
ally marked in the years after the Second World War: Spanish per capita income
in 1950 was 79 % of Italy's and in 1960 only 69 % (R. Summers, I. B. Kravis,
A. Heston, 1980).
There is little doubt about the economic cost to Spain of the Civil War and the
autarchic era of Franco's rule (1939 - 1957).A level of industrial production
equivalent to the pre - war level was not reached until 1949 and, according
to Alcaide's figures, per capita income did not recoup until 1953. Spain's eco¬
nomic recovery after its Civil War was much slower than that of other Euro¬
pean countries after World War II, despite the fact that the latter experienced
more extensive destruction of their structures of production than did Spain. A
large part of the population suffered the consequences of this, and hved on the
edge of poverty for years.
If Spain was strongly protectionist even before 1939, after the Civil War it
completely isolated itself from the outside. Import and export restrictions,
bilateral Clearing agreements and the control of foreign exchange held sway
over foreign trade policy; this was combined, within the country, with the
State's strict regulation of production processes and international trade, a power¬
ful political presence in the assigning of sources and widespread corruption in
the halls of power.
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Of course, a variety of international circumstances propelled the first govern-
ments of the Franco era to choose an Isolationist policy. But this autarchic path
upset neither the new rulers nor the classes which supported them, and dovetail-
ed very nicely with the fascist desire for self-sufficiency. In 1939, General Fran¬
co declared, "Spain is a privileged country which can take care of itself. We have
everything we need to live on, and our production is sufficently abundant to
guarantee our own subsistence. We have no need to import anything."
One cannot, however, dispose of the first decades of the Franco regime with
a simplified disqualification of its economic policy. They were also years of a
significant redistribution of income and accumulation on the part of certain
groups and privileged economic sectors. These groups were finally able, after
the changes in economic policy from 1957 on, to connect with European ex¬
pansion and control the powerful industrializing process of the sixties and early
seventies. Perhaps the most terrible consequence of the Civil War was not eco¬
nomic, but cultural and poHtical. Spain was for too many years completely - and
purposely - closed off from the main trends of European life, thought and cul¬
ture. The enormous cost of this harsh reality to generations of Spaniards is some¬
thing no systematic model wiU ever adequately assess.
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Table I
Completed fertihty rate per woman
Generations Completed Generations Completed
fertility rate fertihty rate
1871-75 4.58 1906-10 3.05
76-80 4.44 11-15 2.88
81-85 4.32 16-20 2.61
86-90 4.04 21-25 2.48
91-95 3.86 26-30 2.52
1896-1900 3.53 31-35 2.66
1901-1905 3.25
Source: A. Saez (1979)
Table II
Life expectancy in Spain
1900 34.8
1910 41.7
1920 41.1
1930 50.0
1940 50.1
1950 62.1
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica.
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Table III
Evolution of the Spanish population
Year Population (*) Annual cumulative
growth rate
10393
15645 0.56
18594 0.43
23564 0.79
27977 0.86
1787
1860
1900
1930
1950
Source: Population censuses. Does not inciude Ceuta, MeHlla and previous
African possessions.
'Population m thousands.
Table IV
Sectoiial distribution of the ;ictive male labor force (%)
1877 1910 1930 1950
Agriculture 72.2 71.6 50.6 54.3
Industry 13.2 14.5 25.3 25.6
Services 14.6 13.9 24.1 20.1
Source: Population censuses and Instituto de Cultura Hispanica (1957).
Agriculture includes the fishing industry; industry includes mining, manufacturing
electricity, gas, water and construction; Services is everything eise.
The active female labor force is not included because of inadequate data.
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Table V
Distribution of the Spanish agricultural product (% of total)
1900 1931
1.- Agriculture 77.3 76.9
Grain 44.7 34.5
Wine 9.5 6.0
Olives 5.1 5.7
Trees and fruit trees 4.3 8.0
Roots, tubers and bulbs 6.2 11.1
Specialty crops (textile crops, beets) 2.0 2.9
Garden crops 3.4 6.0
Cultivated grazing lands 1.7 2.7
2.- Forests, pastures and fodder 9.5 4.1
3.- Livestock 15.4 19.0
100.0 100.0
Source: Group for Rural Historical Studies (G.E.H.R.), 1983.
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Table VI
The value of the Spanish agricultural product in 1931 compared to 1900
1931/1900%
1.- Agriculture 154
Grains 119
Wine 98
Olives 175
Oranges 342
Almonds 236
Potatoes 306
Sugar beets 583
Garden crops 254
Cultivated grazing lands 220
2.- Forests, pastures, fields 68
3.- Livestock 223
Milk 248
Wool 133
Meat 217
Total Production 155
Source: G. E. H. R., 1983, Production has been valued in terms of the 1910
pesetas.
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Table VII
Contribution by sector to the Spanish industrial production index (in %)
Sector
Year 1 2 3 4 5
1861 2.7 31.7 7.4 8.2 50.0
1891 6.6 24.2 12.9 8.1 48.2
1913 11.3 19.3 11.4 11.4 46.6
1922 13.0 9.9 9.2 11.9 55.9
1929 14.3 10.4 13.6 20.0 41.7
1935 17.4 6.5 9.7 16.5 49.9
1940 24.3 5.2 11.5 19.1 39.8
1950 27.2 5.9 12.4 18.6 35.9
Source: A. Carreras (1983).
Sector 1 includes energy. Sector 2, mining, does not inciude minerals used for
energy. Sector 3, producers of intermediate goods for equipment goods. Sector 4,
producers of investment goods. Sector 5, consumer goods and intermediate pro¬
duets for the production of consumer goods.
Table VIII
Percent of growth of industrial production according to sector (1922 - 1929)
Energy 16.9%
Mining 11.4%
Intermediate goods 21.9%
Investment goods 35.3%
Consumer goods 14.5%
Source: Adapted from A. Carreras (1983).
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The Transition from Agricultural to Industrial Society:
Japanese Case *)
Mitoshi Yamaguchi
I. Introduction
The relationship among technical change, population growth, and economic
development are poorly understood. Also, Japan's success in economic develop¬
ment since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 continues to attract attention. In this
paper an attempt is made to measure the effects of differential rates of techni¬
cal change in the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors and of population
growth on Japanese economic development in every decade for the period 1880
-1970.
The model includes an agricultural sector and a nonagricultural sector. It ex-
tends conventional growth accounting to inciude intersectoral relationship and
demand factors (population, per capita income, terms of trade, and imports/
exports) more directly. This teils the difference of the role of technical change,
population growth, capital stock and other variables in the transition from agri¬
cultural to industrial society.
II. General Outline of Japanese Economic Development
Figure 1 shows the annual growth rates of agricultural and nonagricultural
Outputs, inputs (the capital and labor in each sector), the relative price (agri¬
cultural price/ nonagricultural price) and per capita income for the period 1880
- 1970. These are the eight endogenous variables in our model which has the
matrix form Ax=b. The histogram in Figure 1 also gives the historical average
growth rate of each of the 8 endogenous variables in each decade. For example,
the value of the nonagricultural output in the 1880's shows 4.3 %. This means
that real nonagricultural output grew at the rate of 4.3 % between 1880 and
1890. Figure 1 also shows that the growth rate of per capita income (in real
term) accelerated over time. This would indicate the phenomena of the trend
acceleration of the Japanese economy, pointed out by Ohkawa and Rosovsky
(2). Note that the trend acceleration is especially apparent after World War II.
On the other hand when we observe the annual growth rates for the variables
we find numerous wave motions causing the long-term wave motions in the mo-
ving-average of the annual growth rate of each variable.
Let us now consider the depression periods in the Japanese economy. Figure
1 shows that the growth rates of per capita income and nonagricultural output
*) This paper is a summary and extension of Yamaguchi (4), (5), (6), (7). Therefore, we
draw very heavily from these four papers although we recalculated the result by using a
new data.
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Figure 1: Annual Growth Rate of Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
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in the years 1890, 1898, 1900 - 1901, 1907 - 1908, the depression years, have
zero or negative numerical values. However as a whole, the Japanese economy
experienced strong development until 1919. Economic difficulties came after
the year 1920; negative or zero growth rates of per capita income and nonagri¬
cultural output were experienced in the depression year of 1920, the Kanto
earthquake of 1923, the monetary depression of 1927, the Great Depression
of 1930, as Figure 1 indicates. Especially after the heavy crops of rice harvested
in 1930, which is indicated by a large positive growth rate of the agricultural
output and a large negative growth rate of the relative price (agricultural price/
nonagricultural price) in that year, there occurred an agricultural Stagnation pe¬
riod which roughly corresponds to the period between the two World Wars.
If we compare the growth rates of each variable in the agricultural sector
with those of the nonagricultural sector, the growth rates of output and inputs
in the nonagricultural sector are much larger. Note especially that the growth
rates of agricultural labor are zero or negative except during the depressions and
between the two World Wars and become smaller (negative) after World War II,
indicating the unequal development between agriculture and nonagriculture.
The proportions of labor and capital employed in agriculture, and the share
of income produced by agriculture which were 71, 43 and 50 % respectively
in 1880 decreased to 16, 6 and 6 % respectively in 1970 (see Table 3).
Next observe the output growth of each sector. The Variation in the output
of agriculture was very large in the beginning of the whole period (the period of
Meiji era) and decreased trendwise over time. This was due to the fact that
agricultural technology was still in its infancy so that agricultural output was
severely dependent on the weather and natural conditions. Note that the agricul¬
tural depression period which occurres in the 1930's rather than 1920's (the de¬
pression period of the Japanese economy as a whole) was characterized by very
low growth rates of agricultural output and input. On the other hand non¬
agricultural output shows a pattern similar to that of per capita income and we
can observe the trend acceleration as a whole and the depression period in the
1920's similarly. The Variation in growth rates of nonagricultural output was
fairly large in the beginning of the period. This stems from the fact that non¬
agricultural technology was still in the developing stage and was concentrated
on fabrics, spinning and weaving which utilized the agricultural produets as
raw materials.
The agricultural sector shows a relatively smaller value in the uses of fac¬
tor inputs than the nonagricultural sector. However agricultural labor decre¬
ased and agricultural capital increased (i.e., capital was substituted for labor)
in Japanese agriculture, especially after World War II. It is also seen that the uses
of nonagricultural labor increased but those of nonagricultural labor decreased
and became negative in the depression periods and during the two World Wars.
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The relative price of agricultural output shows the largest Variation owing to
the low price elasticity of agricultural produets and the large Variation in agri¬
cultural output. However the Variation of this relative price decreased quite
markedly after World War II, partly due to the agricultural price policy, the de¬
velopment of agricultural technology and the improvement of plant breeding.
We can also observe in Figure 1 that in the year ofriceriot (1918) agricultural
produets had an extremely high relative price.
The annual and decadal growth rate of the 5 prineipal exogenous variables in
our model are also graphed in Figure 1; these are population, land, total labor,
total capital and current agricultural inputs. The growth rates of population and
labor are around 1 % and remain almost constant but note that the growth
rates of labor and population are different in the short run. Population has a
relatively high growth rate in the periods between 1900 - 1930 but labor has
a relatively high growth rate in the 1930's and the 1950's. Land increased until
1920 but decreased sharply in the 1940's and again after 1960. Population,
labor and land increased at fairly constant rates of 1.2, 0.9 and 0.2 % etc.,
while total capital and current agricultural inputs increased at much higher
rates (about 5 or 6 % on the average over the entire period) even though their
rates of increase slowed somewhat in the depressions. Generally speaking the
growth rate of each exogenous variable has been fairly stable except for the
growth rate of current agricultural inputs which fluetuated much more as Fi¬
gure 1 shows.
III. Model and Data
The model is shown in Table 1. It is an agricultural and nonagricultural two
sector model (see Yamaguchi (4), (5), (6), (7) in detail). Eight endogenous va-
'
riables (Y^, Y2, Kj_, K2, Lj_, L2, P, E) and eight exogenous variables (K, L,
Q, B, Ti, T2, mw) are listed in Table 2.
The static version of the model can be transformed into an eight-equation mo¬
del of the form, Ax=b, where A is the matrix of structural parameters, x a vec-
tor of rates of change of the eight endogenous variables, and b a vector of ra¬
tes of change of the exogenous variables. This system is summarized in Table 1,
where dots on the variables denote growth rates.
The inverse of A displays growth rate multipliers (GRM). For example, the 8,
4 element of A ~1 is the partial derivative dE/^L, which indicates by how much
an increase in the growth rate of labor will increase the growth rate of per capita
income.
Estimates of the parameters of the matrix A and the inverse GRM were obtain¬
ed for five-year intervals from 1880 to 1965. Changes in the GRM trace structu¬
ral changes in the economy.
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Table 1 Static und Dynamic Versions of the Mathematical Model
Static model
Equation
No.
Equation
(1)
( 2)
( 3)
( 4)
( 5)
( 6)
( 7)
( 8)
( 9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
Yx = aQP* Ee
Yl
=
Tl Ll K? B (1
Y2 = T2 L2 K2
Li+L2=L
Ki+K2=K
w^aPjtYj/Lj)
w2
=
7P2(Y2/L2)
r2=5P2(Y2/K2)
wl=mww2
ri=r2
PlYi+P2Y2=P'QE
Agricultural demand
function
^ - ß) Agricultural production
function
Nonagricultural produc¬
tion function
Adding up constraint
Value of marginal
L product equals factor
price
Factor
mobility
condition
Income identity
mw
= agricultural wage rate as a proportion of nonagricultural wage
rate
a
= agricultural demand shifter
Wj€ = agricultural price and income elasticity
a, ß = output elasticity of agricultural labour and capital
7, ö
=
output elasticity of nonagricultural labour and capital
\ = proportion of income generated in agriculture
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Dynamic model
Equation Coefficients of the A matrix of structural Vector Vector b of
no. parameters x of exogenous
endoge- variables
nous va¬
riables
(13) 1 0 0 0 0 0 -7} -e Yi a-K^
(14) 1 0 -ß 0 -a 0 0 0 Y2 fi+(l - a -ß) B
(15) 0 1 0 -6 0 -7
0
(16) 0 0 0 0 li 1:
(17) 0 0 Ki K2 0 0
(18) 0 0 1-1-11
(19) 0 0 0-8 0 a-7 0
(20) A 1-A 0 0 0 0
0
i = 1,2 = agricultural and nonagricultural sector, respectively
Yi,Li,Ki.B = sectoral Outputs, labour inputs, capital inputs, and agricultu¬
ral land
P- = sectoral output prices
P = P1/P2 = terms of trade
P' = general price level
wi,ri
= sectoral wage and capital rental rates
T-; = sectoral level of technical efficiency
Q = population
E = per capita income
0
0 *1 t2
0 0 K2 L
0 0 Li k
0 0 L2 rhw
1 0
•
p t2-Ti-.(l-a-0)
k + 7rhw
0
-1
•
E Q
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Table 2: Average Annual Growth Rates of Endogenous and Exogenous
Variables (Percentages)
Yl
Endogenous variables
Y2 Ki K2 Li L2
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
3.4
1.7
2.2
3.2
1.1
0.4
-0.5
3.6
2.2
3.7
3.9
2.6
4.0
2.4
5.7
9.2
11.9
0.7
1.0
1.7
0.9
1.0
0.7
¦1.4
4.6
8.9
3.3
3.5
4.5
6.7
4.8
4.7
6.3
11.5
0.0
0.1
0.0
1.2
0.0
0.3
1.7
1.7
3.6
1.7
1.4
1.3
3.2
1.7
2.8
1.0
¦4.7
2.9
6.3
-1.9
-0.8
0.7
-3.3
7.2
-1.5
2.1
2.7
2.2
1.3
2.6
0.5
3.9
7.1
10.0
Average 1.9 5.4 2.0 5.7 0.6 2.1 0.4 3.8
Exogenous variables
K L Q B +1 T2 a
1880-1890 2.3 0.5 0.9 0.4 3.2 1.7 3.2
1890-1900 2.6 0.6 1.0 0.6 1.3 2.0 -2.5
1900-1910 3.6 0.4 1.2 0.7 1.8 0.2 -0.4
1910-1920 5.3 0.6 1.2 0.7 3.5 -0.7 0.5
1920-1930 4.2 0.9 1.6 -0.1 1.0 -0.3 -2.6
1930-1940 4.2 1.5 1.1 0.3 0.4 2.2 1.0
1940-1950 - 0.2 1.6 -0.4 -1.2 - ~
1950-1960 6.1 2.2 1.2 0.4 4.1 4.1 -1.7
1960-1970 11.3 1.3 1.1 -0.5 0.1 6.5 -3.6
Average 5.0 0.9 1.2 0.2 1.6 2.0 -0.8
Sources:
$"1 - Ohkawa and Shinohara; Y2 - LTES 1, Ohkawa and Shinohara, and Yl; Kl - Yamada
and Hayami; K2 Ohkawa and Shinohara and fclj Li - Ohkawa and Shinohara; L2 - Ohka¬
wa and Shinohara and Li ; P - LTES I. and Ohkawa and Shinohara; E - LTES 1. and Ohka¬
wa and Shinohara; K - Ohkawa and Shinohara; L - Ohkawa and Shinohara; (± - Ohkawa and
Shinohara; £-LTES 9; fi = Yi - ol^ -ßfcj - (1 - O-ß) fe; f2-*2 - 7^-öX ;
Jr1
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By multiplying the GRM of each decade by the corresponding decade rates of
change of the exogenous varibles as they occured in Japan (Table 2), one can
measure the contribution of the exogenous variables to the observed rate of
changes of the endogenous variables, i. e.,
(*E/»L)ttt = (A-l)8,4Lt = ELC,
where ELC (E for income, L for labor, C for contribution) is the measured
contribution of the growth rate of labor to per capita income growth at time t.
The structural parameters used for the A matrix are shown in Table 3. Throug¬
hout the period the nonagricultural sector is more labor intensive than the ag¬
ricultural sector (y> S)• Also, agriculture's share of total income was 50 % in
1880 and decline steadily to 6 %in 1970.
The rates of change of the exogenous variables are summarized in Table 2.
The rates of technical change were measured using equations (14) and (15) of
Table 1. This is the familiär Solow approach. The average rate of nonagricultural
technical change exceeded the agricultural rate of technical change, but the
former fluctuated much more than the latter. Population growth rates were
low and larger after the turn of the Century than before. The labor force grew
at about the same average rate as did population, but these rates differed strong¬
ly in the short run.
Table 2 also summarizes the rates of change of the endogenous variables. The
decÜne of agriculture's share in income is shown clearly in the absolute decline
of the agricultural labor force and the much slower rise of agricultural capital
than of nonagricultural capital. Terms of trade turned in favor of agriculture
throughout most of the period.
IV. Results
Figure 2 shows GRMs for five exogenous variables such as agricultural and
nonagricultural technical change, population, labor and capital on each of the
eight endogenous variables for each five-year period from 1880 to 1970. Here we
focus only the effect of technical change on eight endogenous variables and the
effect of population on per capita income.
With respect to the agricultural sector, agricultural technical change (Ti) has
a large influence on output (Yl). Its influence is greatest in 1880, where a one-
percent increase in Ti causes a 1.00 percent increase in Yl- The influence of
nonagricultural technical change (T2) on Y]_ is negative or zero. Agricultural ca¬
pital (Ki) and labor (Li) are pushed by agricultural technical change (K4T1,
L1T1 < 0) and are pulled by nonagricultural technical change (KiT2,LiT2< 0)
to the nonagricultural sector.
With respect to the nonagricultural sector, nonagricultural technical change
(T2) has a large influence on output (Y2). Its influence is greatest in 1880, whe¬
re a one-percent increase in T2 causes a 1.28 percent increase in Y2- Agricul¬
tural technical change has a small, positive influence on Y2. Nonagricultural
Figure 2: Growth Rate Multiplier
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capital (K2) and labor (L2) are positively influenced by both agricultural and
nonagricultural technical change (K2T1, I^Ti, K2T2, L2T2>0), corresponding
to the push and pull effects of Ti and T2.
The relative (agricultural/nonagricultural) price, P, is strongly influenced by
technical change in both sectors. The influence of agricultural technical change
is negative (PTi < 0), while the influence of nonagricultural technical change is
positive (PT2>0).
Per capita income is increased by technical change in the agricultural sector
(ETi> 0) and the nonagricultural sector (ET2->0), the latter having the strongest
influence. Note that ETi decreases over time, whereas ET2 increases over time.
Population growth has a more detrimental effect on per capita income the
smaller the nonagricultural sector out of which resources must be drawn for an
increased food production (see EQ in Figure 2).
The histogram of Figure 3 shows the historical average growth rates of the 8
endogenous variables as the sum of all the contributions of each exogenous
variable in each decade. We have 8 exogenous variables but only 5 principal
exogenous variables (sectoral technical change T|, total capital K, total labor L
and population Q) are shown in Figure 3 to avoid complicating the picture.
First observe the calculated results of Figures 2, 3. Very briefly, it is seen
that with respect to;
Agricultural output, the largest contribution is agricultural technical change
with total labor, total capital and population following in importance. This is
almost the same order as the GRM's. The order of total capital and total labor
are reverse from the order of the GRM in Figure 2, since the historical growth
rate of total capital is larger than the growth rate of total labor as Table 2 shows.
The contribution of nonagricultural technical change has a zero or negative
value in each decade;
Nonagricultural output, nonagricultural technical change makes the largest
contribution but the contribution varies widely. Total capital, total labor and
agricultural technical change follow in importance with the order of the contri¬
bution of total capital and total labor are reversed from the order of the GRM
in Figure 2. This comes from the same reasons as with agricultural output.
Population growth makes a small negative contribution. Agricultural technical
change on the other hand makes a positive contribution to the growth of non¬
agricultural output, especially in the 1910's and 1920's when agricultural tech¬
nical change makes a larger contribution than nonagricultural technical change—
this in contrast to the negative contribution of nonagricultural technical change
to the agricultural output;
Agricultural capital stock, the largest contributor is, of course, total capital.
Other contributions are fairly small. The effect (GRM) and the contributions
of technical change in both sectors are negative — technical change pushes and
draws agricultural factor inputs to the nonagricultural sector;
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Figure 3: The Contribution of 5 Exogenous Variables
to the 8 Endogenous Variables
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Nonagricultural capital stock, the largest effect and contributor is, of course,
total capital. Agricultural technical change, nonagricultural technical change
and total labor follow in markedly smaller contributions. However these small
positive effects and contributions correspond to the pushing and pulling effect
of technical change as stated above. Finally population has a negative effect
making an opposite contribution as compared with technical change;
Agricultural labor, total labor makes the largest contribution (and effect) with
population following. The rest of the variables have a negative effect and push
and pull» agricultural labor to the nonagricultural sector, especially the pheno¬
menon of agricultural technical change;
Nonagricultural labor, total labor again has the largest effect and contribution.
Agricultural technical change, total capital and nonagricultural technical change
follow in importance. This also corresponds to the pushing and pulling effect
of technical change. Population obviously has a negative effect and contribution
as stated above;
Relative price (ag. price/nonag. price), nonagricultural technical change makes
the largest positive effect and contribution. Agricultural technical change makes
the largest negative effect and contribution. The contributions of the other va¬
riables are very small except for the fairly large contribution of total capital (see
Johnson (1));
Per capita income, nonagricultural technical change has the largest effect and
contribution as a whole, due to the fact that the GRM of nonagricultural techni¬
cal change has the largest value and the historical rate of technical change in
nonagriculture is fairly large, especially after World War II. However its contri¬
bution depends on the decade and shows large Variation. On the other hand the
contribution of agricultural technical change is fairly stable and almost the same
size as the contribution of total labor on average. Also the contribution of agri¬
cultural technical change is relatively larger in the early stage of economic de¬
velopment in Japan. This is because the GRM of agricultural technical change
is larger in this period. The contribution of capital is somewhat larger than that
of labor. Note that the GRM of labor was larger than the GRM of capital since
the historical growth rate of capital was very large indicated in Figure 1. Popu¬
lation has, of course, a negative effect on per capita income. However the net
contribution of population which is the sum of the contributions of population
and of labor has a much smaller negative value. In the ordinary model which
treats labor and population together, we can only obtain the net contribution
of population. However this model allows us to evaluate the contributions of
population and labor independently and see the effect of the labor participation
rate as well.
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V. Asymmetrie Effect of Technical Change in both Sectors
As shown above we understood that there was an asymmetric effect of techni¬
cal change in both sectors.
Figure 4 describes the effects of agricultural technical change (Ti) and Figu¬
re 5 describes the effects of nonagricultural technical change (T2) on both the
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. To simplify the graphic modeis, it is
assumed that labor is the only resource, as the treatment of capital would be
analogous.
Ti increases the productivity of agricultural labor, shown in Figure 4 as an
upward movement of the total productivity curve of agricultural labor, from
TPLV to TPLJ in panel G. Ti is assumed to have no effect on the total
productivity curve of nonagricultural labor, TPL2 in panel I. The increased
productivity of agricultural labor implies an outward shift in the production
possibiHty curve, depicted in panel A. This means that more Yj and Y2 can be
produced given the total amount of labor available (L).
The supply and demand effects of Ti on the agricultural and nonagricultural
sectors are shown in panels C and E respectively. When Ti oecurs, the agricul¬
tural supply curve shifts to the right, from SV to S-i (panel C). Agricultural
demand is also affected. Ti increases per capita income and increased per ca¬
pita income results in increased demand for agricultural and nonagricultural
produets. For agricultural produets, this is shown as a shift in the demand curve
from DV to DJ (panel C). The amount of Yi produced increases from YV
to Yj and the priced falls from P^ to P*.
Ti results in two cross-effects on the nonagricultural sector, both on the
demand side: a decrease in demand because the fall in the price of agricultural
goods has increased the relative price of nonagricultural goods (the price effect)
and an increase in demand due to the increase in per capita income noted above
(the income effect). Given the relatively high income elasticity for nonagricul¬
tural produets, the positive income effect outweighs the negative price effect,
resutling in a rightward shift in demand, from D9 to D2 (panel E). This
increase in demand results in an increase of Y2 produced (from Y9 to Y2)
and increase in its price (from P9 to P^)*
The decreased price of Yi and increased price of Y2 cause the relative (ag-
ricultural/nonagricultural) price (P) to decline. This is shown in panel D where
the relative price line becomes less steep (from P^ to P ). The optimal combi¬
nation of Yi and Y2 moves from point a to a* in panel A, where the new pro¬
duction possibility curve is tangent to the new price line. More of both Yi and
Y2 are produced.
The increased productivity of agricultural labor (Li) means the increase in Yi
can be produced with less labor, shown by a decrease in Li from lV to L*
in panel G. Since the productivity of nonagricultural labor (L2) has not incre-
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ased, the increase in Y2 produced requires an increase in L2, fromL 9 t0 ^2 *n
panel I. These changes in sectoral requirements of labor simultaneously change
sectoral demand for labor. The value of marginal productivity of Lj declines
relative to that of L2. This is shown in Figure 4, assuming VMPLi shifts down¬
ward (from VMPL^ to VMPLj in panel F) and VMPL2 shifts upward (From
VMPL2 to VMPL2 in panel J). The increased demand for L2 relative to Li
leads to increased wages for the former relative to the latter, shown as a dec¬
line in the relative wage rate from m to mw in panel R. The new wage
rates and new values of marginal productivities for Li and L2 are equated in
panels F andj respectively. The result is a shift in agricultural labor (lV-L^
in panel G) to the nonagricultural sector. Panel H ensures that the sum of labor
used in each sector equals the total amount available (L).
As for the effects of nonagricultural technical change (T2), a similar graphic
model is given in Figure 5, again assuming labor to be the only resource. T2 in¬
creases the productivity of nonagricultural labor, shown as an upward shift of
its total productivity curve, from TPL2 to TPL2 in panel I. T2 is assumed to
have no effect on the total productivity curve of agricultural labor, TPLi in pa¬
nel G.
T2 causes the nonagricultural supply curve to shift to the right, from S^ to
S9 (panel E). T2 increases profits in the nonagricultural sector, leading to
increased per capita income and increased demand for agricultural and nonagri¬
cultural produets. For nonagricultural produets, this is shown as a shift in the
demand curve from D9 to Di (panel E). The amount of Y2 produced in¬
creases from Y9 to Yi and the price falls from Po to Pi.
Regarding T2*s effects on the agricultural sector, the same two cross-effects
on demand (as Ti exerted on the nonagricultural sector) occur. Agricultural
demand is affected negatively by the price effect, since agricultural goods are
now priced higher relative to nonagricultural goods. It is affected positively by
the income effect, given increased per capita income resulting from T2. Due to
the relatively low income elasticity of agricultural produets, the positive income
effect is outweighed by the negative price effect, resulting in a leftward shift of
the demand curve, from D^ to D^ in panel C. The decrease in demand results
in a decrease of Yi produced (firom YV to Y*) and a fall in price (from PV
to Pi). The fall in price of agricultural produets is less than that of nonagricul¬
tural produets causing P to increase. This is shown in panel D, where the re¬
lative price line becomes steeper (from P^ to P*).
The decreased amount of Yi produced requires less Li, shown as a decrease
of L^ from lV to Li in panel G. Despite the increased productivity of L2, the
large increase in Y2 produced requires more L2, shown as an increase from L9
to L2 in panel I. These changes in sectoral requirements of labor simultane-
ously change sectoral labor demand. The value of the marginal productivity
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of Li again declines relative to that of L2. This is shown in Figure 5 (panels F
an J), assuming both VMPLi and VMPL2 shift downwards, the former shift-
ing relatively more. The lowered demand for Li relative to L2 leads to a dec¬
line in the relative wage rate, from m^ to mw in panel R. The new wage ra¬
tes and new values of marginal productivities for Li and L2 are equated in pa¬
nels F and J, causing a shift in agricultural labor to the nonagricultural sector
(LJ -h\ in panel G).
In summary, one can compare and contrast the effects of Ti and T2. Their
effects on labor also apply to capital. The direct effects of Ti and T2 are similar
in that they lower product price (increased supply exceeds increased demand)
and increase the marginal productivity of labor in their respective sectors.
With respect to cross-effects, Ti and T2 affect demand in the other sector in
similar ways but different directions. Ti leads to increases in nonagricultural
demand and hence increased output in the nonagricultural sector. T2, on the
other hand, results in decreases in agricultural demand, causing a decline in agri¬
cultural output. Both Ti and T2 lead to increases in the VMP of L2 relative to
that of Li.
VI. Conclusion
Some of main conclusions are summarized as follows. (1) Population growth
has a more detrimental effect on per capita income the smaller the nonagricultu¬
ral sector out of which resources must be drawn for an increased food produc¬
tion. (2) Technical change in Japan has contributed more to growth than tra¬
ditional factors. Overall, nonagricultural technical change has contributed more
to per capita income than agricultural technical change. However, the contri¬
bution of the latter was more stable from decade to decade and particularly im¬
portant during the early economic development and depression periods. (3)
Technical change in agriculture tends to push resources out of agriculture, while
nonagricultural technical change tends to draw resources into nonagriculture.
The asymmetric effect of technical change is due to the low price and income
elasticities for agricultural goods.
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Capitalist Development and Social Structure in Argentina,
1880-1930
Hugo F. Castillo and Joseph S. Tulchin
The search for the historical roots of the economic, social and political
problems that beset Latin America has been a constant task for several de¬
cades. Over the past thirty years there has been a staggering amount publish¬
ed, from different perspectives, attempting to explain why the nations of
the region have not managed to create the bases for seif sustaining economic
growth. The problems of imerialism, of modes of production, of the world
economic system have generated not only a monumental bibliographic pro¬
duction, but also important theoretical and political debates 1). Recent
studies have indicated that capitalism developed through various forms and
mechanisms, forms that reflected and adjusted to the characteristics of each
area. The rhythm of penetration and its intensity varied across time and
space, giving rise to diverse combinations of productive Systems and social
organizations 2).
This theoretical debate is important in the sense that it provides instru¬
ments of analysis that help to explain and to articulate fundamental aspects
of the development of dependent capitalism in Latin America. Many of the
works have tned to explain how the expansion of the capitalist economic
system integrated into the same market economies that included different
productive Systems that came to occupy such diverse positions or functions
within the structure of that world economic system 3). This model, which
establishes fundamental differences between economies of the center and of
the periphery, but which at the same time emphasizes the tight articulation
1) Andre Gunder Frank, Rodolfo P u l g g r o s, Ernesto L a c 1 a u, Amenca
Latma feudalismo o Capitahsmo7 (Bogota, Cuadernos La Oveja Negra, 1972), Sempat
Assadourian, Ciro F S Cardoso, etal, Modos de produccion en America
Latina. (Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente, Buenos Aires Siglo XXI, 1973), Ciro F. Car
d o s o and Hector Perez B r l g n o 1 l, Historia Economica de America Latina, vol 2,
(Barcelona: Editorial Cntica, 1979), pp 100 104, Richard Harris, "Marxism and the
Agrarian Question in Latin Amenca," Latin American Perspectives, vol V, 4, 1978 The
concept of "articulaci<5n de modos de produccicm" is formulated in Pierre Philippe R e y,
Les Alllances de Classes (Paris Maspero, 1976), see also John Taylor, From Moderni
zation to Modes of Production A Critique of Sociologies of Development and Underdeve
lopment (London MacMillan, 1979), Harold W o 1 p e, ed , The Articulation of Modes
of Production (London Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).
2) See Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge, "Introduction patterns of agra
nan capitalism,'1 in Duncan and Rutledge, edsM Land and Labor In Latin Arne
nca (Cambridge Cambndge University Press, 1977).
3) Fernando H Cardoso and Enzo F a 1 e t t o, Dependencia y Desarrollo en
America Latina, (Mexico Siglo XXI, 14a edic 1978), p. 23
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between the two, has helped to explain some of the mechanisms of profit
transfer from periphery to center, the distortions that capitalism undergoes
in peripheral countries, as well as the unified nature of the world econo¬
my 4). One of the most frequent criticisms of this theoretical scheme is that
its macrostructural character made it difficult to link it to structures and the
dynamic formation of classes in specific historical cases, with concrete forms
of appropriation specific to a given productive system 5). The debate now
requires empirical historical studies.
The disintegration of the Spanish colonial empire and the subsequent
Organization of numerous national states coincidentally with the onset of
industrial capitalism accelerated the expansion of capitalism, in the center as
well as in the periphery. The growing demand for primary produets and food
stimulated the expansion of productive activities in virgin lands of Latin
America and imposed significant changes on the areas of oldest colonization
with long established productive structures. These new nations tended to
specialize in the production of primary produets through the sale of which
they were linked to the international market 6)m
In some cases, the growing international demand reenforced labor Systems
with mechanisms of extra-economic coercion; in others the obligations of
workers were increased and their benefits curtailed, moving toward a wage
labor system 7). In still other cases, the expansion was aecomplished through
the incorporation and exploitation of virgin lands by colonists and landow¬
ners, creating productive structures that differed from the zones of earlier
settlement, most notably in being completely integrated into the world capi¬
talist system from the outset 8).
4) Este modelo de centro-perferia ha servido de base para diferentes formulaciones teori-
cas que tratan de explicar los mecanismos de reproduccion del sistema capitalista mundial,
see Paul B a r a n, Political Economy of Growth (1957); Samir Amin, Unequal Develop¬
ment (1976); A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment (1976); I. Waller¬
stein, The Capitalist World Economy (1979).
5) Cardoso and Perez B r i g n o 1 i, Historia Economica, vol. 2, 104.
6) Roberto Cortes Co nde, The First Stages of Modernization in Latin America (New
York : Harper& Row, 1974).
7) See Frederick Katz, "Labor Conditions on Haciendas in Porflrian Mexico: some
tendencies, some trends," HAHR 54; 1 (Feb. 1974); A. Bauer, "Rural Workers in
Spanish America: Problems of Peonage and Oppression," HAHR, 59; 1 (Feb. 1979); S. M.
Smith, "Labor Exploitation on Pre-1952 Haciendas in the Lower Valley of Cocha-
bamba, Bolivia," Caravelle, 28 (1977).
8) See C. Kay, "The Development of the Chilean Hacienda System, 1850 - 1973,"
in Duncan and Rutledge , eds., Land and Labor in Latin America; A. Guer-
r e r o, "Renta diferencial de la tierra y vias de disolucion de la hacienda pre-capitalista,"
Caravelle 28, (1977); Solomon Miller, "Proletarianization of Indian Peasants in North¬
ern Peru, in Dwight B. H e a t h, ed., Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin
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The phenomenon of frontier expansion and the incorporation of new lands
has frequently attracted the attention of geographers, developmental eco¬
nomists, and historians because the dynamics of expansion offers an unusual
opportunity to study the origins and development of social and economic
structures. In this case we are particularly interested in the agrarian struc¬
tures that developed in Argentina at the end of the 19th Century in response
to the rising European demand for foodstuffs and the demographic pressures
there. The process of colonization and the Organization of units of produc¬
tion in this case implied the appropriation of the land, the development of
labor Systems, and the investment of capital in the improvement of the land
as well as the development of an infrastructure. We want to study and explain
the characteristics of this dynamic process of expansion, paying particular
attention tö the dialectical relation between internal processes and external
ones during the period of expansion 9),
Despite the abundance of studies of nations of recent settlement, such as
Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, Argentina, Canada, etc., it is still not clear
how international monopoly capital, through its action in peripheral nations,
creates the objective conditions which besides allowing its reproduction
also conditions the development of social and economic structures in the
dependent countries 10).
In general, the mechanisms of imperialist penetration are well known: con¬
trol of the commercial trade system, direct Investments in transportation,
communication Systems, and public Utilities, loans to govemment and direct
Investment in such activities as plantations, ranching and mining. For the
imperialist nations, the search for markets, the need to guarantee sources
of primary produets, and the flow of capital determined the basic elements
Amenca, 2nd ed (New York, 1974), Alvaro J a r a ,ed., Tierras nuevas expansion tern
tonal y ocupacion del suelo en Amenca Latina (Mexico El Colegio de Mexico, 1969),
Alistair Hennessy, The Frontier in Latin Amencan History, (Albuquerque Univ
of New Mexico Press, 1978), Thomas H Holloway, "The coffee colono of Sa'o
Paulo, Brazil. migration and mobihty, 1880 - 1930," in Duncan and Rutledge,
eds., Land and Labor, Cardoso y Perez Bngnoli Historia Economica, vol. 2,
pp. 63-84.
9) See, for example, the articie by Peter W l n n, "British Informal Empire in Uruguay
in the Nineteenth Century," Past and Present, no 73 (Nov. 1976)
10) For Argentina see Tulio Halpenn D o n g h i, "La expansion de la frontera de Bue¬
nos Aires (1810 - 1852)," and also Roberto Cortes Co n d e, "Patrones de asentamiento
y explotaci6*n agropecuaria en los nuevos temtonos Argentmos (1890 - 1910)," in Alvaro
J a r a , ed., Tierras Nuevas, for Brazil see M. W. N i c h o 11 s, "The agricultural fron
tier in Modern Brazihan history, the State of Parana 1920 - 1965," in Cultural Change in
Brazil: Papers from the Modwest Assoc of Latin American Studies (Muncie 1969) On the
concept of dependent reproduction, see Ronaldo M u n c k, Politics and Dependency in
the Third World. The Case of Latin Amenca (London Zed Books, Ltd, 1984) pp 31 35.
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of the new system of domination H). Given the essentially rural nature of
most of the Latin American societies and the low level of investment in the
countryside, it isn't stränge that most of the students of the phenomenon
have ignored the role of foreign finance capital in the development of agra¬
rian productive Systems in the lands of recent settlement. This problem is
particularly acute in a country like Argentina where such a significant portion
of its territory was settied in the 19th Century and where so much of its
national income came from the agricultural activity on that newly settied
land.
Looked at from another angle, the settlement of empty lands constitutes
an important period in the process of the consolidation of the national State,
since the State is incorporating into the national sovereignty lands that had
been previously beyond its direct control12). The political dimension of this
process is made evident when we remember that the conditions that govern
the access to land ownership are regulated by the central govemment and
tend to reflect the economic interests and ideology of the dominant class.
During this period of accelerating participation in the world market and of
the formation of national markets, economic liberalism was the doctrine that
best rationalized the changes that the ruling groups desired to introduce in
production and trade. This new Situation created.favorable conditions for the
formation of social and political alliances that supported the dominant
growth model based on an economy of exports, alliances that included groups
and fractions of national classes and representatives of international compa¬
nies who, together, constituted what Poulantzas calied "a power block 13)."
Given the existence of an international economic system that by means
of political and social mediation exercises undeniable influence on national
11) Albert Szymansky, in describing the characteristics of imperialism during this
period, indicates that beginning around the middle of the 19th Century there occurred a
radical transformation in the nature of imperialism as a result of the emergence of giant
corporations and cartels that monopolized markets and which allowed them to assure them¬
selves of a cheap supply of primary produets and to secure the most favorable prices for
their manufactured goods. Moreover, there was a strong concentration of their Investments
in infrastrueture, especially in railroads. Thus, for example, the British investments in Ar¬
gentina, Chile, Brazil and Uruguay increased between 44 % and 68 % from 1860 to 1913.
As a result of this new pattern of accumulation, on a world scale, of this unequal exchange
which was a consequence of the monopolization of markets, there was a transfer of wealth
from the periphery to the center. See The Logic of Imperialism (New York: Praeger, 1981),
pp. 103
- 112; and Cardoso and F a 1 e 11 o , Dependencia y subdesarrollo, pp. 43 -
44.
12) See Oscar O s z 1 a k,La formacion del estado Argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Belgrano, 1982).
13) Nicos Poulantzas, Clases sociales y poder pohtico en el estado capitalista
(Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1978), pp. 302 - 303, 311 - 327.
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economic development, it is vital to establish clearly the mechanism of control
used by the central countries, the exporters of capital and of manufactures,
and the impact of their activities on the dependent societies and economies.
We consider that the historiographical dabate over modes of production
and over the world capitalist system wil be enriched if we can study in de¬
tail how one mode of production comes to dominate others within a given
social formation and what are its specific mechanisms of domination 14).
In these circumstances we propose that the study of the agrarian credit System
that evolved in Argentina during the period of most rapid expansion offers the
possibility of exploring the problem of dependence, the mechanisms of the
transfer of surpluses from the periphery to the center, and the complicated issue
of capital accumulation in agriculture, with all of the implications that it has for
understanding the development of internal and external structures of domina¬
tion. We feel that this is a crucial aspect of Argentine socio-economic develop¬
ment that has been ignored, perhaps because of the attention focused on the
more obvious characteristics of imperialist penetration. In this paper, we will
test the hypothesis that credit and the manipulation of the commercial and
financial system were the central mechanism through which a fraction of the
dominant class, in alliance with international capital, secured its position of
dominance and contributed to shaping the social structures and production
structures which were integrated functionally into the dominant capitalist
mode of production 15).
Although we have selected Argentina as a case study, we believe that the
structure of domination that we will describe was present in various countries
in Latin America that experienced similar export economic booms at the end
of the 19th Century and probably is charcteristic also of other dependent eco¬
nomies in the Third World even today. We have picked Argentina because it
joins a variety of favorable conditions for study. It is a country that is often
pointed to as a classic example of the frontier society. It is a country that
has been acutely frustrated in its efforts to break out of the circle of underdeve¬
lopment despite periods of notable economic growth and despite enviable
natural resource endowment. Finally, we chose Argentina because earlier stu¬
dies have identified rieh regional Variation within the broad category of export
economy, a diversity that allows for a multiplicity of forms and stages in the
evolution of agrarian Systems. Those studies also pointed to the importance of
14) For a brief analysis of the concept of mode of production, see Tom Bottomore,
Lawrence Harris, V. G. Kiermand, Ralph M i I i b a n d , eds., A Dictionary
of Marxist Thought (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Reference Pub. Ltd., 1983), pp. 335 - 337.
See, also Assadourian y C. F. C a r d o s o, Modos de produccion, p. 21.
15) A. G. Ford, EI patron oro: 1880 - 1914. Inglaterra y Argentina (B. A.: Editorial
del Instituto Di Telia, 1966) see especially chapters V and VI, pp. 143 - 185. For the con¬
cept of class fractions, see Poulantzas, Clases sociales y poder politico, pp. 88 - 100.
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the financial system in the development of export agriculture, a phenomenon
that fits in perfectly with the sort of theoretical issues that interest us 16).
The dramatic economic expansion on the Argentine pampa was financed by
two parallel credit Systems. One was loans direct from the nation's principal
banks to a small group of landowners and entrepreneurs together with direct
investments by foreign corporations. The second was based on a vast network
of local lenders - middlemen - who were distributing the capital of a relatively
small number of major corporations that used the Services of the Banco de la
Naciön Argentina to move their own money to the branches of the bank throug¬
hout the country. On the pampa, the overwhelming portion of the capital was
controlled by transnational cereal brokers and consignment agents who provided
the liquidity for more than 90 percent of all agricultural producers, and at
rates around 24 percent interest per year, four times greater than the rates usually
charged for bank loans to landowners or other privileged borrowers. Because
of the high rates of interest charged by the consignment houses and because
of their domination of the financial system, we will use the flow of this expen-
sive credit as a measure or indicator of economic and financial dependence,
dependence that will vary inversely with the independence that the rural produ-
cer enjoys in the marketplace. We will assume that the flow of this credit marks
areas and groups of producers who, for whatever reason, did not have access
to cheaper credit offered by the nation's banks I7).
The financial system that was based on the movement of sight drafts (giros)
to the branches of the Banco de la Nacion was an integral part of the internatio¬
nal capitalist system in which Argentina was inserted in the second half of the
nineteenth Century. Thus, in order to understand the function of the giros
in the Argentine economy, we must link them to the evolution of the various
productive structures in the country. This imposes upon us the requirement of
characterizing the mode or modes of production and forms of production that
coexisted or developed in Argentina during this period of rapid economic ex¬
pansion, as well as exploring the relations of domination that were established
within each 18).
16) See Joseph S. T u 1 c h i n, "Agricultural Credit in Argentina, 1920 -1926," Insti¬
tute of Latin American Studies, UNC, Occasional Papers Series, (1983).
17) The description that Szymansky offers of monopoly capital in Europe applies
perfectly to the Argentine case, see The Logic of Imperialism, p. 103.
Iß) Actualmente hay un debate historiogrifico bastante importante sobre la persistencia
de "modos de produccion" o "formas de produccion" precapitalistas en la region, que
aparecen subordinadas al modo de produccion capitalista dominante. Una buena sintesis de
la polemica se encuentra en Richard Harris, "Marxism and the Agrarian Question in
Latin America," Latin American Perspectives,, vol. V, 5 (Fall, 1978); Barry H i n d e s s
and Paul Q. H i r s t, Pre-capitalist Modes of Production (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1975). Ver tambien Poulantzas, Clases sociales y poder politico, pp. 78 - 83.
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Our study focuses on a period in which capitalism had been established as the
dominant mode of production, even when it had developed under various forms
and conditions. The expansion of agricultural activity on the pampa and in other
regions of the country occurred in various forms, determined by geographic, eco¬
logical, and demographic conditions, as well as by the historical process of
settlement in the various regions. Thus, even on the pampa, as Flichman has
pointed out, tenancy took many forms - capitalist renting, campesino tenancy,
and units of production organized in a capitalist fashion by the landowners
themselves 19).
If we extend our purview to regions of the country beyond the pampa, we can
observe that diverse agrarian Systems were incorporated into the world capitalist
market without causing the disappearance of older forms of production and
labor recruitment, forms that imply non-economic mechanisms of coercion and
even non-capitalist forms of production. Wage labor and agrarian capitalism de¬
veloped at different rates in different regions, and the expansion of agricultural
production was not always the result of the extension of capitalist relations of
production in agriculture. The principal characteristic of this period was the
tight integration among different forms of production, even while the orienta¬
tion of the process was toward the expansion of capitalism in agriculture20).
19) Sobre el concepto de "dominacion de un modo produccion", Samir Amin indica que
ello implica "1) la dominaciö*n de la ley fundamental del modo dominante, que determina
las condiciones de la reproduccion del conjunto de la formacion, 2) en consecuencia trans-
ferencia de una parte del excedente (surplus) generado en los modos dominados hacia el
modo domiante, 3) la dominacion politica de la clase dominante del modo dominante, 4)
la dominacion ideologica del modo dominante
"
Samir Amin y Costas V e r g o
p o u 1 o s, La question paysanne et le capitalisme (Paris Editions Anthropos Idep, 1974)
p 11 See also Alonzo Aguilar, En torno al capitalismo Latino Amencano (Mexico
D F UNAM, 1975), p 38, Guillermo Flichman, La renta del suelo y el desarrollo
agrano argentino (Mexico Siglo Veintmno, 1975), p. 89, James R S c o b l e, Argen
tina, a City and a Nation (New York Oxford University Press, 1971), pp 48 49, and
Scalabnm Ortiz, op cit
20) For a charactenzation of the contemporary Situation in Argentina en terminos que
son tambien valido para el penodo estudiado, see Juan Villaro el cited by Richard
L Harris, "Marxism and the Agrarian Question in Latin Amenca," loc cit., pp 3 4
Este penodo de transiciön en el cual empiezan a aparecer relaciones de produccion pro-
piamente capitahstas en el campo, que coexisten con diversas forma de produccion, al
gunas de ellas pre-capitalistas, ha generado un debate histonogräfico en torna a Uamada
"articulacion de modos de produccion," Uno de los puntos esensiales de este debate gira
en torna al caracter de las economias campesinas y si debe considerarsele como un modo de
produccion o como una forma de produccion Para una sintesis del debate teonco asi como
tambien una interpretacion personal ver, Alain de J a n v r y, The Agrarian Question
of Latin Amenca, (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp 94 - 140,
una discusiön teörica sobre el problema de la articulacion de los modos de produccion en
Harold Wolpe, ed , The Articulation of Modes of Production, pp. 1 - 44
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For most of the colonial period, Argentina was an economic backwater in the
Spanish empire. The northwestern region, along the foothills of the Andes, serv¬
ed as an outlying source of supply for the valuable mining towns on the alti-
plano. Salta and Jujuy were transshipment points and centers for the production
of mules indispensable to the mining economy. Further south, Tucuman, San
Juan and Cordoba were sources of foodstuffs and labor, just as they had been
during the later pre-Columbian era.
Catamarca, a mountanous region, was noted for its household production
of textiles, an activity that continues to the present day. The northeastern
section of the country was sparsely populated, especially away from the banks
of the major river System. Asuncion and the Indian reservations in its hinter-
land were the principal center of economic and social activity in the northeast
and, because of the peculiar nature of their governance, they were effectively
cut off from the other Settlements in the area, serving largely as a frontier
buffer between the Portuguese and the Spanish territories.
Further to the south, on the broad pampa, cattle and horses introduced by
the first explorers in the 16th Century virtually ran wild. Nomadic Indians
controlled the vast Stretches of open land and Spanish Settlements were confin-
ed to the immediate environs of Buenos Aires and a narrow Stretch of land
along the banks of the Parana river and then west, to Cordoba, the main wagon
route to the altplano. Hapsburg neglect of the region that was to become the
dynamic heartland of the modern Argentine nation allowed the early evolution
of a capitalist mode of production based on the surplus production of hides and
wheat, most of which was exported illegally from the many small ports along the
Parana, in English bottoms, for the supply of Portuguese slave plantations in
Brazil or British plantations in the Caribbean. The recent studies of Jesuit
haciendas throughout Latin America during the colonial era have demonstrated
that these units were run for the purpose of producing a profit and that the
profit was earned by the deliberate production of surplus commodities intend-
ed for specific markets. The Jesuits, if you will, were one of the first transnatio¬
nal corporations, adjusting the activity in any given unit with a view to the
benefit of their entire international enterprise 21).
While there is no longer much question that these Jesuit haciendas and many
private ones as well were run as commercial enterprises, consciously inserted into
a broader commercial network and managed professionally with the objective
of producing a surplus that would generate a profit for the owners, the labor
Systems on these estates have defied easy characterization. It is safe to say
that there was very little wage labor, and less on the church-owned properties
21) See Nicholas P. C u s h n e r, Lords of the Land: Sugar, Wine, and Jesuit Estates
of Coastal Peru, 1600 - 1767 (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1980);
and, for New Spain, Herman W. Konrad, A Jesuit Hacienda in Colonial Mexico (Stan¬
ford: Stanford University Press, 1980).
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than on pnvate lands Most of the labor on the great estates was controlled by
semi-feudal mechanisms that were common throughout the Spanish empire
The high degree of control over labor that was typical of landed estates in the
interior of the River Plate area contrasted sharply with the absence of control
over the semi nomadic gauchos who provided the labor on the cattle frontier
of the pampa22)
By the middle of the 18th Century, the labor system on the cattle ranches
constituted a market relationship between landowners and those engaged in the
marketing of hides and other produets of the seemingly hmitless herds of cattle
and bands or gangs of gauchos available for hire Most of the labor transactions
were piecework but there were some instances of contracts covering specific
periods of time or precisely defined roundups 23)
The sharp differences between the httoral and the intenor in labor Systems
and relations of production became more pronounced as the 18th Century wore
on, particularly after 1776, when the creation of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de
la Plata gave the city of Buenos Aires and its hinterland a legitimacy and impor
tance within the empire that it had lacked As the struggle for independence
focused attention on the locus of political power, the tension between the litto
ral and the interior provinces flared repeatedly into violence during the early
decades of the 19th Century In economic terms, the httoral looked outward
and sought to turn the land and the cattle to profit through international trade
The interior feared and opposed international trade since neither the artisans
and small producers nor the large landowners had much they could seil abroad
competitively and saw the new manufactures of Europe's industnal eitles as
their death knell 24)
The history of the dramatic expansion of the Argentine export economy in
the 19th Century has been told and retold many times In the process of reinsert
ing Argentina into the world economy and imposing a capitalist mode of produc
tion on the nation, those most closely associated with the export of beef and
cereals, known as the export oligarchy, shaped the State to their own ends and
came to dominate the society and the pohty In economic terms, the domination
of the pampa relegated the interior regions to a backwater inefficient producers
of goods and Services for the domestic market, land tenure patterns httle chang
22) Eric Hobsbawn, Bandits (New York Pantheon Books, 1981) Hennessy The
Frontier in Latin America, and Mario G o n g o r a, "Vagabundage societe pastorale en
Amenque Latme (specialement au Chile Central) Annales (Jan Feb 1966)
23) See Jonathan D Brown A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776 1860
(Cambndge Cambridge University Press, 1975)
24) See among many others, Carlos Diaz Alejandro Essays on the Economic
History of the Argentine Republic (New Haven Yale University Press 1970) S c o b l e
Revolution on the Pampa (Austin University of Texas Press, 1964) and T u 1 c h l n,
The Structure of Power of the Argentine Pampa (fortheoming)
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ed from the colonial period, and labor Systems also reminiscent of earlier periods
and of pre-capitalist modes of production. In political terms, the oligarchy came
to terms with the local bosses and elites of the interior. The sugar interests of the
northwest and the wine growers of the Andean foothills secured tariff protection
from the federal govemment that guaranteed their economic survival. They, as
well as the landlords of the northeast and the sheep ranchers of the far south
enjoyed a measure of political independence on local issues so long as they
didn't "cause trouble" to the national govemment25).
There is ample historical evidence to reinforce the ecological and economic
indications to suggest that the study of mechanisms of control and social struc¬
ture in Argentina must be conducted on a regional, not a national level. The
regional differences imposed different settlement patterns and these, in turn,
contributed to the evolution of different social organizations, different forms of
economic activity, and different patterns of political behavior in the various
regions 26). Earlier work has confirmed the expectations that the differences
25) Jorge B a 1 a n, "Urbanizacion Regional y, Produccion Agraria en Argentina: un
Analisis comparativo) Estudios CEDES, vol. 2, 2 (1979): and "Regional Urbanization un¬
der Primary Sector Expansion," in A. Portes and H. Browning, eds,, Current
Perspectives in Latin American Urban Research (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976).
26) We have dealt elsewhere, in great detail with the justification for the regional study
of Argentine development, See T u 1 c h i n, Structure of Power in Argentina, chapter 2
(forthcoming). Here, we simply might call the reader's attention to the theory of Human
Ecology which deals with the manner in which groups organize and live together, and lo¬
cation theory, which deals with the distribution of resources within a society. On the for¬
mer, see Arnos H a w 1 e y, "Human Ecology," International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1967). The basic elements of location theory are summarized
most conveniently in John Friedmann and Willian Alonso, eds.,, Regional
Development and Planning (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1964), (Part II, "Location Theory").
The special case known as staple theory is discussed in several readings included in the vo¬
lume edited by Friedmann and Alonso, already cited, and in Melville H. W a t k i n s, "A
Staple Approach in Australian Economic History," Business Archives and History, vol, IV,
1 (February 1964), pp. 1 - 22; and R. E. C a v e s,
"
'Vent for Surplus' Models for
Trade and Growth ," in R. E. B a 1 d w i n, et ah, Trade, Growth and the Balance
of Payments (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), pp. 95 - 115. Applications of
these theories to the Argentine case inciude Hector J. C. G r u p e, et a 1., Releva-
miento de la Estructura Regional de la Economia Argentina, 5 vols. (Buenos Aries: Consejo
Federal de Inversiones and the Centro de Investigaciones Econömicas, Instituto Torcuato
di Telia, 1962); and Hector L. D i e g u e z, "Argentina y Australia: Algunos aspectos de
su desarrollo economico comparado," Documento de Trabajo, No. 38 (1968), Instituto
Torcuato di Telia. Modern location theory is intended to refer to phenomena on the inter¬
national or intranational levels, and the concept of region may refer to sections within a
single country or to countries within the international Community. Originally, in the wri-
tings of nineteenth Century theorists such as Von Thunen, the concepts were applied to
relatively small areas. The regional basis for economic development is explored in Harvey
S. Perl off, Edgar S. Dünn, Jr., Eric E. Lampard, and Richard F. Muth,
Regions, Resources, and Economic Growth (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
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among the regions of the pampa are as significant as differences between the
pampa as a unit and other regions in the country. This includes differences
of population density, ethnic composition, principal economic activity of the
population, land tenure pattern, as well as the size and type of agricultural
units. In other words, the structural conditions varied from region to region.
We intend to describe the socio-economic structure of each region before ex-
ploring the possible influence of the credit system over each of them. With this
objective, we have selected a set of variables, taken from the Third National
Census (1914) which reflects significant features of the regional productive
structures, and which enable us to compare the regions to one another27).
Regional Characterization of Tenency Structures and Labor Systems
Region 1: Santa Fe Wheat
This region is composed of the ten counties in the center of Santa Fe province
(see Map 1). It is the area which was the first to receive agricultural colonists
and continued to be the most intensely colonized zone on the pampa. Before
1860, the soils were considered less attractive than the pasturelands of the north-
western section of the province of Buenos Aires, but even if later experience
demonstrated that it was not ideal for cereal production, its reddish soil seemed
adequately fertile and it received adequate rainfall. These factors, together with
easy access to the Parana River, used to transport goods to Buenos Aires, were
1960), and applied in considerable recent research on the economic history of the United
States, for example, National Bureau of Economic Research, Conference on Research in
Income and Wealth, Regional Income, Studies in Income and Wealth, and Trends in the
American Economy in the Nineteenth Century, Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 24
(Princeton Princeton University Press, 1960)
On the growth of Buenos Aires as a commercial center, see James R S c o b 1 e, Buenos
Aires Plaza to Suburb, 1870 1910 (N. Y Oxford University Press, 1974), and Charles
S Sargent, The Spatial Evolution of Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1870 1930
(Tempe Published by the Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University,
1974). For a more general Statement on the function of commercial cities, see Adna W e
ber, Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century (New York Cornell University Press,
1889) On the growth of commercial cities in the U S , see Allan R Pred, Urban
Growth and the Circulation of Information The United States System of Cities, 1790
1840 (Harvard Studies in Urban History) (Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press,
1973)
For case studies of the impact of differential regional development on social Organization
and pohtical activity, see the papers of Dogan, Linz, Allardt and Personen, Rokkan and
Soares, in S M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Align
ments- Cross National Perspectives (N Y The Free Press, 1967), and GA Banck, R
B u v e, and L Van Vroonhoven, eds , State and Region in Latin Amenca A
Workshop (Amsterdam Center for Latin American Research and Documentation, 1981).
27) The empirical data for this analysis is taken from Repubhca Argentina, Bureau Nacio¬
nal de Estadistica, Tercer Censo Nacional, 10 vols. (Buenos Aires Talleres Graficos de L J
Rossoy Cia, 1916- 1917)
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sufficient to stimulate cereal production for export until well into the twentieth
Century 2^).
The family farm of 100 to 500 hectares was the predominant unit in the re¬
gion (see Table 1), whether owned or rented. This activity co-existed with capi¬
tal intensive ranching that was concentrated in the western portion of most of
the counties, closest to the province of Cordoba.
Region 2: Northern Wheat
This region includes some of the oldest Settlements in Argentina, 31 counties
of the province of Buenos Aires, extending northwest from the Federal Capital,
the contiguous two counties at the southwestern tip of Santa Fe and the eastern-
most county of Cordoba, 34 counties in all. This land had been a pasture since
the 18th Century and it was from here that the herds of criollo cattle were
moved south onto new lands. The railroad arrived here very soon after the first
tracks had been laid from Rosario in Santa Fe to the city of Cordoba. By the
time of the third national census, the region was dominated by the capital
intensive fattening ranches, including the famous cabanas, where prize animals
were raised and groomed with care. These were not large units and many of
them were rented, indicating the kind of leverage these entrepreneurs could get
on their capital. Wheat farming was important, but much less so than in the San¬
ta Fe wheat zone 2^).
Region 3: Southern Wheat
This region is the band of counties south of the Saladillo River, stretching
from the Bay of Samborombon on the east to the frontier with Cordoba and
La Pampa territory on the west, a total of 20 counties. The geographic condi¬
tions here are essentially the same as in Region 2, except for the easternmost
counties that are low lying and wet, but the region lay beyond the ring of forts
that protected early Settlements in region 2 from marauding Indians, so that ef¬
fective settlement had to await the railroad, which arrived in the 1880s. The
ranching here is far more extensive than in either of the other zones (see Table
1), as demonstrated by the significance of large units and the high capitalization
per unit. Salaried laborers on these units are a more significant portion of the
agricultural labor force than in either of the other zones previously mentioned.
Region 4: Southern Littoral
This is a region composed of the fourteen counties of Entre Rios province
and three Buenos Aires counties in the River Plate Delta. While the latter have
28) For detailed studies of this region, see the work of Ezequiel Gallo, for example,
Agricultural Colomzacion and Society in Argentina. The Province of Santa Fe, 1870 - 1895
(D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1970)
29) Tuho Halperm D o n g h l es quien ha estudiado con gran detalle el desarrollo socio
economico de esta region. Puede consultarse un resumen de sus investigaciones en el capi-
taulo "La expansicm de la frontera de Buenos Aires (1810 1852)," en Alvaro J ar a y
otros, op. cit..
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the same ecological characteristics as the southern counties of Entre Rios, these
are grouped with the northern counties of the province because the entire re¬
gion is dominated by the river Systems that mark the frontiers of the province.
Colonization began here late in the Century and gave the region a heavy concen¬
tration of small units operated by their owners. The major portion of the reg¬
ion's land was devoted to fairly extensive undercapitalized ranches 30).
Region 5: New South
The 22 counties of this region, stretching south and west of region 3 are
characterized by hard natural grasses that require tilling and conversion to a
crop such as alfalfa before the land can be used effectively to graze the blooded
stock characteristic of the fattening establishments further north.
The settlement on this frontier was the result of internal migration by creole
entrepreneurs rather than immigrant sharecroppers and the transformation of
the land took place slowly over a long period of time, mainly through labor
inputs rather than through significant infusions of capital. The indices we have
followed reflect this historical experience.
Extensive grazing was the dominant form of production. Another significant
feature of the form of production in this zone was the employment of salaried
labor, 38 % of all farm employees, one of the highest levels in the nation. This
suggests that the transition to a capitalist mode of production was uneven. While
capital investment was not intense and ownership retained elements of a tradi¬
tional, pre-capitalist system of production, the formation of a rural Proletariat
had evolved as nearly as far as any region in the country.
The ranchers in the zone, certainly not poor, exhibited several characteris¬
tics that distinquished them from colleagues further to the north (Zones 3 and
2) and emphasized the differentiation in market access between fatteners and
breeders. The breeders of region 5 were busy Converting their estates to more
valuable mixed farming units through the use of salaried labor and tenants,
which is reflected in the high incidence of tenancy (see Table 1).
Region 6: Western Wheat
This region consists of the six counties on the eastern slope of the Cordoba
hüls. Here, the rainfall is slightly less abundant than in Santa Fe, immediately
to the east, and the soil is greyish and fertile. The first trunk line of the railroad
crossed this region in 1870, but there was no further construction until well into
the 1890s. There were Settlements dating from the colonial period but they
were sparse until a wave of Immigration into the area at the end of the 19th
Century. Curiously, the immigration into Cordoba received none of the organi-
30) Los estudios sobre asentamientos en Entre Rios incluyen el de Richard W. W i 1 k i e:
"Environmental Perception and Migration Behavior: A Case Study of Rural Argentina,'*
LASA 6th National Meeting (1976); y "Rural "Depopulation: A Case Study of an Argentine
Village," Everett Lee, ed., Proceedings of the IBP V Assembly (London: Oxford Uni¬
versity Press, 1976).
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zational supports that it did in Santa Fe and would, later, in Entre Rios. The
result was a pattern of small and intermediate holdings that is unique on the
humid pampa. The dominant activity was wheat farming on moderately sized
units, generally cultivated by families. Levels of capitalization were extremely
low.
Region 7: Frontier Wheat
Included here are twenty-eight counties, the westernmost tier of Buenos
Aires province and the contiguous tier of counties in what was then the Na¬
tional Territory of La Pampa, as well as the southern tip of San Luis province.
This is the semi-arid pampa, with the least fertile soils of the entire pampean
area. Effective settlement came only with the railroad after the campaigns ag¬
ainst the Indians who had controlled the land for centuries. The federal govem¬
ment distributed parcels to veterans of the Indian campaigns as a means of
settling the area, but the land quickly was accumulated into huge tracts by
porteno landowners. Some of these, in turn, were sold to colonization compa¬
nies, who organized communities in coordination with the railroads31).
The government's land policy is reflected in the land tenure pattern, with a
significant incidence of latifundia, widespread dedication to wheat farming,
and high incidence of tenancy. The Statistical evidence suggests that this is a
zone undergoing rapid expansion though already fully integrated into the
international market.
We can divide the rest of the regions into four macroregions, Patagonia, Cuyo,
the Northeast, and the Northwest. Patagonia, regions 8, 9, and 10, includes
the modern provinces of Rio Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego.
It was the sheep raising area, characterized by vast expanses of unfenced land
over which grazed forty percent of the nation's sheep. Farming was restricted
to the river Valleys, the most important of which was the Rio Negro. A genera¬
tion later, the fruit farms of the Rio Negro would supply the entire country and
play a prominant role in the region. At the time of the 1914 census, they were
not yet statistically significant. It is useful to point to the absence of family
farms in the region. This, together with the landholding pattern, the high inci¬
dence of wage labor, especially at sheering time, on large units often admini-
stered as commercial enterprises on behalf of absentee owners, many of whom
were foreign nationals whose enterprises would today be considered transna¬
tional companies, created the conditions for abusive exploitation of labor, which
precipitated violent class conflicts in the 1920s 32).
31) Para el asentamiento en el territorio de La Pampa vease Romain G a i g n a r d:
"Origenes y evoluciön de la pequena propiedad campesina en la pampa seca Argentina (El
caso de la provincia de La Pampa)," Desarrollo Economico, vol. 6, 21 (1969). El estudio
de este problema desde otra perspectiva puede consultarse en Joseph L. Love, "An
Approach to Regionalism," en Richard G r a h a n y Peter H. Smith, eds., New
Approaches to Latin American History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974).
209
The Cuyo region, encompassing the provinces of Neuquen and Mendoza, was
the center of wine making, as it is today. Here the land tenure pattern is one of
large units covering most of the territory cheek by jowl with massive numbers
of tiny units, generally owned by their Operators. The symbiotic relationship
between these units reflects the nature of the principal economic activity. The
small producers were entirely dependent upon the larger ones for storage faci¬
lities, for sale of their wine grapes and, for credit. It was not unusual forlarge
landowners to hire workers by contract to work portions of their lands, and
to pay the workers with wages, a small house, and the tools of his labor. In sum,
a region that exhibits all the characteristics of traditional agriculture 33).
A similar pattern is found in the Northwest, regions 14 and 15, the provinces
of Tucuman, Salta and Jujuy, only the crop is sugar, not wine grapes. Again,
the dependency of the small producer on the central is reflected in the land
tenure pattern and in the very low levels of capitalization per hectare and per
person in agriculture (see Table 1). The major differences between the sugar
and wine districts are that the former was an area of much older settlement,
lying athwart the old wagon trail from Buenos Aires and Cordoba to the mines
of upper Peru, and that the population was more densely settied, a response to
the higher demand for seasonal labor in the sugar centrales than in the wine
bodegas.
The sugar oligarchy maintained its regional interests within the framework
of national politics without integrating itself into the international market.
On the contrary, the production of sugar was so inefficient in international
terms that the national industry preserved its economic viability only behind
a high tariff wall erected by the national govemment. The sugar companies,
like the wineries and the sheep ranch companies used the giros to provide li-
quidity to pay their workers during the harvest and to provide credit to the small
producers at usorious rates 34).
The Northeast, regions 16, 17, 18, and 19, the provinces of Santiago del
Estero, Corrientes and Misiones, and the national territories of Formosa and
El Chaco, is characterized by a combination of large units and many small peasant
holdings. Levels of capitalization are extremely low. It is a region in which there
32) For details on the land and labor Situation in Patagonia, see Jose Maria Borrero,
La patagonia trä'gica (Buenos Aires: Editorial Amencana, 1967); on the evolution of the
fruit farms in the Rio Negro Valley, see Cesar Vapnarsky, Pueblos del Norte de la
Patagonia, 1779 - 1957 (Fuerte General Roca: Editorial La Patagonia, 1983), on the bloody
labor uprising in Santa Cruz, see Oswaldo Bayer, La patagonia tragica, 3 vols. (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1972 - 73).
33) Flichman, La renta del suelo, pp. 122 - 28. The following descnptions owe
much to this fascinating study. See, also, ßalan, loc. cit.
34) Donna Guy, Argentine Sugar Politics; and B a 1 a n, loc. cit., on the regional
oligarchy.
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is a great deal of wealth but most of it is tied to the land and tied up in the land.
The large estancias represent social Status, economic security and political power
to their owners, but they do not produce significant suplus to allow capital ac¬
cumulation. For the most part herds and lands had not been modernized by the
time of the 1914 census and the economy of the region was not integrated into
the international economy 35),
This brief characterization of diverse regions in Argentina has permitted us
to establish some important elements of interregional differentiation associated
with land tenure, labor Systems and forms of production. On the basis of these
differences we will suggest that the characteristics of dominant and subordinate
groups also will vary from region to region. However, this must not cause us to
forget that the landowning class constituted the hegemonic group in rural so¬
ciety. Looking beyond the diversity of regional socio-economic structures and
the dynamic peculiar to each of them, there were mechanisms that articulated
these structures, that linked different forms of production and diverse regions.
Thus, even if it is true that the regions differed markedly from one to an¬
other, we must not forget that they were bound together within an international
capitalist system. Nowhere was the domination of the export oligarchy more
obvious, nowhere was the pattern of distortion in the economic growth of the
nation more apparent to contempraries as well as to later students of the process
than in the Organization of the banking industry and in the severe limitations on
the access to capital. Here, as in no other form of economic activity, the ünka¬
ges between Argentine production and transnational capital were powerful and
exclusive. The flow of giros around the country, because it was so closely
associated with export crops and because it was such expensive credit, reflects
the penetration of international finance capital in the Argentine economy and
the direct manipulation of the economy by foreign interests through this per-
vasive mechanism of control,
In the following sections we will describe the distribution of giros across
Space and over time. Then, we will transform the giros into our dependent vari¬
able and correlate it with the socio-economic indicators we used in the earlier
sections in which we characterized the various regions. According to our work¬
ing hypothesis, we should expect to find wide regional variations in the socio¬
economic characteristics that correlate best with the flow of giros. The objec¬
tive of our Statistical exercise is to identify those dependent groups or elements
within the productive structure of each region that are the consumers of the ex¬
pensive credit distributed through the giros system, as well as the forms of
production most closely associated with the giros.
The Banco de la Nacion dominated Argentine finance. In 1910, it handled
roughly one-third of all banking business directly and, through its control over
35) Flichman, op. cit., pp. 129 - 35.
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foreign exchange, treasury deposits, and links with the Caja de Conversion, had
indirect control over a least another third, perhaps another half, of the busi¬
ness. Even strong private banks had to resort to the Banco de la Nacion for
short-term loans or credits to keep them going 36). Thanks, in part, to its
strength and to the bad harvests of 1910 and 1911, the Banco de la Naci6n
slowly increased its share of the business until, with further Stimulus from the
war in Europe, it reached a high point of direct control over nearly 60 percent.
Most of the increase was at the expense of other Argentine banks.
The Banco de la Naciö'n operated on a strictly commercial basis. Loans were
granted only to individuals and firms with the finest credit ratings or with
impeccable guarantees. This, alone, would have been sufficient to exclude all
but the largest and most liquid ranchers and corporations from access to bank
credit. There was one additional factor that closed the door tight on the vast
majority of farmers and ranchers. The Banco de la Nacion was restricted by its
charter to granting loans of 90, 180, or, in special cases, 270 days. Under such
conditions loans to the agricultural sector could not be used to expand produc¬
tion, they could have only commercial functions to tide a basically solvent ran¬
cher over a temporary liquidity difficulty or to extend the leverage of his capi-
tal37).
The bank's loans to the agricultural sector were rarely transactions between
the bank and a producer. There were usually from one to three middlemen
between the bank and the producer who needed the money. Fully two-thirds
36) Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires Facultad de Economia, Instituto de Economia
Bancaria, Estadfstica Bancana (1936). For a more general view of the credit system, see
Laura R a n d a 1 1, An Economic History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century (NY*
Columbia University Press, 1978), Chapter 4
37) The archival records of the Banco de la Nacion indicate that large loans were made
at or close to the pnme rate of 5 or 6 percent to prominent landowners with one or more
guarantor (cosignatanos) and were renewed over and over again. While the data are not
available to demonstrate precisely what proportion of such loans were rolled over and how
long such a process might be continued, it is clear that the bank's best customers were
assured of what amounted to a line of credit that provided them with the liquidity they
needed to maintain their productive activity The device of rolhng over loans at penodic
intervals was common to commerical banks m other countnes. For a detailed account of
commercial banking practices in the USA at this time, see John A James, The Evolu¬
tion of National Money Market, 1898 - 1911 (Pnnceton. Princeton University Press, 1977),
chapter IL James estimates that 65 percent of agricultural loans by rural banks in the USA
were renewed at least once and that at least 20 percent of non-collateral loans were used
for financing flxed capital (pp. 84 - 94). It should be perfectly clear that ours is a partial
view of the Argentine credit system. The Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires played an
important role in Buenos Aires agriculture, but there is no data available comparable to that
for the Banco de la Naciö'n. This, together with the Banco de la Naciön's Strategie position
within the national banking network, has convinced us to accept the latter as representative
of the entire system.
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of the farms in the pampa region (including the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa
Fe, Cordoba, Entre Rios, and the Territory of La Pampa) were run by people
who did not own the land. These tenants, or employees, might get the financ¬
ing they needed from the landowner, who might get it directly from the banks.
More often, the tenant got the money he needed to buy seed, hire labor to
harvest his crop, or buy machinery to work his land from the local supplier,
or almacenero. The almacenero was a local monopolist of credit who sold money
at 20 to 25 percent interest. He got his money from consignment houses in
Buenos Aires or from their agents in his district at about 12 percent interest.
The dealers in commercial paper were the wholesalers of the rural credit busi¬
ness, and they got their money from the banks, at about 6 percent interest,
or from their European partners.
The Banco de la Nacion provided the cereal export houses with the means to
move the capital - sight drafts (giros) on the bank's branches in the country-
side. The cereal houses could thus move the money to buy the grain they needed
to fill their export commitments. The individual farmer was defenseless when
agents for the big cereal houses came around to buy at the peak of the harvest.
He needed the money. He was in debt to the almacenero, the consignment agent,
and to the landowner who held the rental contract on the farm. To hold his crop
off the market until prices firmed, the farmer would need direct access to
credit and a place to störe the grain. However, banks would not lend to him;
his only source of credit was the almacenero or some other agent of the export
houses. Even had the farmer been able to renew his loans, there were no storage
facilities available to him. By law, the railroad companies were supposed to
build grain deposit facilities at every railhead in the cereal zone, but in 1914 the
existing facilities were adequate for only thirty percent of the nation's cereal
exports. By some remarkable coincidence, nearly all of the available storage
along the railroad lines was leased to one firm, the Cereal Deposit Company,
which during the harvest, subleased the space to the highest bidder, so that the
individual farmer could not compete with the cash-rich cereal houses 38).
Both the banking system and the informal credit machinery focused finan¬
cial power on the Banco de la Nacion and favored those directly connected with
the export of cereals and meat, and, to a lesser extent, large corporations pro¬
ducing sugar or wine. Any effort to alter the credit system would threaten the
economic groups which benefitted from it and prompt them to sally forth to
defend their interests. Economic advantage had as much or more to do with
privileged access to cheap credit as with hard work or efficiency. It could mean
38) For a description of how the credit System operated in the rural sector, see B e j a -
r a n o, op. cit.; R. P. E m i 1 i a n i, Reorganizacion Economica, Politica y Social (BsAs:
Privately Printed, 1920); and S c o b i e, Revolution on the Pampas. For the Chilean
case, see Bauer, Chilean Rural Society from the Spanish Conquest to 1930 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 105 et seq.
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as much as 18 percent, the difference between a handsome profit and capital
accumulation on the one hand and insolvency and perpetual debt on the other.
Rather than bringing in new capital to increase the liquidity of the Argentine
economy, to the extent that the transnational merchants secured their working
capital from Argentine banks, they actually drained capital from the economy
by taking it out of the hands of the producers through the usorious interest
rates they charged. Thus, not only did the cereal houses make money on the
export transaction, they also captured the portion of profit that might have gone
to the individual producer were it not for the insidiously illiquid credit system
which they dominated.
GIROS: An Indirect Measure of Credit and Control in the Countryside
We are fortunate in having available the data necessary to study one facet of
this informal credit system. The archives of the Banco de la Naciö'n inciude
records of all the giros sent through its facilities to branches throughout the
country. While these giros do not represent all of the capital available to agri-
culturalists from private sources, they do represent a significant portion and
there are enough of them over the years to Warrant careful analysis. For each
entry in the bank's Libros de Actos there is the date of the transaction, the name
of the firm moving the money, the branch of the bank to which it moved, the
amount of the transaction, the agent of the Company taking receipt of the draft,
and the conditions under which the funds are moved. During the twenty years
from 1910 to 1929, there were nearly ten thousand giros recorded in the Libros
de Actas. In the aggregate, they represent the movement of over 800 million
pesos by nearly five hundred different firms to over two hundred branches of
the National Bank spread all around the country. At first glance, given the
overwhelming importance of agricultural activity on the pampa, it might appear
that this is not an imposing number of transactions. What is important, however,
is the amount of money moved by the cereal houses and consignment agents. In
several of the years studied, giros moved by known consignment agents and grain
exporters through the bank to its branches on the pampa amounted to 80 per¬
cent of the value of the nation's grain exports. That such considerable amounts
of capital could be moved around the country by a few firms in a small number
of transactions is an indication of their economic power and the smooth efficien¬
cy of the informal credit system that operated in their interest.
While it is true that the giros were not restricted to the cereal companies - they
were used by the sugar companies in the Northwest, the wineries in Cuyo, the
sheep ranchers in Patagonia, and the quebracho firms in the Northeast, as well
as those engaged in other forms of economic activity - there is no doubt that the
cereal exporting houses constituted the largest single category of users of this
service offered by the National Bank and that they moved the largest block of
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funds. Of the 48 most active users of the giros Service, 33 were cereal brokers
and exporters and another 5 were banks whose activity was
concentrated in the
cereal zone and were undoubtedly acting on behalf of consignment agents and
others concemed with the marketing and export of agricultural commodities.
These thirty-eight companies were responsible for moving over 80 percent of
all giros recorded in that twenty year span.
The structure of this informal credit system was oligopolistic. Two firms
moved twenty-eight percent of the money, and ten moved nearly sixty percent.
For the most part, the major exporting firms maintained their market share
throughout the period under study. The only significnt shift was that by the end
of the period, a number of international banks had come to play important
roles in the marketing of the harvest, whereas not one was among the most
active firms in the years prior to World War I. This probably indicates a gradual
institutionalization of the middleman, taking more of the business out of the
hands of Argentine firms and placing it directly under the control of foreign
or transnational companies 39). Even before the changes resulting from the war,
it is evident that international firms dominated the credit markets and the ex¬
port trade. As many as six-teen of the twenty most
active firms in 1910 were
foreign owned or controlled, or at best precursors of the present day trans¬
national corporations. In 1925, if we exclude four sugar companies, foreign
controlled firms accounted for 15 or the 18 most active users of the giros
Service.
The most obvious feature of the giros flow is the dramatic increase over time.
This indicates a rapid expansion of agricultural production and progressively
tighter integration of that activity into the international market. The distribu¬
tion of the giros throughout the country is summarized in Table 3, and under-
scores the prominance of the pampa in the agricultural activity of the nation.
At this point, it is necessary to reiterate that the giros, as high cost credit,
were used by producers only when other forms of credit were not available.
Consequently, because of its cost, it indicates a relationship of dominance and
Subordination between the distributors of the credit, those who owned the
capital, and those who borrowed the money. The same relationship is implied
in the cases in which a cereal house, winery, sugar mill or sheep rancher would
move the money in order to buy from a small producer the fruits of his labors.
Such producers could afford to continue their productive activities under the
bürden of such financial conditions only if the return on their own investment
was sufficiently great to overcome the enormous difference between the cost
of official bank credit and the cost of the unofficial credit distributed by the
39) For a study of the international grain trade in the twentieth Century, see Dan Mor¬
gan, Merchants of Grain (NY: Viking Press, 1978).
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Table 2
National Total of Giros, 1910 - 1930, in paper pesos
1910 12,196,188 1923 29,101,087
1911 12,332,818 1924 45,029,851
1912 9,359,523 1925 69,379,442
1913 24,048,530 1926 77,802,358
1914 22,415,171 1927 63,363,502
1915 30,258,259 1928 83,310,487
1916 26,888,281 1929 72,676,400
*
1930 57,278,977
* Data for the year 1917
- 1923 are not available.
Source: Archives of the Banco de la Nacion Argentina, Libros de Actas.
Table 3
Distribution of giros by macro-regions, by year, as a percentage of the national
total.
Year/Macroregion Pampa BsAs Cuyo NW NE Pata¬
gonia
1910 80.73 1.82 3.61 4.76 6.54 2.54
1911 72.96 3.46 1.87 10.12 4.69 6.90
1912 73.85 2.62 3.00 10.00 4.22 6.30
1913 68.48 6.48 1.12 10.46 3.74 9.73
1914 71.73 0.59 1.10 13.21 4.49 8.88
1915 73.17 1.26 0.76 15.19 2.71 6.91
1916
*
71.25 0.67 0.83 13.84 4.15 9.26
1923 65.38 0.36 2.92 12.35 8.16 10.32
1924 64.65 0.26 2.47 12.57 7.67 12.38
1925 62.41 0.18 3.38 12.45 8.62 12.96
1926 64.68 1.35 3.46 12.43 8.32 9.71
1927 65.72 0.02 3.54 14.31 9.13 7.27
1928 62.71 0.17 4.10 12.89 10.12 10.10
1929 62.43 0.01 3.49 14.20 9.53 10.34
1930 52.83 0.12 3.62 17.81 13.16 12.46
*Data for 1917-- 1922 not available
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giros system; that is, when they enjoyed a comparative advantage either in the
national or the international market. The pertinant question that is posed next
is what kind of regional productive structures demanded and permited such a
peculiar credit system.
In order to answer this question in a useful manner, it is necessary to go back
and disaggregate the Pampa into its regional components. As we indicated ear¬
lier, the pampa was not a homogenous area and the diversity of its productive
structures is reflected in the wide regional Variation in giros flows over time
(Table 4).
Table 4
Distribution of Giros on the Pampa, as a Percentage of the National Total,
for Various Years.
Region Year
1910 1912 1914 1916 1924 1926 1928
1 18.20 26.66 15.91 17.11 16.21 16.85 18.42
2 17.09 13.14 14.39 7.61 7.97 8.02 9.27
3 8.42 4.22 8.04 4.71 5.48 5.24 3.76
4 7.46 6.99 8.62 9.05 9.81 8.74 8.76
5 8.60 5.88 5.16 8.52 6.13 6.03 4.43
6 1.31 2.03 1.65 1.16 2.43 1.69 3.61
7 19.62 13.92 16.93 25.75 29.11 17.92 14.41
The intraregional Variation of giros activity over time reflects the evolution
of Systems of production, as well as the mere increase in export agricultural
activity. Doubling the number of hectares planted in wheat would not neces-
sarily lead to a doubling in the quantity of giros flowing into the region. If
the increase in production represented an accumulation of capital or a shift
from tenant farming to cultivation of the land by the owner and a hired labor
force, it is conceivable that some portion of the increased acreage was financed
directly by the banks or under more favorable conditions than the giros. That we
cannot determine from these data. However, we can explore the relations bet¬
ween the flow of giros and regional variations in productive Systems, to test our
original hypothesis that these giros can be used to identify patterns of dependent
agriculture in Argentina and that the perpetuation of that dependence was a
function of the inequities in the credit System.
On the surface, changes in the distribution of giros across the pampa appear
to reflect two significant shifts in productive activity. The sharp shifts in regions
3 and 5, the central portion of the province of Buenos Aires, indicate the trans¬
ition to mixed agriculture that had begun at the end of the 19th Century. Swi-
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tching the use of land, from grazing to the cultivation of cereals in response
to anticipated Swings in market demand for beef and wheat, created large chang¬
es from year to year in the producers' need for liquidity. The steady decline
in region 2 marks the deepening commitment of producers there to fattening,
as well as the geographic concentration of politically and socially prominant
figures whose names appear on the rolls of the Banco de la Nacion as those
receiving direct loans at the normal market rate of six or seven percent 40). The
rising trend for region 7 represents the expansion of export agriculture on the
southwestern frontier. Colonization was used here, as it had been in region 1
(Santa Fe) thirty years earlier, and as it was being used in region 4 (Entre Rios)
to bring land under cultivation. Such grazing as was done was extensive and al¬
most entirely oriented toward the domestic market. Mixed farming, so preva¬
lent in regions 3 and 5, was virtually non existent.
The flow of credit to the northeast remained fairly steady through 1916, bet¬
ween three and four percent of the national total. In the next decade, however,
it rose to a high of 13 percent in 1930 (see Table 3). This indicates a growing
demand for credit for the expansion of the regional economy. Given the fact
that the region's economy was scarcely integrated into the world market until
the first world war, this increased flow of giros marks the dramatic growth
in the extraction of quebracho and other plantation crops, almost entirely by
transnational corporations. These changes would, over time, precipitate signi¬
ficant changes in the productive structures of the region, but for the moment
the same pattern of dependent development that we have seen on the pampa
was being reproduced. As on the pampa, the expensive credit made available
through to the giros system to the producer undoubtedly crimped severely the
process of capital accumulation.
Outside of the pampa, the northwest received the most giros of any macro-
region. The flow to this region was fairly stable, indicating a Consolidated pro¬
ductive structure with a considerable economicaliy active sector that depended
on the giros for its effective functioning. Given the fact that sugar cultivation
was the overwhelmingly preponderant activity, it is clear that the relations of
production in the region were stable and had been organized over a long period
of time. Furthermore, the fact that the sugar industry was insulated from the
international market and that the region's production was headed for the natio¬
nal market also contributed to the stability of the productive structure and the
flow of giros, arguing that the political influence of the sugar oligarchy remain¬
ed effective throughout the period.
The flow of giros to Cuyo fluctuated widely during the period under study,
even declining in the 1920s. Since the area was dominated by grape growing
40) Data from the Archives of the Banco de la Nacion Argentma, Libros de Actas- Presta-
mos, 1910- 1917.
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and wine making, we must assume that the fluctuations had something to do
with the changing fate of that industry. As with sugar, the wine produced in
the zone was intended for the national market and so there was little price com-
petition and little opportunity for exploring whatever comparative advantage
the region might have had on the international market.
The semi-circle of counties around the metropoitan area of Buenos Aires
experienced a dramatic expansion and then a severe contraction of the giros
flow. This region undoubtedly was experiencing major transformations as a
result of the growth of the city of Buenos Aires. The land in the region was
dedicated at the beginning of the period to truck farming and fattening of
cattle on the prestigious cabanas. By 1930, many of these had given way to
suburban subdivisions in which immigrants or their children invested the capi¬
tal they had accumulated after long years of hard work in the city. None of
these groups would have been clients for the giros credit system.
In Patagonia, after a rapid growth between 1910 and 1916, the flow of giros
stabilized at just over 10 percent of the national total. Although sheepherding
was the dominant activity in the macroregion, at the end of the period, it is
likely that the expanding fruit farms around the Rio Negro became important
consumers of the credit that the giros represented. The transnational companies
that dominated the sheep raising used the system to move their capital around
the country, pay their laborers and buy the wool clip from smaller producers.
The production of wool remained fairly stable throughout the period.
The flow of giros around the country across time indicates significant increase
in economic activity and expansion of the geographic base of the nation's export
oriented activities. Before the war, almost all of the giros went into the pampa
and the regions where plantation crops were cultivated, Cuyo and the North¬
west. By the 1920s, this Situation had begun to change, as the amounts flowing
to the interior and to Patagonia mounted. By 1924, the pampa received 64 per¬
cent of the national total of giros, down from a high of nearly 81 percent, and
by the end of the decade it had fallen below 53 percent. By contrast, in the same
year, Patagonia received 12 percent, the northwest 17.8 percent, the northeast
13 percent, and Cuyo 3.6 percent. This redistribution reflects an expansion of
the productive activities in these zones and their tighter integration into the
national and the international market system. This suggests that there had
occured in the interior regions the reproduction of the same pattern of depen¬
dent development that characterized the pampa as a result of its rapid expansion
before the war. Following the same reasoning, we can interpret the decline in
the share of the giros going to the pampa as an indication that the dependent
sector was reduced. It is also possible, however, that a certain equilibrium had
been achieved among the number of producers, the amount of land available
and the demand for credit, so that as the demand and the availability of these
factors of production increased in other regions, the proportional share of the
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pampa declined. Of course, it is important to remember that 53 percent of the
national total in 1930 was thirty million peses, whereas 80 percent of the total
in 1910 was only a little under 10 million, indicating a strong increase in the
export agricultural activity on the pampa tied to the usorious credit represented
by the giros.
The following section will test the central hypothesis of the paper in exploring
the linkages between these giros flows and the regional productive structures
defined through the census data. The distinctive characteristics of each macro-
region have been standardized in a series of indicators which we will correlate
with the giros, which thereby become our dependent variable. The indicators
are those variables used in the earlier section in which we described the va¬
rious regions 41).
If we take the macrozone of the Pampa and correlate the flow of giros with
the selected socio-economic indicators with which we have been working, we
find a clear association with tenants. Thus, in 1910, the simple Pearson corre¬
lation (r) is 0.30, rising to .42 in 1914, and reaching its strongest in 1926, at
.55 (see Table 5). There is also a strong positive correlation between the flow
of giros and smallholding, although the strength of the association varies from
one year to the next. With the data available to us, we can't offer a satisfactory
explanation for these fluctuations, since there are innumerable factors-econo-
rnic, international, even climatic-that might affect these results. The correla¬
tions with the other variables are weak. The fact that there is no clear corre¬
lation between the flow of giros and export cereal cultivation appears to run
counter to our central hypothesis. But we must remember that the general view
of the pampa masks important interregional differences. differences which were
the result of different historical experiences, different settlement patterns and
different combinations of the factors of production. As with the discription of
the social structures themselves, we must disaggregate the data into the several
pampean regions, to see which of the indicators are associated most closely with
the flow of the giros.
41) The linkage between the two data sets is effected through the creation ofa geographi-
cal-financial unit calied a Bounty, which assigns bank branches to the counties in which they
are located. These units are based upon the unprovable assumption that each branch of the
National Bank monopolized giros activity in its zone. There is no way to demonstrate that
Firm X did not use the money sent to Branch 1 to do business with a farmer whose land
was closer to Branch 2. We simply assume that propinquity creates zones of influence. There
are no Bounties smaller than one county. Where more than one branch was in a county, the
business of those branches was aggregated into a single Bounty whose geographical limits
were that county. Where there were no branches in a county, that county was assigned to
the nearest branch and the corresponding bounty included as many counties surrounding
that branch as might be considered within its sphere of influence. Then, the data for coun¬
ties was aggregated to Bounties, so that both giros activity and census characteristics could
be analyzed with the same unit of analysis.
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In the wheat zone of Santa Fe (Zone 1), the giros correlate positively with
the index of land concentration, the GINI, and most powerfuUy of all with
smallholders. In addition, there is a positive correlation throughout the period
with tenants. The pattern of relationships suggests that the private credit was
concentrated in areas in which the greatest amount of land was held by the
fewest producers, areas characterized both by few large units and many very
small units, most of which probably were rented rather than owned by the
people who lived on the land and worked it.
The only apparent surprise in this regional matrix is the clear negative corre¬
lation between the flow of giros and the production of wheat and linseed, which
we know was considerable. The explanation for this lies in the settlement pat¬
tern in this region-that the bulk of the wheat was produced on cooperatives
and on family run farms which had access to credit on slightly better terms than
the numerous individual producers on the smallest units of production, most
of whom had arrived late in the alluvial process of international migration. The
members of cooperatives were less vulnerable to pressure by the large cereal
houses and had a better chance of accumulating capital than counterparts in other
regions who pitted their fortunes against both nature and the oligopolistic
market.
There is a negative correlation also between giros flow and the index of capi¬
talization in livestock, a reflection of the pattern in which the heaviest invest¬
ment in ranching represented the most modern segment of the cattle industry
and tended to be associated with smaller units. In other words, it appears that
the giros are associated with the most traditional segment of the Santa Fe
agricultural region, the large ranches cheek by jowl with many very small units,
many of them rented. These were the producers most dependent upon the
cereal houses for the maintenance of their productive activities.
In the old ranching zone of Buenos Aires, just south of Santa Fe (Zone 2), the
pattern of relationships is ambiguous at the outset of the period but becomes
somewhat clearer in the 1920s, when the giros come to have fairly strong posi¬
tive associations with wheat and linseed production, with the various indexes
of capitalization, and with tenants. The picture that emerges suggests a process
of slow penetration of agricultural activity by the usorious middlemen as well as
in ranching. The size of the productive unit does not seem to have played a
role in the distribution of the giros, except that the smallholder variable has a
negative relationship with giros throughout the period.
Further south, in zone 3, the pattern of correlations is too imprecise to charac-
terize. But this imprecision is consistent with our description of this zone as
one in transition between extensive, more traditional forms of production and
more intensive forms of production. We can assume that the flow of giros fluc-
tuated too much over time and across space to establish a pattern at the aggre-
gate, county level with which we are dealing.
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In the province of Entre Rios, zone 4, there are positive correlations between
giros flow and tenancy and cereal production, correlations which tend to beco¬
me stronger over time, suggesting a growing rigidity in the dependent sector of
the region. Of interest, also, is the marked difference in the relationship between
giros and farmers on the one hand and ranchers on the other. The marked dif¬
ference begins to erode in the 1920s, as the negative correlation between ran¬
chers and giros deteriorates and then becomes positive, although never very
strong. These changes reflect the dramatic transformation created by the sig¬
nificant numbers of immigrant farmers, most of them poor tenants, who pushed
the ranchers further and further north, as they took over land they could get
their hands on in their drive to make it in the new world. These immigrants
came much later than their counterparts across the Parana River in Santa Fe and
never succeeded in organizing themselves as effectively to protect themselves
from the vicissitudes of the marketplace.
Out on the southern frontier of Buenos Aires province, zone 5, the giros
flows correlated negatively with the GINI index and with ranchers, and posi-
tively with farmers, although none of the associations is very strong. The most
interesting relationships are those between giros and tenancy and wheat culti¬
vation both of which become quite strong during the 1920s. Here, in marked
contrast to the experience in the colonization zones (1 and 4), farming was a
vulnerable activity. The wheat farmers were the dependent group.
The pattern of associations in region 6, along the Cordoba foothills, is almost
too clear, undoubtedly a function of the small number of county units included
in the matrix. The giros vary positiverly with the number of farmers, wheat
production, tenancy, and negatively with the GINI index. On the basis of this
matrix of associations, as well as the other evidence available to us, there appears
to have been a stable demand for giros in this region among tenants, most of
whom probably were farmers, and among farmers cultivating their own land,
farmers who were neither the holders of the smallest nor the largest units. While
the amount of money sent into the zone in the 1910s was not great, it increased
rapidly in the 1920s, indicating an accelerating expansion of production and of
demand for expensive credit in the years before the collapse of the international
economy.
In the semi arid zone 7, in the national territory of La Pampa, the positive
associations are with cereal cultivation, tenancy and farmers. Cereal producing
farmers are the ones forcing the change from extensive grazing to more market
oriented cereal production, but they did so at the cost of their dependence upon
the consignment houses for their capital. Here, again, the ecological transition is
reflected in the evolution of the Statistical associations over time. The correla¬
tion with ranching-extensive, under-capitalized units for the most part, mode-
rately strong in the 1910s, breaks down completely after 1920, while the
association with wage laborers grows stronger during the decade of the 1920s,
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a further indication of the expansion of commercial, dependent agriculture.
In the macrozone of Cuyo, the wine district, the flow of giros was fairly con¬
stant in the years before the war, fluctuating in a narrow ränge between 300,000
and 400,00 pesos, only to increase more than ten times in the 1920s. Despite
this dramatic increase, which suggests an expansion in the dependent sector of
the economy over time, the pattern of correlations remains fundamentally the
same. There are strong positive correlations between the flow of giros and te¬
nancy, the production of grapes, salaried workers and smallholders, with the
third tending to weaken in the 1920s. As if to replace it, the correlation with
ranchers becomes strong in the 1920s, suggesting the incorporation of new
groups into the dependent sector as the economy expanded. Given that the culti¬
vation of grapes and the production of wine constituted the principal economic
activity of this zone, we can imagine that the consumers of the giros were found
for the most part among tenants and smallholders working closely with the
large producers and wineries who bought up the production of the zone. In a
fashion analagous to the relationship between cereal consignment houses and
farmers on the pampa, the large wineries and a few large vineyards used the
giros credit system to maintain their control over the vast majority of grape
producers. In this case, the use of correlational analysis provides powerful con-
firmation of the hypothesis conceming social structure and credit.
Almost the same structure can be discerned in the sugar zone of the North¬
west, encompassing the provinces of Tucuman, Salta, and Jujuy. The amount
of giros sent into the zone increased virtually every year, while the correlations
remained positive with the production of sugarcane, smallholders, and salaried
workers. The large centrales or sugar refineries sent the giros to their agents
in the zone and used the money to buy the cuttings of smallholders. These
numerous minifundistas, together with the large number of day laborers employ¬
ed during the harvest or zafra were the dependent sector, tied to the large cen¬
trales in a stable structure of dependence through the mechanism of the informal
credit system.
The other two macrozones, the Northeast and Patagonia do not follow this
pattern, although for very different reasons. The complex regional production
structure of the Northeast, one of the oldest in the country, displays no clear
correlations between giros flow and social structure. Without more detailed
information about the region, it would be impossible to know why this is so,
although the fact that the economy of the region was linked so tenuously to the
international market probably lies at the heart of any explanation. In Patagonia,
which was dominated economicaliy by the grazing of sheep, the correlations
with grazing and with ranching are negative, which suggests that the sheepherders
had access to other sources of credit, just as did the major ranchers and cattle-
men on the pampa. On the other hand, the correlations between giros and far¬
mers are positive and get stronger as the amount of giros increases in the 1920s.
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Conclusion
In this study we have described and analyzed the characteristics, functioning
and consequences ofa credit System which imposed onerous burdens on the agri¬
cultural producers of Argentina but which they could not do without. The ef¬
fects of this credit system were not limited to the economic sphere, but exten¬
ded to the structure of society contributing to the definition of hierarchical
positions of domination and Subordination and to the distinction of fractions
within the dominant class.
We began this study with a brief examination of the theoretical debate over
modes of production and social structures in Latin America and we attempted
to establish its Utility as an instrument of analysis of the historical development
of the region. We proposed that the best way to contribute to the discussion was
through empirical historical research that would allow us to test the effective¬
ness of this concept as a tool for the study of the past. By way of summarizing
our findings, it would be helpful to evaluate how some of the concepts taken
from historical materialism contributed to our effort to distinguish among the
various forms in which the production process was organized in a specific histo¬
rical context. We consider the idea of articulation of modes and the form of pro¬
duction to enhance the flexibility of dealing with the theoretical problems that
arise when dealing with a specific social formation.
Different forms of production correspond to diverse types of social relations.
Both of these change over time and across Space, affected by historical and eco¬
logical factors, by which we mean characteristics having to do with human and
natural resources. The conclusion that we drew from this Observation was that
it was necessary to study forms of production at the regional level as a prelimi-
nary step to identifying the dominant groups in the export economy. The con¬
cept of dominance is central to our study. We have used it to describe capitalism
as the dominant mode of production in relation to other modes of production
and we emphasized the role of dominance played by specific classes within this
mode. Building on the premise that there were various modes in the social for¬
mation of Argentina during the period under study, we distinguished among
fractions within the dominant class, suggesting that the most significant charac¬
teristic in social differentiation was access to finance capital and the internatio¬
nal market. The preferential access of one or another group was a reasonably
precise reflection of the relative positions of power within the landed oligarchy
as well as reflecting similar hierarchical positions among the fractions of the
subordinated classes.
Once we have accepted the Suggestion of fractions of a class playing different
roles in the socio-political evolution of a nation, we can move a step further in
our theoretical formulation to suggest that the same class fraction can assume
distinct roles in different regions, and that these variations will be predicated
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upon the diverse forms of social Organization and upon differential access to
the market. In the case of the Argentine agricultural export economy during
the first quarter of the twentieth Century, the dominant groups were those
who controlled the export sector, at the head of which were the pampean
landowning oligarchy. Landownership undoubtedly was a critical feature in
the distinction between dominance and Subordination in the society, but as we
have seen, some of the most powerful and richest of the agrarian entrepreneurs,
the fatteners, were not owners of large tracts of land, they were tenants. At the
same time, some owners of huge tracts of land were in a vulnerable position in
the market and suffered from the same restricted access to credit as tenants
and sharecroppers of vastly more modest means. While it is certainly true that
the landowning class was the dominant class, it is necessary to go beyond this
generalization to study the specific characteristics of the dominant groups in
each region and to try to clarify the sources of their domination. The mecha¬
nisms of domination varied from region to region, but in most cases, they were
defined by control over labor, access to the market and to credit, access to con¬
trol over land, and participation in the key function or principal economic
activity in the region.
Given the fact that the pampa constituted the most dynamic nucleus of the
Argentine economy in this period, and bearing in mind that settlement and
exploitation of that territory was a phenomenon of the last half of the nine¬
teenth Century, our study coincides with one of the most interesting phenomena
of modern Latin American history, that of the expansion of frontier lands
and the consolidation of the national territory. From this perspective, the inter¬
regional contrasts emerge with particular force: the interior, a zone of old colo-
nization with traditional social structures, and the pampa and the littoral, an
area of more recent settlement and from its inception tightly integrated into the
international market. The settlement of the pampa was closely linked to the
growing external demand for agricultural produets and the consolidation of the
export economy. The combination of an enormous external market and favo¬
rable natural conditions stimulated the mobilization of capital and labor from
Europe to Argentina to the fertile virgin lands. With them came the railroad
and modern means of communication. The transfer of these factors of produc¬
tion, which had not been available in Argentina, created powerful new social
and economic forces in Argentina. Even the interior of the country was not
impervious to these new forces. The expansion of the railroad and Communi¬
cations networks facilitated the consolidation of a national market, making
possible the tight integration of the interior regions even without destroying
the fundamental elements of their traditional productive structures.
The entire period of economic expansion in Argentina was characterized by
a lack of liquidity, which complicated access to the marketplace. Under these
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conditions, access to bank credit constituted one of the most decisive elements
of leverage in determining the relative positions of power in different social
sectors or fragments of classes. In addition, the study of the credit System has
enabled us to understand better one of the mechanisms through which the
central countries, especially Great Britain, used the control which they en¬
joyed over the international commercial and financial System to extract large
profits from the periphery while incurring very little risk. In this sense, our study
tends to confirm the hypothesis dealing with the process of transfer of surplus
from the periphery to the center as the result of the consolidation of the export
economies in Latin America. It is important to underline that the use of this
form of expensive credit was not restricted to the pampa, the zone most dedi¬
cated to exports, but also extended to the interior and the south, serving as a
mechanism to integrate these regional economies into a credit System controlled
and manipulated from overseas. Under these conditions, finance capital articu-
lated diverse regional economies and forms of production that cannot be classi¬
fied as capitalist, in a structure whose various elements had in cammon the
characteristic of dependence upon the dominant group.
It is obvious that use of the credit funnelled through the giros network placed
the producer in a position of dependence. Through correlation analysis, we have
been able to demonstrate that dependent groups varied from one zone to an¬
other. On the pampa, the dependent group varied from one region to another.
For example, in region 1, there is a strong correlation between smallholders
and the flow of giros. The negative correlations between giros and wheat and
linseed are an indication that holders of medium sized units in this region, most
of them colonists, had by the time of the 1914 census managed to organize co¬
operatives or other means through which they were able to obtain cheaper credit
through banking institutions. In region 2, the correlations between giros and
the set of census variables were not very strong, but they demonstrated a rising
tendency over time in the case of tenants and wheat and linseed. There were
also rising trends in the correlations between giros and the variables associated
with ranching. From this, we concluded that there appeared to be a slow pene-
tration of the giros network into the agricultural activity of this region, which
argued for a deterioration of the market position for the majority of producers
in the region. The picture is less clear in regions 3, 4, and 5 for the entire period
under study. In the fringe of counties around the Federal Capital, there is a
strong correlation between giros flow and tenants, smallholders, wheat, and wage
labor which suggests not only that smallholders were especially vulnerbale there
but also that there was a group of ranchers that could not gain access to more
institutionalized sources of credit and were forced to recur to the middlemen
and lenders who controlled the capital moved by giros.
In Cuyo, the correlations indicate that tenants, more often than not small
cultivators of grape vines, were the ultimate consumers of the major portion
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of the giros, making them the group dependent upon the wine makers or bode-
gueros. In the Northeast, the simple correlations are an inadequate instrument
for capturing the complexity of the distribution of credit to various producing
groups. By contrast, in the Northwest, the picture that emerges from the cor¬
relations is sharply etched, indicating a vast group of cane producers, probably
smallholders or fixed laborers on plantations working as sharecroppers, who
are the ultimate consumers of the capital represented by the giros. Finally, in
Patagonia the simple correlations do not isolate a single group as the users of the
giros. They point to two quite different groups. The first were farmers, concen¬
trated along the banks of the major rivers in the region, who used the capital,
through intermediaries, much as on the pampa, to finance their production
cycle. The second group, which accounted for the larger portion of the giros,
was the sheepranchers, demonstrating how the giros facilitated the financial
domination of the transnational corporations.
In this study, we have attempted to describe empirically the characteristics
and the socio-economic impact of an agrarian credit System that served the inte-
rests of international capital during the period of the export economic boom in
Argentina in the first quarter of the twentieth Century. Throughout this study
we have emphasized the critical importance of penetrating beyond national
level analyses to focus on the specific peculiarities of the historical development
of each ecological region in order to understand fully the nature of the mecha¬
nisms of domination and of dependence in the Third World. This research has
attempted to identify the dependent groups and class fragments in different
social structures, from region to region; specifically those groups that produced
for the market and found themselves caught up in a credit system controlled
by international cereal brokers who extracted usorious interest rates from their
cHents. This study has demonstrated also how the credit system controlled
various groups, groups whose only common characteristic was their dependence
upon those who controlled the source of their liquidity. In this sense, finance
capital articulated diverse forms of production with different levels of develop¬
ment of the productive forces and extracted surpluses from them without
necessarily having to transform them. On the pampa the credit system inhibited
the process of capital accumulation among tenants, which taken together with
the serious obstacles to landownership imposed by the landed oligarchy, led to
a result in which the rapid economic expansion of this period did not produce
a middle rank or class of agricultural producers. The steady increase in the flow
of giros suggests that the dramatic expansion of economic activity did not bring
in its wake any redistribution of wealth, but a steady growth in the dependent
sector.
This can be seen in the gradual spread of the giros to finance more and more
forms of economic activity, even to inciude portions of the landowning oli¬
garchy itself, as cattle breeders found themselves losing access to the internatio-
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nal market in the years prior to the Great Depression. It can be seen, also, in the
extension of the giros network to the interior and the adaptation of the credit
system to the forms of production peculiar to those macrozones. The giros
serve as an index of financial control over the producers of the agricultural
produets that were so crucial to Argentina's well being. By carefully tracing the
flow of capital through the branches of the National Bank, we can measure
the rhythm of export agriculture expansion. Perhaps even more significant, be¬
cause of the usorious informal credit System that used the bank to send giros,
we can define with precision the forms of production in each region or macro¬
zone that were relatively dependent. These findings have dual theoretical signi¬
ficance. They confirm the expectations that different historical experiences
and factor endowments would lead to different forms of social Organization
from one region to another. Further, they indicate that within the capitalist
mode of production there might be various forms of production with concomi-
tant variations in relations of production. In other words, similar forms of
production had markedly different degrees of success across regions. Put in
another way, the characteristics of dependent social Organization varied from
region to region.
It is impossible in this paper to explain the regional pattern of socio-economic
dependence. That must await further studies. On the basis of our research, we
believe future work should be comparative and should focus on levels of analy¬
sis more specific than the nation-state. Only through such studies will we achieve
a better understanding of dependency and the evolution of export economies.
